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Abstract
Chapter 1 examines whether immigrants gain a comparative advantage relative to natives in
highly protected labor markets. This may be the case if immigrants, being new to the country,
are less aware of employment protection regulations and less likely to claim their rights. I test
this hypothesis drawing on evidence for the EU and on two natural experiments for Spain and
Italy. The results suggest that stricter Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) does indeed
benefit immigrants relative to natives. Stricter EPL is found to reduce employment and reduce
hiring and firing rates for natives. By contrast, it has no effect on most immigrants and may
even increase employment rates for those who have been in the country for a longer period.
Chapter 2 is the product of joint work with Marcello Esteviio (IMF) and looks at the effect
of the 35-hour workweek in France on wages, employment, dual job holdings and happiness. It
explores the different timing of implementation of the shorter workweek in large and small firms
to measure its causal effect. The results suggest that the reduction in hours did not succeed
in increasing employment and generated a series of behavioural responses that are likely to
have reduced welfare, as workers and firms tried to avoid the rigidities created by the reform.
This suggests that the French government should increase the flexibility of workers and firms
in setting hours of work.
Chapter 3 is the product of joint work with Olivier Blanchard (MIT) and Francesco Giavazzi
(UniversitA Commerciale Luigi Bocconi). Two main forces lie behind the large U.S. current
account deficits: an increase in U.S. demand for foreign goods and an increase in foreign demand
for U.S. assets. Both have contributed to steadily increasing current account deficits since the
mid-1990s, accompanied by a real dollar appreciation until late 2001 and a real depreciation
since. We develop a simple model of exchange rate and current account determination based
on imperfect substitutability in goods and asset markets and use it to interpret the past and
explore alternative future scenarios. We conclude that substantially more depreciation is to
come against the yen, the renminbi, and the euro.
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Title: Professor of Economics
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Title: Class of 1941 Professor of Economics
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Chapter 1
Does Employment Protection Help
Immigrants? Evidence from
European Labor Markets
1.1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with two heavily discussed topics in the literature on European labor
markets: immigrant assimilation (how well immigrants do in the labor market), and the effect
of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) on job flows and employment.
EPL includes several elements, such as notification procedures for dismissal, rules regarding
the classification of dismissals as 'unfair', the amount of compensation following 'unfair' dis-
missals, etc. Depending on the reasons behind the firing, regulations in most European coun-
tries distinguish between redundancies (due to economic reasons, for example, poor sales, loss
of competitiveness, economic recession, etc.) and disciplinary dismissals (due to misconduct,
absenteeism, negligence, etc.). Redundancies are generally considered 'fair' dismissals and the
" Special thanks goes to my advisors, Josh Angrist and Olivier Blanchard, for their advice and encouragement.
For helpful discussions and insightful comments, I thank Paul Bedford, Adriana Kugler, and Giovanni Pica. The
MIT Shultz Fund and the Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation (through a PhD fellowship) provided
financial support.
worker is entitled to a severance payment. Disciplinary dismissals do not imply any severance
payment, but the worker may take the case to the labor authority if he believes the dismissal
was 'unfair'. In this situation, one outcome could be compensation through conciliation, where
the firm and the worker meet with the labor authority in order to reach a settlement. When
conciliation fails, the case goes to the labor courts. If the court decision favors the worker and
the judge declares the dismissal 'unfair', then severance payments are increased.
Because EPL increases firms' firing costs, it may impact on job flows and the level of employ-
ment. There has been an extensive amount of research exploring these relations. Theoretical
models, such as the flow model with endogenous job destruction of Pissarides (2000), show that
an increase in employment protection reduces both job creation and job destruction and has
an ambiguous effect on employment.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the differential impact of EPL on the labor market
outcomes of natives and immigrants, in particular to ask whether immigrants gain a comparative
advantage relative to natives in highly regulated labor markets. This could be the case if
immigrants are less covered by EPL than natives. Because the analysis here focuses solely on
legal immigrants, there is no difference between the legal status of natives and immigrants, so
the same employment protection regulations apply to both. However, being new to the country,
immigrants may be less informed about their rights and may, for example, not seek to claim
compensation for 'unfair' dismissal. Therefore, while the legal coverage of EPL is the same for
natives and immigrants, the effective coverage may be lower for immigrants.
One reason why immigrants may be less informed about their rights is if they are relatively
less likely to join unions than natives. Figure 1 reports union membership rates by citizenship for
a number of European countries, the US and Canada, taken from the 2003 International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP). Union membership varies widely across Europe, and is typically
highest in northern Europe. In all countries, natives have higher union membership rates than
immigrants. For the US, these numbers can be compared with data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS), reported in MPI (2004). In the CPS, 12.9% natives and 10.2% immigrants were
union members in 2003. The evidence on union membership supports the hypothesis that there
may be an information gap between immigrants and natives regarding labor market regulations.
To test whether immigrants gain a comparative advantage in heavily regulated labor mar-
kets, this paper draws on three pieces of evidence. The first is the EU Labour Force Survey
(LFS), which covers 15 European countries from the mid-1990s to 2005.The other two sources of
evidence are natural experiments, based on labor market reforms in Spain and Italy. The Span-
ish reforms were enacted in 1997 and 2001 and introduced a new type of permanent contract
with lower dismissal costs for some categories of workers, namely unemployed people between
the ages of 16 and 30 and over age 45. The Italian reform was enacted in 1990 and increased
dismissal costs for permanent contracts in firms with under 15 employees. The heterogeneity in
the application of both these reforms allows the design of natural experiments that can be used
to examine the effect of changes in dismissal costs on employment of natives and immigrants.
All these pieces of evidence tell a consistent story and confirm the hypothesis that immi-
grants obtain a comparative advantage in heavily regulated labor markets. The evidence from
the EU LFS shows that EPL (measured by a time-varying index constructed from the OECD
synthetic indices) reduces employment for natives but not for immigrants. The results suggest
that EPL may even increase employment for immigrants who have been in the country for a
longer time. The natural experiment for Spain shows that a reduction in dismissal costs in-
creased permanent employment for natives but not for immigrants. Finally, the evidence for
Italy shows that an increase in dismissal costs decreased both hiring and firing, with a larger
effect on natives than on immigrants.
The empirical framework used in these three applications follows closely the methodology in
Angrist and Kugler (2003), Kugler et al (2002), and Kugler and Pica (2005). Angrist and Kugler
(2003) examine how labor and product market rigidities affect the impact of immigration on
the employment of natives. Using data from the EU LFS, they find that immigration generates
larger job losses for natives in countries with more restrictive regulations. Kugler et al (2002)
and Kugler and Pica (2005) analyze the 1997 Spanish reform and the 1990 Italian reform using
the same data sources and research design as this paper. However, they do not distinguish
between natives and immigrants. This paper extends their analysis by looking at the differential
impact of EPL on these two groups of workers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents a simple model of the effect of
EPL on the labor market. Section 1.3 briefly reviews some key empirical studies. Section 1.4
presents evidence based on the EU LFS. Section 1.5 presents the results of a natural experiment
for the 1997 and 2001 Spanish reforms. Section 1.6 looks at the 1990 Italian reform. Section
1.7 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
To analyze the effect of EPL on the labor market outcomes of natives and immigrants, a simple
model is constructed, drawing on the flow model with endogenous job destruction of Pissarides
(2000). The presentation here combines elements of the models in Blanchard and Portugal
(2001) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), but extends them to consider two types of workers:
natives and immigrants. In the simplest version of the model, a particular job is either always
filled by natives or always filled by immigrants, i.e., there is no substitution between the two
types of workers on the labor demand side. The model can then be extended such that a
particular job can be filled by either natives or immigrants over time. In this version, firms
observe the worker's type and can choose freely between hiring a native or an immigrant.
1.2.1 Assumptions
There are jobs and workers in the economy. Workers are of two types: natives and immigrants.
A match between a job and a worker may be destroyed due to a productivity shock. When a
productivity shock occurs, firms have the option to either fire or retain the worker. Employment
protection takes the form of a firing cost that the firm must pay if it decides to fire the worker.
For simplicity, it assumed that natives and immigrants are in all ways identical, except in
the level of the firing cost, which is lower for immigrants. This difference in firing costs has
implications for wages and the hiring and firing rates of the two types of workers.
More specifically, the model has the following ingredients:
1. A match between a job and a worker yields productivity e, which is a random variable
with support ] - 0o, E] and cumulative distribution function G(.).
2. Productivity shocks occur with probability A. When a shock occurs, a new level of
productivity is drawn from the distribution G(.) and firms have the option to either
fire or retain the worker. Productivity shocks are idiosyncratic, i.e., they affect jobs
independently.
3. If the firm fires the worker following a productivity shock, it must pay a firing cost. This
cost should not be interpreted as a transfer from the firm to the worker, but rather as pure
waste (for example, administrative costs such as notice periods, possible legal procedures,
necessary authorizations for dismissal, etc.). 1
4. The firing cost determines the critical level of productivity, 6 R, below which the firm fires
the worker.
5. There are two types of workers in the economy: natives and immigrants. They are in all
ways identical, except in the level of the firing cost, which equals f for natives and Of,
where 0 < 0 < 1, for immigrants. The difference in firing costs between the two groups is
not due to differences in their legal coverage (since the same employment protection rules
apply to both), but rather to differences in the level of awareness regarding regulations.
Immigrants, being new to the labor market and less likely to join unions, are less aware of
the employment protection regulations and less likely to claim compensation for dismissal.
Therefore, even though legal coverage is the same for the two types of workers, effective
coverage is lower for immigrants.
6. The model is characterized by 'workers waiting at the gate', so that, when a match is
destroyed following a productivity shock, firms can hire another worker immediately. All
new hires start with productivity es.
7. Employed workers receive a wage w. Wages for each match are determined by symmetric
Nash bargaining between the firm and the worker. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
wage is set at the beginning of the match.
8. Unemployed workers are entitled to unemployment benefits z and have a probability h
of finding a job. Because job creation and job destruction follow Poisson processes, the
inverse of h equals the duration of unemployment.
1The distinction between interpreting EPL as a transfer from firms to workers or pure waste is important.
Lazear (1990) shows that, if employment protection was just a transfer from firms to workers and capital markets
were perfect, then the effects of EPL could be undone by a contract including a compensation from the worker
to the firm at the time of hiring.
1.2.2 No Substitution on the Labor Demand Side
In this version of the model, a particular job is either always filled by natives (N) or always
filled by immigrants (I), i.e., there is no substitution between the two types of workers on the
demand side. The equilibrium for each type is characterized by the critical level of productivity
e~, the wage w" , and the job finding rate h', where i = N, I. The equilibrium will be derived
for natives. Because immigrants are in all ways identical to natives, except for the firing cost,
the equilibrium equations for them will be identical to those for natives, except that f should
be replaced with Of.
It is useful to start by writing the value of a filled vacancy for the firm and a native worker.
A job filled with a native worker with current productivity E gives an expected profit IgI (E),
defined as:
rfj(e) = (e - wN) + AG(eN)[IIH(e • ) - II() - f] + Aj (Iln(e') - Hi (E))dG(e') (1.1)
In this equation (e-wN) is the current profit from the match. The second term captures the
expected profit if there is a productivity shock and the firm fires the worker, an outcome that
occurs with probability AG(e ). In that case, the firm loses the current profit and must pay the
employment protection cost f. The job is filled with another native worker, with productivity
E,. The third term captures the expected profit if there is a productivity shock and the firm
keeps the worker. In this case, a new level of productivity is drawn from the distribution G(.).
The expected utility of the native worker is defined as:
rV7 = wN + AG(E•)(VN - VN) (1.2)
The second term captures the utility if the worker is fired following a productivity shock.
In that case, he becomes unemployed and receives the expected utility of unemployment, V'N ,
which is given by:
rvi = z + hN[VN - VNI (1.3)
These three equations can be used to solve for the equilibrium, which is characterized by
the critical level of productivity eN, the wage wN, and the hiring rate hN.
(i) Critical level of productivity E
The firm fires the worker if the value of the match falls below the value of a new match
net of employment protection costs. Therefore, the critical level of productivity below which a
native worker is fired satisfies:
N(CN)n= nN(E _ f
Using equation (1.1) and solving:
eR = es - f(A + r)
This equation describes the effect of an increase in employment protection on the firing rate
and gives the first important prediction of the model: if the firing cost increases, the critical
level of productivity below which the firm fires the worker decreases. Therefore, an increase in
employment protection reduces the firing rate.
The equivalent equilibrium equation for immigrants is:
eR = e, -Of(A+r)
Because 0 < ¢ < 1, it follows that e/ > eN. This implies that the firing rate (given by
AG(e~)) is higher for immigrants than for natives. It also implies that the impact of an increase
in employment protection on the firing rate is lower for immigrants than for natives, since they
are effectively less covered by EPL.
(ii) Wage
Symmetric Nash bargaining implies that the surplus of the job for the worker equals the
surplus for the firm. For jobs filled with native workers, this implies:
VN - V, = II( -_(IIN(Es)- f)
v - V = f
The left hand side is the value of the job for a native worker. The alternative to being
employed is to be unemployed and have expected utility V,N . The right hand side is the value
of the job for the firm. If the firm fires the worker, it finds a replacement worker, but must pay
the cost f.
This expression can be combined with equations (1.2) and (1.3) to solve for the wage paid
to natives:
N = z + (r + AG(EN ) ÷ hN)f
The equivalent equilibrium equation for the wage paid to immigrants is:
w' = z + (r + AG(EIR) + h'l)f
For a given critical level of productivity e: and a given job finding rate hi , an increase
in employment protection increases the bargained wage. This result is intuitive: employment
protection increases the workers' bargaining power as it is more costly for the firm to replace
the worker. This effect is weaker for immigrants than for natives as they are effectively less
covered by EPL.
(iii) Hiring rate hi
Employment protection increases the cost of labor in two ways: by increasing the firing cost,
and by increasing the bargained wage. Firms respond to the increase in costs by hiring fewer
workers. So, an increase in employment protection reduces the hiring rate and increases the
duration of unemployment. Because the effect on firing costs and on wages is larger for natives,
an increase in EPL reduces the hiring rate by more for natives than for immigrants.
An implication of these predictions is that the effect of employment protection on the un-
employment rate of natives and immigrants is ambiguous. The unemployment rate equals the
product of the firing rate and unemployment duration. Because employment protection reduces
the firing rate and increases unemployment duration, its effect on the unemployment rate is
theoretically undetermined and is ultimately an empirical question.
1.2.3 Substitution on the Labor Demand Side
In the model with no substitution on the labor demand side it is assumed that a particular job is
either always filled by natives or always filled by immigrants. In practice, however, a particular
job can be filled by either natives or immigrants over time. Therefore, it is important to
introduce substitution between the two types of workers on the demand side.
The nature of the equilibrium is quite intuitive. Because immigrants have a lower firing cost
than natives and are identical to them in all other respects, they are a priori more attractive
to firms. Firms will only hire natives if their expected cost is the same as that of immigrants,
i.e., if their relative wage decreases in order to compensate for their higher expected firing cost.
If natives are to accept a lower relative wage in the bargaining process, unemployment must
be less attractive to them. Therefore, equilibrium unemployment duration will be higher for
natives than for immigrants, i.e., they will have a relatively lower hiring rate.
More formally, the equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
(i) Relative firing rates
The firing rate of each type is determined by the condition that the value of the match
equals the value of a new match net of employment protection costs. For natives, this can be
written as:
leC(6) = Ile(_S)- f
The equivalent condition for immigrants is:
He(eR) = He(es) - Of
Note that in this version of the model there is only one profit function IIe(E) rather than
two separate functions for each type, since now the same job may be filled by either natives or
immigrants over time.
Because 0 < 0 < 1 and both types have the same initial productivity es, it follows that
IHe(e ) < le(E4!). Given that the profit function is increasing in the level of productivity, this
implies that eN < e I, i.e., immigrants have a relatively higher firing rate than for natives.
Moreover, an increase in employment protection reduces the firing rate of natives by a relatively
larger amount, since they are effectively more covered by EPL than immigrants.
(ii) Relative wages
Using equation (1.1) and the fact that the two types of workers have the same initial
productivity E, and the same productivity distribution G(.), it follows that the condition for
firms to be willing to hire natives is:
wN - w = AG(Ec )f - AG(cN)f < 0
This condition says that firms are indifferent between hiring natives and immigrants if the
relative wage of natives decreases as to equate the difference in expected firing costs. This
implies a lower relative wage for natives than for immigrants, which is probably at odds with
reality in most countries.
It is important to emphasize that this is a ceteris paribus result, i.e., for simplicity, the model
assumes that immigrants and natives are in all ways identical, except for the level of the firing
cost. If natives were assumed to have a higher starting productivity, e~, and a productivity
distribution, G(.), with a higher support than immigrants, then the difference in wages would
be equal to the difference in current and expected future productivities minus the difference in
expected firing costs. With those assumptions, it could easily be the case that natives would
have a higher relative wage than immigrants.
Regardless of what is assumed in terms of relative productivities, an increase in f increases
the relative firing cost of natives and makes them relatively less attractive to firms. There-
fore, an increase in employment protection reduces the equilibrium wage of natives relative to
immigrants.
(iii) Relative hiring rates
For natives to be willing to accept a lower relative wage in the bargaining process following
an increase in f, their labor market conditions must deteriorate. Therefore, an increase in
employment protection increases relative unemployment duration for natives, i.e., it decreases
their relative hiring rate.
To close this section it is important to note that, just as in the model with no substitu-
tion between the two types of workers, the effect of an increase in employment protection on
the relative unemployment rates of natives and immigrants is ambiguous. On the one hand,
EPL reduces the relative firing rate of natives. On the other hand, it increases relative unem-
ployment duration. Because the unemployment rate equals the product of the firing rate and
unemployment duration, its response to an increase in employment protection is ambiguous.
1.3 Results from Empirical Studies
The predictions of the flow model of unemployment have been tested in a number empirical
studies, using both macro and micro data. Overall, the macro evidence is inconclusive and
the results are very sensitive to the specification used. Evidence based on micro data is more
conclusive.
A key reference in the macro literature is the study by Lazear (1990), which looks at the
effect of employment protection on the level of employment in 22 OECD countries. Using
data from 1956 to 1984, he finds that an increase in EPL reduces employment. Similar results
were obtained by Scarpetta (1996) using data for 15 to 17 OECD countries over the period
1983 to 1993. But studies based on other specifications find different results. Bertola (1990)
finds that employment protection does not reduce employment for a given wage and does not
increase bargained wages. Nickell (1997) investigates the relation between unemployment and
the OECD index of employment protection, using data for 20 OECD countries over the periods
1983 to 1988 and 1989 to 1994. He also does not find any significant effect of employment
protection on unemployment.
Studies based on macro data suffer from two main problems. First, it is difficult to establish
the direction of causality, as it is not clear whether employment protection reduces employment
or whether countries with low employment adopt stricter labor market regulations. Second,
there is little time-series variation in measures of employment protection, which makes it hard
to identify any effect. Reflecting these concerns, a more promising avenue of research are studies
with micro data, in particular those that analyze the effects of particular reforms that change
the regulation on employment protection. When there is heterogeneity in the applicability of
the reforms, it is possible to construct natural experiments and identify the causal effect of
employment protection on employment and job flows.
Two key references in the micro literature are Kugler et al (2002) and Kugler and Pica
(2005). Kugler et al (2002) construct a natural experiment to analyze the impact of the 1997
reform in Spain, which introduced a new type of permanent contract, with lower dismissal costs,
applicable to certain categories of workers (namely unemployed people between the ages of 16
and 30 and over age 45). They find that, for young workers, the reform increased transitions
both from unemployment to permanent employment and from temporary to permanent em-
ployment and had little effect on dismissals. As a result, permanent employment increased for
young workers following the reform. The results for old workers are less significant. Kugler
and Pica (2005) also use a natural experiment to analyze the effect of the 1990 reform in Italy,
which increased dismissal costs for firms with under 15 employees. They find that the increase
in dismissal costs decreased hiring and firing in small firms relative to large firms.
This paper extends the analysis of Kugler et al (2002) and Kugler and Pica (2005) to
examine the differential impact of EPL on immigrants and natives. The study which is closest
in spirit to this paper, exploring the interaction between immigration and institutional factors,
is Angrist and Kugler (2003). The authors look at how labor and product market rigidities
affect the impact of immigration on natives and find that immigration generates larger native
job losses in countries with more restrictive institutions. This is consistent with the view that
immigrants gain a comparative advantage relative to natives in highly regulated labor markets.
1.4 Evidence from the EU LFS
1.4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The EU data were extracted from the Eurostat Labor Force Survey (LFS) by the German
Federal Statistics Office. The dataset comprises time series of immigration and labor market
variables aggregated by age, gender, education, country of birth, and, for immigrants, years
since arrival. The Data Appendix contains more information about the data.
The countries and years included in the sample are listed in Table 1. Data for most countries
cover the period 1995 to 2005. To ensure that the coverage of immigrants in the data is
appropriate, the percentage of foreign born in the population in the LFS is compared with
similar numbers from the last Census year, reported in OECD(2006). A perfect coincidence
between the two series should not be expected because the LFS covers only the population
above age 15, whereas the Census covers the entire population. Even so, the two series are
remarkably similar, suggesting a good coverage of immigrants in the LFS data.
The definition of immigrant adopted here for the EU LFS analysis is based on nativity, i.e.,
country of birth. This definition is chosen because the variable years of residence, used as a
control in the empirical analysis, is based on nativity. An alternative would be to focus on
nationality. Angrist and Kugler (2001) briefly explore the implications of defining immigrants
based on nativity or nationality and find that the groups of immigrants roughly coincide.
Some descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. Participation rates show no clear pattern
across countries, but immigrants tend to have lower participation rates than natives, especially
the ones who have been in the country for a shorter period of time. Employment-to-population
ratios exhibit a similar pattern. Turning to the share of total employment in permanent and
temporary contracts, Spain is the country where temporary contracts are most common, ac-
counting for over 20% of employment for natives and over 50% for recent male immigrants.
France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Portugal also have large shares of work-
ers in temporary contracts. The incidence of temporary employment is larger for women than
for men and for immigrants than for natives, declining with years since immigration.
1.4.2 Measures of Employment Protection
Time series data on EPL for permanent and temporary contracts for the period 1985 to 2005
were created using OECD summary indicators of the strictness of EPL in different countries
and information on the breaking points of the indicators. The Data Appendix explains how the
data were constructed.
Other papers have constructed similar measures. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) draw on
data from Lazear (1990) and from the OECD indicators from the late 1980s and late 1990s
to construct a 5-year period index of employment protection from 1960 to 1995. This paper
follows a similar approach, but with three main differences. First, the availability of OECD
indicators for 2003 allows the construction of a longer time series. Second, it looks separately
at EPL on permanent and temporary contracts, rather than the aggregation of the two. Third,
rather than constructing 5-year period indices, this paper explores information on the timing
of reforms to adjust the OECD indicators at the exact year when reforms took place.
The evolution of the EPL indices for permanent and temporary contracts in Germany, Spain,
France, the UK, and Italy is described in Figures 2 and 3. There is considerable variation in
EPL across countries. The UK is the least regulated, whereas Spain and France are the most
restrictive. However, there is not much time variation in the indices. Some countries, such
as Italy and Germany, have introduced reforms at the margin, increasing the flexibility of
temporary contracts, with the introduction and generalization of temporary work agencies,
while leaving regulations on permanent contracts virtually unchanged. There are very few
examples of EPL reforms for permanent contracts. Spain is an exception, having introduced
reforms in 1994 and 1997. The Spanish case will be discussed in the next section. The 1990
Italian reform discussed in section 1.6, which increased 'unfair' dismissal costs for firms with
under 15 employees, was not taken into account in the construction of the OECD series.
1.4.3 Estimates of the Effects of Employment Protection
The flow model of unemployment presented in section 1.2 predicts that EPL increases hiring
and firing rates and has an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. Before turning to a
more rigorous analysis of the effects of EPL, it is useful to look at some simple scatter diagrams.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 plot the employment protection index for permanent jobs against unemploy-
ment duration, employment duration, and the employment rate, for natives and immigrants.
The observations are averages across all countries and years in the sample. If we view job
creation and job destruction as Poisson processes, unemployment duration is the inverse of the
probability of being hired and employment duration is the inverse of the probability of being
fired. Therefore, unemployment and employment durations provide information on the hiring
and firing rates, respectively.
Figures 4 and 5 suggest that there is a positive relation between EPL and unemployment
and employment durations for natives, but not for immigrants. This is consistent with the
predictions of the model: EPL reduces hiring and firing, but the effect is smaller for immigrants,
since they are effectively less covered by EPL. Figure 6 suggests that there is no correlation
between EPL and the employment rate, which is also consistent with the results of the model.
Although suggestive, these scatter diagrams do not explore the time series, cross-country,
and cross-demographic group variation in the data. To do a more formal analysis of the effects
of EPL on labor market outcomes, the following general specification is used:
Yijt = aEPLit + 6j(Years residencej * EPLit) + Pi + y + pXijt + eijt (1.4)
where yijt is the outcome of interest for country i, year t, and demographic group j (where
j denotes gender, age, education and nativity groups as defined in Appendix A.1). EPLit is
the EPL index on permanent or temporary contracts and is measured in deviations from cross
country means to make the effect interpretable as the effect 'at the mean'. Years residencej is
a set of dummy variables, where the omitted variable equals 1 for natives and 0 for immigrants,
and the remaining three dummies classify immigrants into different groups depending on years
since arrival (5 years or less, 6 to 10 years, and more than 10 years). /i are country fixed
effects and 'yt are year fixed effects. Xijt is a vector of other controls, which includes dummies
for gender, age, education, and nativity groups. It also includes interactions of all regressors
(including country and year dummies) with the dummies Years residencej, so that a can be
interpreted as the effect of EPL on native workers and 5j as the differential effect of EPL on
immigrants relative to natives, by years of residence.
To explore the channel through which EPL may impact differently on natives and im-
migrants, Xijt includes interactions of the education dummies with EPLit. The reason for
including these interactions is that immigrants may be less educated than natives and may,
therefore, work in less protected jobs. As a result, they would be less affected by EPL due
to their lower education and not because of other differences. The inclusion of these controls
allows the two effects to be separated.
In this specification, identification comes not only from the time series variation in EPL,
which is very limited, but also from the cross-country and cross-demographic group variation.
Standard errors are clustered on country * year to control for common errors within these
groups. Failure to take this into account would lead to underestimation of the standard errors
and overestimation of the effect of interest, as described in Moulton (1990).
Participation Rates
Before turning to the effect of EPL on employment, equation (1.4) is estimated with the labor
force participation rate as the dependent variable. In principle, the effect of EPL on participa-
tion is undetermined. On the one hand, EPL reduces the hiring rate, making it harder for an
unemployed worker to find a job. The worker may get discouraged and leave the labor force.
On the other hand, EPL also reduces the firing rate, increasing the value of having a job and
encouraging participation.
The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 3. There is no evidence that EPL
on permanent contracts has any effect on participation. The controls have the expected signs:
immigrants have higher participation rates than natives, men have higher participation rates
than women and participation increases with age and education. EPL on temporary contracts
has a very small effect on participation rates.
Employment Rates
Theory does not make clear predictions regarding the effect of EPL on employment and, as
discussed above, the empirical evidence on this effect based on macro studies is mixed. The last
two columns of Table 3 report the results of estimating equation (1.4) to study the impact of
EPL on the employment rate. Interestingly, higher EPL for permanent contracts unambiguously
decreases the employment rate of natives. An increase in the EPL index for permanent contracts
by one unit relative to the cross country mean reduces the employment rate of natives by
approximately four percentage points. However, the effect is positive for immigrants who have
been in the country for at least six years and increases on years since arrival. This suggests that
higher EPL on permanent contracts may actually improve the job prospects of immigrants. By
contrast, EPL on temporary contracts has a small positive effect for natives and no significant
effect for immigrants.
To investigate whether the differential effect of EPL on immigrants and natives is due to dif-
ferences in workers' characteristics, the estimation includes interactions between the education
dummies and EPL. The coefficients on these interactions show that EPL has a larger negative
effect on employment for more educated workers. This is not surprising since it is plausible
that more educated workers are more aware of their rights under EPL. Even including these
controls, the results suggest that EPL on permanent contracts reduces employment for natives
and increases it for immigrants with more than six years of residence.
There may be other differences between immigrants and natives, in addition to education,
which explain the differential impact of EPL. For example, it is possible that immigrants,
being new to the country, are less informed about the legislation (perhaps because they are less
unionized than natives) and, therefore, less likely to seek compensation in case of dismissal. The
data on unionization rates in Figure 1 support this explanation. Another piece of evidence that
would be relevant to further support this hypothesis would be data on the number of complaints
or the amount of severance payments received by natives and immigrants. Unfortunately, this
information is not available disaggregated by nativity.
The notion that the differential effect of EPL on natives and immigrants is due to an
information problem seems to be at odds with the evidence in Table 3 that the effect of EPL on
employment becomes positive for immigrants who have been in the country for more than six
years and increases on years since arrival. It seems plausible that immigrants who have been
in the country for a longer time are more integrated, have a better knowledge of the language,
and are also more aware of the labor market regulations than those who have just arrived.
Therefore, one would expect that, if the comparative advantage of immigrants was based on an
information problem, recent immigrants would be the ones to benefit the most.
However, an increase in years since arrival has two counteracting effects. On the one hand,
recent immigrants may be less informed of the legislation and be effectively less covered by EPL.
On the other hand, they may also be less attractive to employers, either because they are less
productive (for example, because they have a poor knowledge of the language) or are perceived
as being less productive or less reliable (since they do not have a history of employment in the
country). If the second effect dominates, then it is plausible that an increase in EPL induces
firms to hire more immigrants of older arrival cohorts.
Employment and Unemployment Duration
The effect of EPL on the employment rate is the result of two types of flows: flows from
employment into unemployment, and flows from unemployment into employment. Both theory
and the micro evidence suggest that EPL decreases these flows. On the one hand, by increasing
the cost of firing, EPL reduces flows into unemployment. On the other hand, by increasing the
costs for firms and the bargaining power of workers, EPL reduces flows into employment. The
EU LFS collects no information on job flows, but it contains information on unemployment
and employment durations. Since unemployment duration is the inverse of the hiring rate and
employment duration is the inverse of the firing rate, this information is sufficient to analyze
the effect of EPL on job flows.
The results of estimating equation (1.4) with unemployment and employment duration as
dependent variables are shown in Table 4. An increase in EPL for permanent contracts increases
unemployment duration, i.e., decreases the hiring rate, for natives. The effect on immigrants is
much weaker, and even reverses sign for immigrants with six to ten years of residence. These
results are consistent with the model in section 1.2, which predicts that an increase in EPL
reduces the relative hiring rate of natives. By contrast, EPL for temporary contracts has no
significant effect on the probability of being unemployed for more than one year.
Turning to the effects on employment duration, the results suggest that EPL on permanent
contracts increases the probability of being employed for more than five years by approximately
the same amount for natives and for immigrants. This result does not match the model in
section 1.2, which predicts that an increase in EPL should reduce the relative firing rate of
natives. When looking at the effect of EPL on temporary contracts, the results in column (2)
show no significant effect on the probability of being employed for more than five years. This
is not surprising since this type of EPL works on contracts of short duration. Indeed, as the
last column suggests, EPL on temporary contracts does have a significant positive effect on the
probability of being employed for more than one year.
The results on employment and unemployment duration are consistent with the findings for
the employment rate. EPL on permanent contracts decreases hiring and firing. For natives,
the reduction in hiring has a larger magnitude than the reduction in firing, resulting in a
negative effect on the employment rate. For immigrants, EPL on permanent contracts has a
much smaller effect on hiring and about the same effect of firing. The combination of these
two effects results in a positive effect of permanent EPL on the employment rate of immigrants
with more than six years of residence.
As for the employment rate, the differential effect of EPL on employment and unemployment
duration across nativity groups cannot be fully explained by differences in education. Even
controlling for interactions between the EPL index and the education dummies, the differential
effect of EPL on natives and immigrants persists. Again, this suggests that there may be other
important differences between the two groups, such as the fact that immigrants are new to the
country, less aware of the legislation and less unionized than natives and, therefore, less likely
to seek compensation in case of dismissal.
1.5 Evidence from the 1997 and 2001 Spanish Reforms
1.5.1 Institutional Background
In 1984 Spain liberalized the use of temporary contracts which previously could only be used
for seasonal jobs. This reform generalized their use to all workers and sectors, resulting in a
rapid increase in temporary employment and creating a dual labor market. Spain became the
country with the highest proportion of workers with temporary contracts in the EU, as reported
in Table 2.
Subsequent governments implemented reforms to mitigate the duality in the Spanish labor
market. In 1994, a reform restored the rule that temporary contracts could only be used for
seasonal jobs and eliminated the most flexible type of temporary contract: the fixed term con-
tract to promote employment. This reform also acted upon permanent contracts, relaxing their
dismissal conditions. However, the 1994 reform is regarded as having been largely ineffective.
In practice, firms continued to hire workers under temporary contracts for all types of jobs.
In 1997, again with the intention of reducing duality in the labor market, the newly elected
conservative government of Jos6 Marfa Aznar implemented a further reform. Instead of reducing
dismissal costs for permanent contracts across the board, this reform introduced a new type
of permanent contract - 'contract for promoting permanent employment' - with lower levels of
compensation for 'unfair' dismissals. While the level of compensation of standard permanent
contracts equals 45 days for each year of service, up to a maximum of 42 monthly payments,
the new contract has a level of compensation equal to 33 days for each year of service, up to a
maximum of 24 monthly payments.
The new type of permanent contract applied only to certain categories of workers, namely
the young unemployed (age 16 to 30), the unemployed for more than one year, the unemployed
over age 45, disabled workers, and workers previously hired under temporary contracts. In
order to encourage firms to hire under the new permanent contract, the law reduced payroll
taxes for newly signed contracts and for conversions from temporary to permanent employment
using the new contract. The payroll tax reductions ranged from 40% to 90% and lasted for two
years, except for contracts for the unemployed over age 45, where the reductions lasted for the
duration of the contract.
The 1997 reform was initially valid for four years. In 2001, the Spanish government decided
to adopt the new type of contract on a permanent basis and extended its scope, including new
target groups, such as women hired in sectors were they are under-represented, unemployed
women hired in the period of 24 months after childbirth, and people earning integration incomes.
There was also another reform in 2001 which introduced dismissal costs for temporary contracts,
equal to 8 days per year worked. This amount is not significant, but the purpose was again to
approximate the costs of temporary and permanent contracts in order to reduce duality in the
labor market.
Table 5, reproduced from Kugler et al (2002), lists the reductions in dismissal costs and
in payroll taxes introduced by the 1997 and 2001 reforms for different categories of workers.
The 1997 reform applied to contracts signed in 1997 and 1998. The 2001 reform extended the
reduction in dismissal costs and in payroll taxes to contracts signed in or after 1999. The table
shows that the extent of the incentives varies by demographic group, with unemployed workers
age 30 to 44 unaffected.
1.5.2 Identification Strategy
The variability in the application of the 1997 and 2001 reforms to different demographic groups
allows the design of a natural experiment to study the effect of the reduction in dismissal costs
on the Spanish labor market. There are different margins of variability that could be explored:
comparing workers in different age groups, comparing disabled to non-disabled, women under-
represented in their occupation to those not under-represented, the long-term unemployed to
other unemployed, etc.
Following Kugler et al (2002), this paper explores the variability in age and compares labor
market outcomes of workers age 30 to 44 (control group) to workers age 16 to 29 (treatment
group 1) and workers age 45 to 59 (treatment group 2) before and after the reform. Workers
above age 59 are excluded in order to isolate the effect of the reform of dismissal costs and avoid
capturing the effect of simultaneous reforms to the pension system2 . The advantage of defining
groups based on age is that, unlike some other classifications (such as women under-represented
in their occupation and the long-term unemployed) self-selection is not a problem.
To estimate the effect of the reform on the employment probability, the following logit
specification is used:
eit = A[aXit + yodt + 71qt + fltreatmentli + f 2treatment2i + (1.5)
61(treatmentli x posit) + 62 (treatment2i x postt)] + eit
The dependent variable eit is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is employed under a
permanent or temporary contract and 0 if he is unemployed or inactive. Self-employed workers
are excluded from the analysis. Xit is a vector of controls, including an indicator for head of
household, an indicator for being married, and the number of years of schooling. dt is a set of
year dummies and qt is a set of quarter dummies. treatmentli is an indicator equal to 1 for
young individuals (age 16 to 29) and treatment2i is an indicator equal to 1 for old individuals
(age 45 to 59).
The coefficients 61 and 62 are the difference-in-differences estimates, which capture the effect
of the reduction in dismissal costs on the employment probability of the young and the old.
They are the coefficients on the interactions between the treatment indicators and postt, which
equals 1 for the period after the 1997 reform and 0 for the period before the reform. Because
2 See, for example, European Commission Report (2006) for an overview of reforms to the Spanish pension
system in the early 2000s.
the reform took place during the second quarter of 1997, this quarter is omitted. Therefore,
the period before the reform extends from the first quarter of 1992 to the first quarter of 1997
and the period after the reform extends from the third quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter
of 2006. By going beyond 2001, the results capture the effects of both the 1997 reform and its
extension in 2001.
Equation (1.5) is estimated separately for immigrants and natives and for men and women.
The distinction between the effect on immigrants and natives is central to the analysis in this
paper. The distinction between the effect on men and women is important given that the
extension of the reform in 2001 gave special treatment to some categories of women. When
the equation is estimated for the subsample of immigrants, the vector of controls Xit also
includes the number of years of residence and the region of nationality (EU 15, other Europe.
Central and South America, North America, Africa, and Asia and Oceania). In all estimations,
standard errors are clustered by year * age group, where age group is 16 to 29 (young), 30 to
44 (middle-aged), and 45 to 59 (old). This controls for common errors within these age groups.
The key element of this strategy is that the outcome of the control group (individuals age
30 to 44) is taken as a counterfactual for the experiences of the treatment groups in the absence
of the reforms. This strategy is valid if there are no contemporaneous shocks, other than the
reforms on dismissal costs, affecting the outcomes of the control and treatment groups during
the period of analysis. If the business cycle affects the control and treatment groups differently,
for example, then the estimates may capture the effect of the business cycle instead of the effect
of the reduction in dismissal costs, producing biased results. To account for this possibility, the
specification is changed to control for age group-specific business cycle effects:
eit = A[aXit + yodr + ylqt + pltreatmentli + 0 2treatment2i + 61 (treatmentli x postt) + (1.6)
62 (treatment2i x postt) + •1 (treatmentli x expansiont) + X2 (treatment2i x expansiont)] + ,i
In this specification, the variable expansiont is an indicator equal to 1 for the expansionary
years 1995, and 1998 to 2000, and 0 otherwise. The interactions between the indicators for
treatment and the expansion variable control for age group-specific business cycle effects.
Equations (1.5) and (1.6) capture the effect of the reform on the probability of being em-
ployed. Because a clear motivation for the reform was to reduce labor market segmentation,
encouraging firms to replace temporary contracts with permanent ones, it is important to look
not only at the effect on the probability of being employed, but also at the composition of
employment. For this purpose, the model can be extended to a multinomial framework in
which eit takes three values: 1 if the individual is unemployed or inactive, 2 if he works under
a temporary contract, and 3 if he works under a permanent contract. The estimation of the
extended model is carried out by multinomial logit.
1.5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data are drawn from the Spanish economically active population survey (EPA - Encuesta
de Poblaci6n Activa), which collects detailed information on individuals' demographic charac-
teristics and labor market outcomes. The data are at quarterly frequency and cover the period
from the first quarter of 1992 to the fourth quarter of 2006. Data starting in the first quarter of
1999 are available on the website of the Spanish Statistics Institute (INE - Instituto Nacional
de Estadistica). Data for the earlier period were provided on request by the INE.
Because the purpose of this study is to compare the labor market performance of immigrants
and natives, it is important to have information on nativity or nationality. It is also important
to control for years of residence in Spain. The EPA reports this information from the first
quarter of 1992 onwards. The identification of immigrants and natives is based on nationality
rather than nativity, since the variable years of residence in Spain is only collected for foreign
nationals.
To test whether the coverage of immigrants in the EPA is appropriate, Table 6 compares the
percentage of immigrants in the EPA with equivalent numbers from OECD (2006), which are
taken from the registry on the number of work permits until 1999 and, from 2000 onwards, from
social security data. The table shows that immigrants are over-represented in the EPA relative
to the data on work permits, and slightly under-represented relative to the social security data.
Overall, though, the coverage of immigrants in the EPA seems reasonably accurate relative to
these other sources.
The numbers in Table 6 show a remarkable increase in immigration into Spain, especially
since 2000. By the end of 2006, immigrants represented more than 8% of the Spanish labor
force. Looking at the origin of immigrants, Figure 7 shows that, not surprisingly, most Spanish
immigrants come from Central and South America. The second largest area of origin is other
Europe, with a remarkable increase since 2000, most likely reflecting an increase in immigration
from Eastern Europe following the enlargement of the European Union.
Descriptive statistics for the Spanish EPA are reported in Table 7. The probability of being
employed on a permanent job increases with age and is larger for natives than for immigrants.
The employment probability increased after the reforms for all groups. There also appears to be
a change in the composition of employment for native workers affected by the reforms. Natives
age 30 to 44 show no increase in their probability of permanent employment, but younger
and older natives do appear to have found it easier to find permanent jobs. For these age
groups, there was also a simultaneous reduction in the probability of temporary employment,
suggesting that firms may have used the new type of contract to convert temporary jobs into
permanent positions. This suggests that the 1997 and 2001 reforms had a positive effect on the
permanent employment probability of natives and reduced duality in the Spanish labor market.
For immigrants, the results are not as clear. The next section explores these effects in more
detail, controlling for demographic characteristics.
1.5.4 Employment Effects
The results of estimating equations (1.5) and (1.6) for the employment probability and its de-
composition into temporary and permanent employment are reported in Table 8. The evidence
suggests that the reforms had no significant effect on the employment probability of young
native men relative to middle-aged, but reduced the employment probability of old native men
by 4.8 percentage points. Relative to middle-aged native women, the employment probability
of young and old native women increased by 1.4 and 1.7 percentage points, respectively. There
was no significant effect on the employment probability of immigrants, except for old immigrant
women, whose employment probability increased by 5.2 percentage points relative to middle-
aged immigrant women. Overall, the results suggest that the reduction in dismissal costs did not
increase employment across the board. While it seems to have improved employment prospects
for women, it had the opposite effect for old native men.
Turning to the effect of the reforms on permanent and temporary employment, the results
show a large and statistically significant reduction in the temporary employment probability
and an increase in the permanent employment probability for young natives and for old native
women. For old native men, however, there is a reduction in both the temporary and the
permanent employment probabilities. The effect on immigrants is less clear. There is evidence
that the reform reduced the temporary employment probability for young immigrants and
increased it for old immigrants, but the effects on the permanent employment probability are
insignificant.
These results are consistent with the findings in Kugler et al (2002), which suggest that the
1997 reform increased permanent employment for young natives relative to the middle-aged,
but had an insignificant effect on old natives. As discussed in section 1.2, theory makes no
clear predictions regarding the effect of EPL on the level of employment, since it affects hiring
and firing rates in the same direction. Using a panel version of the EPA which allows following
the same individuals over time and measuring transitions, Kugler et al find that, for young
natives, the 1997 reform increased transitions both from unemployment and from temporary
employment to permanent employment and had little effect on dismissals. The increase in the
hiring rate without a simultaneous increase in the firing rate explains the increase in permanent
employment for young natives following the reform. The results in Kugler et al cannot be used
to benchmark the effects on immigrants, since their study does not distinguish workers by
nationality.
1.6 Evidence from the 1990 Italian Reform
1.6.1 Institutional Background
A significant reform in EPL in Italy took effect in May 1990 and updated legislation from 1970.
The 1970 law introduced much stricter dismissal regulation for large firms than for small firms.
While large firms (those above 15 employees) were required to pay foregone wages and rehire
the worker in case of 'unfair' dismissal3 , small firms were exempt. The 1990 reform reduced this
:;Aternatively, the worker may opt for a financial compensation (equal to 15 monthly payments) instead of
being rehired.
discrepancy between large and small firms, introducing dismissal costs for firms with less than
15 employees. If the dismissal is considered to be 'unfair', small firms must either rehire the
worker or pay compensation. The latter varies between 2.5 and 6 monthly payments, depending
on the tenure of the dismissed worker. The rules for large firms were not changed. The different
treatment given to large and small firms in the 1990 reform introduces variation which can be
explored to study the effect of dismissal costs on employment.
The 1970 law was at the root of much tension in the early 2000s. In October 2001, the
recently elected center-right government of Silvio Berlusconi proposed a series of labor market
reforms, including the reform of the 1970 regulation on 'unfair' dismissals. The proposal was
to abolish compulsory reinstatement of unfairly dismissed workers in favor of financial compen-
sation. This generated controversy among trade unions and left-wing movements, culminating
with the murder of the mentor of the proposed reforms, Marco Biagi, in March 2002, attributed
to the terrorist group Brigate Rosse. Given the turmoil, the reform of the dismissal regulations
was not implemented.
While there have not been major reforms on employment protection for permanent contracts
in Italy (with the exception of the 1990 reform), there has been an increase in flexibility in the
use of temporary contracts. In 1987 the government liberalized the use of temporary contracts,
subject to collective agreements specifying certain target groups. Flexibility at the margin was
further increased in 1997 with the liberalization of temporary help agencies.
1.6.2 Identification Strategy
The differential treatment given to small and large firms in the 1990 reform is explored to
estimate the impact of dismissal costs on hiring and firing rates. Because the reform increased
dismissal costs for firms with less than 15 employees and did not change costs for firms with
more than 15 employees, a natural experiment can be constructed. Large firms are taken as
the control group and their outcomes interpreted as the counterfactual, i.e., what would have
happened in small firms if dismissal costs had not increased. The effect of the increase in
dismissal costs is measured by comparing the change in outcomes before and after the reform
in small relative to large firms.
Since firm size may itself be affected by the reform, the classification of firms as small and
large follows the strategy in Kugler and Pica (2005): small firms are those with less than 15
employees and large firms are those with more than 15 employees in all years before the reform.
Therefore, the analysis excludes firms which crossed the 15 employees threshold before the
reform.4
The following logit specification is used to estimate the effect of the 1990 reform on hiring
and firing rates:
yijt = A[aopostt + asmallj + a2immigranti + a 3(immigranti x postt) (1.7)
+a4(immigranti x smallj) + a5 (smallj x postt)
+a6(immigranti x smallj x postt) + /Xijt] + eit
The dependent variable yijt is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j hired (fired) worker i at time
t and 0 otherwise. postt is an indicator equal to 1 for the period post 1990 and 0 for the period
pre 1990. smallj is an indicator equal to 1 if firm j had less than 15 employees in all years
before 1990 and 0 otherwise. immigranti is an indicator equal to 1 if worker i is an immigrant.
Xijt is a vector of controls, including worker characteristics (age, skill level, and log of wage)
and firm characteristics (sector of activity, and region). All the controls are also interacted with
the immigranti indicator.
The effect of the reform on natives is given by the coefficient a 5 and the effect on immigrants
is given by the sum of a5 and as. Therefore, a6 captures the differential effect of the reform on
immigrants relative to natives. Because the 1990 law refers to permanent rather than temporary
employment, the sample is limited to job spells under permanent contracts. In all specifications,
standard errors are clustered by post * firm size.
As for the analysis of the Spanish reform, it is important to control for group-specific business
cycle effects. If the business cycle affects small and large firms differently, the results will be
biased and will be capturing the effect of the business cycle as well as the effect of the increase
in dismissal costs. To account for this possibility, the following specification is used, where the
'This correction is important as there is evidence that firms change behaviour in response to the threshold.
For example, Borgarello et al (2004) find that firms just belowl5 employees are more reluctant to hire than those
more distant from the threshold.
variable recessiont is an indicator equal to 1 during the recession years of 1992, 1993, and 1996:
Yijt = A[aopostt + elsmallj + o2 immigranti + a 3(immigranti x postt) (1.8)
+a 4 (immigranti x smallj) + c 5 (smallj x postt) + a6 (immigranti x smallj x postt)
+Airecessiont + A2 (smallj x recessiont) + ) 3 (recessiont x immigranti)
+A4(smallj x recessiont x immigranti) + /Xijt] + Eit
1.6.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data are drawn from the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), which contains information
on individual job spells and is based on administrative records from the Italian Social Security
Institute (INPS) 5 . The reference population includes Italians and foreigners who have worked
in Italy at some point during their careers. A sample of 1:90 is extracted from this population,
including about 740,000 observations. Workers in the public sector are not sampled.
The dataset is a matched employer-employee panel and contains detailed information on the
characteristics of the worker (including year of birth, gender, country of birth, and skill level),
the job (including the dates when the job started and ended, the annual wage, and the number
of days worked in the year) and the firm (including the exact number of employees, the year
when the firm was established, its region, and sector of activity). It covers the years 1986 to
1999 and the definition of immigrants is based on country of birth, i.e., nativity.
Table 9 reports descriptive statistics. Small firms have higher hiring and firing rates than
large firms. Moreover, there has been a larger decline in the hiring rate in small firms than in
large firms after the reform for all demographic groups. Also, while the firing rate increased in
large firms after the law, it did not change much in small firms. This is a first indication that the
increase in dismissal costs for small firms reduced hiring and firing rates relative to large firms.
However, to confirm this result, it is important to control for worker and firm characteristics.
"The WHIP data were provided on request by Laboratorio Revelli - Centre for Employment Studies,
http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip.
1.6.4 Effect on hiring and firing
The results of estimating equations (1.7) and (1.8) for the hiring and firing rates are reported in
Table 10. The coefficients on Small firm * Post capture the effect of the increase in dismissal
costs on natives and the sum of the coefficients on Small firm * Post and Immigrant *
Small firm * Post captures the effect on immigrants. The results suggest that the reform
reduced hiring and firing rates for native men and women. The effects are quite large and very
significant. The probability of being hired decreased by 3.4 percentage points for native men
and 6.1 percentage points for native women following the reform. The probability of being fired
decreased by 6.5 percentage points for native men and 5.9 percentage points for native women.
Turning to the effect on immigrants, the evidence suggest that the increase in dismissal costs
also reduced their hiring and firing rates, but by a much smaller amount than for natives. The
probability of being hired decreased by only 0.7 percentage points for immigrant men and 3.1
percentage points for immigrant women. The decrease in the probability of being fired was of
2.8 and 3.6 percentage points for immigrant men and women, respectively. This smaller impact
on immigrants is consistent with the predictions of the model, since they are effectively less
covered by EPL than natives.
1.7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper revisits the literature on the labor market effects of EPL, exploring its differential
effect on natives and immigrants. Across three empirical exercises, it tells a consistent story:
because immigrants are less protected by EPL than natives, they gain a comparative advantage
in the labor market.
The results are summarized in Table 11. The evidence from the EU LFS suggests that
stricter EPL on permanent contracts reduces employment of natives, but has a positive effect
on employment of immigrants with more than six years of residence. This comes from a com-
bination of the effects on hiring and firing rates: for natives, EPL reduces both hiring and
firing, but the impact on hiring is larger, resulting in a reduction on the employment rate; for
immigrants, EPL has no effect on hiring and reduces firing, resulting in an increase on the
employment rate.
The analysis of the 1997 and 2001 Spanish reforms suggests that a reduction on EPL on
permanent contracts increases permanent employment for natives but not for immigrants. The
evidence from the 1990 Italian reform suggests that an increase in EPL reduces hiring and firing
for natives, but has a much smaller effect on immigrants.
The consistency of the results from these three experiments is reassuring, since some es-
timations overcome the shortcomings of others. In particular, country-specific evidence has
advantages over cross-country evidence as it allows disentangling the effects of EPL per se
from the effects of the interaction of EPL with other labor market features, such as unemploy-
ment benefits, minimum wages, and early retirement schemes. Cross-country evidence does
not separate these effects because of the lack of time series variation for many of these fea-
tures. Country-specific evidence, however, separates these effects because different institutions
interacting with EPL do not have the same cross-sectional variation as EPL.
Within the country-specific evidence, the experiment for Spain is probably superior to the
one for Italy. This is because self-selection between the treatment and control groups is absent
in Spain, where the treatment was applied as a function of age, but is likely to be present in
Italy, where workers may move between large and small firms and employers may change their
hiring and firing decisions in order to keep the size of the firm below a certain threshold.
The results point to an interesting interaction between labor market institutions and immi-
grant assimilation. Angrist and Kugler (2003) show that the displacement effect of immigrants
on natives is smaller in countries with more flexible institutions. Our findings are supportive of
that conclusion and suggest that, in countries with restrictive labor markets, immigrants gain
a comparative advantage relative to the natives because they are less protected. There appears
to be a silver lining to labor market rigidities after all.
Figure 1. Union Membership Rates by Citizenship
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SOURCE: International Social Survey Programme (2003)
Table 1. Coverage of the EU LFS
LFS coverage % of immigrants in the population
LFS 2005 OECD 2004
Austria 1995-2005 14.9 13
Belgium 1995-2005 13 11.4
Denmark 1995-2005 6.2 6.3
Finland 1995-2005 2.6 3.2
France 1995-2005 11.7 10 (a)
Germany 1999-2005 n.a. 12.9
Greece 1995-2005 6.7 10.3 (b)
Ireland 1999-2005 10.3 11
Netherlands 1996-2005 12.2 10.6
Norway 1996-2005 7.5 7.8
Portugal 1995-2005 6.1 6.7
Spain 1995-2005 10.1 5.3 (b)
Sweden 1995-2005 13 12.2
Switzerland 2005 24.7 23.5
UK 1995-2005 10.4 9.3
SOURCE: EU Labor Force Survey and OECD (2006)
NOTE: Definition of immigrants is based on nativity. OECD (2006) numbers come from the last Census in
or before 2004. (a) Data from 1999 Census. (b) Data from 2001 Census.
Table 2. Characteristics of Immigrants and Natives
Men Women
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
0-5 years 6-10 years >10 years 0-5 years 6-10 years >10 years
residence residence residence residence residence residence
A. Labor Force Participation rate
Austria 88.33 83.86 92.74 87.91 71.76 53.99 70.90 69.52
Belgium 85.06 78.10 82.67 77.94 66.14 45.08 48.43 49.52
Denmark 90.87 74.97 72.10 82.02 82.33 47.66 56.40 72.22
Finland 86.13 80.72 85.48 87.40 81.13 52.82 63.05 78.09
France 87.88 73.77 85.83 87.30 74.18 40.36 53.31 63.76
Germany 90.44 79.80 90.69 89.18 76.50 49.65 62.67 66.59
Greece 88.52 91.48 95.40 92.24 55.42 61.54 64.29 60.67
Ireland 87.99 78.19 86.34 89.55 60.16 57.06 58.31 62.55
Netherlands 91.68 66.26 80.24 82.73 72.85 44.64 51.24 62.03
Norway 89.26 83.67 86.31 84.66 81.41 59.40 68.86 75.94
Portugal 88.24 92.49 84.23 86.11 71.29 75.34 67.65 75.57
Spain 87.21 93.21 92.64 89.07 56.25 69.98 67.03 58.27
Sweden 89.05 69.83 80.96 82.92 84.92 54.37 67.25 76.63
Switzerland 94.34 94.04 93.77 89.71 86.44 69.18 70.61 76.01
UK 90.01 74.80 84.11 87.14 74.32 53.59 57.25 66.30
B. Employment/Population
Austria 84.72 74.76 84.32 79.63 68.79 47.86 66.04 64.35
Belgium 80.38 64.38 67.08 66.39 60.32 34.67 37.89 40.68
Denmark 86.30 61.98 62.61 73.45 76.92 38.50 47.27 65.61
Finland 77.07 59.71 63.22 72.84 72.68 36.52 47.02 66.26
France 80.65 54.66 66.54 73.70 65.68 27.27 37.62 52.72
Germany 83.11 63.66 76.47 78.21 69.84 38.44 54.43 58.83
Greece 83.05 82.17 89.28 83.52 47.21 48.26 52.40 49.83
Ireland 80.94 70.25 78.59 81.61 56.00 50.82 53.66 57.79
Netherlands 89.52 56.33 70.90 76.57 70.11 37.55 45.73 57.76
Norway 86.54 72.96 74.14 79.91 78.92 53.71 61.56 72.53
Portugal 84.57 85.37 75.52 80.04 67.23 64.91 59.64 69.19
Spain 76.92 81.86 82.46 80.28 44.05 59.20 55.93 49.09
Sweden 83.36 53.86 61.70 73.15 80.44 41.26 54.42 69.52
Switzerland 89.45 86.84 83.33 83.99 82.22 58.68 61.21 69.91
UK 83.65 65.08 73.36 78.54 70.73 47.19 51.83 61.67
C. Permanent employment/Employment
Austria 77.3 76.8 84.5 84.7 79.2 79.7 86.5 87.1
Belgium 77.6 73.4 73.3 75.2 77.1 69.1 72.2 74.2
Denmark 79.9 73.9 72.1 75.7 84 65.9 64 79.7
Finland 70.2 59.7 65.3 69.8 71.9 50.9 51.6 63.2
France 74.8 60.6 69 75.5 77.6 58.6 73.3 80.2
Germany 74.8 65.7 77.1 79.1 79.4 66.7 76.7 81.8
Greece 49.5 67.1 70.9 64.9 52.3 63.1 63.8 65.8
Ireland 70.9 80.7 70.4 70.2 86.7 81.7 77.7 80.6
Netherlands 77.1 61.2 68 76 75.6 55.7 65.8 75.7
Norway 80.4 75.4 73.4 79 81.8 68.6 73.1 78.9
Portugal 59.7 39.1 43.3 62.4 60.2 47.9 54.9 66.9
Spain 53.8 28.8 36.4 38.4 53.8 43.7 43 43.5
Sweden 74.3 57.2 62.7 69.7 78.9 51.2 58.7 76.7
Switzerland 73.3 73.5 78.5 79.9 72 73.9 76.2 82.6
UK 77.7 74.2 73.3 70.5 85.4 69.3 78.9 79.9
D. Temporary employment/Employment
Austria 6.5 15 9.2 4.3 6.9 13 8.5 4.5
Belgium 4.7 12 9 4.3 9.1 16.8 10.8 8.7
Denmark 7.8 21.3 17 8.1 10.4 20.3 27.7 12
Finland 11.4 31.8 20.1 13.8 18.6 55.2 40.4 32
France 10.4 29.2 18.3 10.6 13.2 31.1 20.4 13.5
Germany 10.7 27.4 16 7.4 11.5 27.4 17.6 8.7
Greece 5.5 25.8 17.3 9.6 7.9 28.9 22.1 12.1
Ireland 2.9 8.1 3.4 2.2 5.3 11.8 5.5 5
Netherlands 8.8 31.9 22.7 11.8 14 37.7 25.5 15
Norway 7.3 16.1 15.1 8.3 11.9 24.3 18 13.4
Portugal 10.7 45.5 32.7 16.7 13.1 42.5 26 17.9
Spain 22.9 57 40.5 24.8 28.1 48.1 37.6 23.8
Sweden 9.8 29 19.4 10.8 14.7 39.5 32.6 15.6
Switzerland 18 17.7 13.1 6.8 20.6 18.5 14.9 8.3
UK 4.5 17 9.5 4.5 6.4 22.7 10.7 7
SOURCE: EU Labor Force Survey
NOTE: Averages over the period of data coverage. Sample restricted to population aged 20-59. Definition of immigrants is based on nativity.
Figure 2. Evolution of EPL Index for Permanent Contracts 1985-2005
SOURCE: See Data Appendix
Figure 3. Evolution of EPL Index for Temporary Contracts 1985-2005
SOURCE: See Data Appendix
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Figure 4. Correlation between EPL and Unemployment Duration
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Figure 5. Correlation between EPL and Employment Duration
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Figure 6. Correlation between EPL and the Employment Rate
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SOURCE: for labor market variables, EU Labor Force Survey; for employment protection index, see
Data Appendix.
NOTE: p denotes the correlation coefficient between the series in the two axes.
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Table 3. Effect of EPL on Participation and Employment
Labor Force Participation Rate
(1) (2)
-0.006 -
(0.012)
EPL permanent
EPL temporary
Years residence 0-5
Years residence 6-10
Years residence >10
Years residence 0-5*EPL permanent
Years residence 6-10*EPL permanent
Years residence >10*EPL permanent
Years residence 0-5*EPL temporary
Years residence 6-10*EPL temporary
Years residence >10*EPL temporary
Medium education
High education
Medium education*EPL permanent
High education*EPL permanent
Medium education*EPL temporary
High education*EPL temporary
Female
Age 25-39
Age 40-59
0.111***
(0.030)
0.175***
(0.033)
0.074***
(0.018)
0.015
(0.030)
0.041
(0.036)
0.003
(0.023)
0.143***
(0.005)
0.232***
(0.006)
-0.040***
(0.006)
-0.036***
(0.007)
-0.121***
(0.005)
0.274***
(0.011)
0.213***
(0.010)
0.009**
(0.004)
0.109***
(0.026)
0.224***
(0.027)
0.080***
(0.018)
-0.002
(0.013)
0.023**
(0.010)
-0.011*
(0.006)
0.141***
(0.005)
0.231***
(0.006)
-0.024***
(0.003)
-0.014***
(0.004)
-0.122***
(0.005)
0.273***
(0.011)
0.213***
(0.010)
(1)
-0.038
(0.023
Employment Rate
(2)
)
-0.019
(0.027)
0.015
(0.023)
-0.093***
(0.021)
0.003
(0.047)
0.064**
(0.028)
0.108***
(0.032)
0.048***
(0.003)
0.070***
(0.004)
-0.016***
(0.003)
-0.025***
(0.004)
-0.024***
(0.003)
0.089***
(0.005)
0.118***
(0.007)
0.013***
(0.004)
-0.029
(0.027)
0.037*
(0.020)
-0.060***
(0.014)
-0.013
(0.015)
-0.013
(0.011)
-0.015**
(0.006)
0.047***
(0.003)
0.069***
(0.004)
-0.008***
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.003)
-0.024***
(0.003)
0.089***
(0.005)
0.117***
(0.007)
SOURCE: EU Labor Force Survey
NOTE: EPL is measured as deviation from cross country mean; N=4428; standard errors adjusted for clustering by
country*year; regressions also control for country and year dummies, country*years residence, year*years residence,
female*years residence, age*years residence and education*years residence. OLS estimates. * denotes significance at the 10%
level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Table 4. Effect of EPL on Employment and Unemployment Duration
Unemployed >1 year Employed > 5 years Employed > 1 year
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
EPL permanent 0.132*** - 0.097** - 0.002
(0.043)
EPL temporary
Years residence 0-5
Years residence 6-10
Years residence >10
Years residence 0-5*EPL permanent
Years residence 6-10*EPL permanent
Years residence >10*EPL permanent
Years residence 0-5*EPL temporary
Years residence 6-10*EPL temporary
Years residence >10*EPL temporary
Medium education
High education
Medium education*EPL permanent
High education*EPL permanent
Medium education*EPL temporary
High education*EPL temporary
Female
Age 25-39
Age 40-59
0.038
(0.057)
0.171**
(0.075)
-0.032
(0.035)
0.043
(0.085)
-0.195**
(0.097)
-0.081 *
(0.048)
-0.012
(0.018)
0.083
(0.062)
0.100
(0.074)
-0.100**
(0.039)
- 0.036
(0.029)
- 0.029
(0.030)
-0.014
(0.015)
-0.043*** -0.041***
(0.006) (0.006)
-0.084*** -0.083***
(0.010) (0.010)
0.029*** -
(0.008)
0.041*** -
(0.011)
0.062***
(0.005)
0.182***
(0.008)
0.292***
(0.011)
0.014***
(0.005)
0.019***
(0.006)
0.062***
(0.005)
0.183***
(0.008)
0.292***
(0.011)
(0.042)(0.045)
-0.078**
(0.032)
0.011
(0.087)
-0.050**
(0.020)
-0.053
(0.071)
0.043
(0.086)
0.048
(0.036)
0.018***
(0.004)
-0.021***
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
0.007*
(0.004)
-0.030***
(0.002)
0.429***
(0.005)
0.707***
(0.006)
0.008
(0.005)
-0.150***
(0.045)
0.032
(0.082)
-0.047**
(0.018)
-0.040***
(0.015)
-0.010
(0.020)
0.012
(0.008)
0.019**
(0.003)
-0.021***
(0.004)
-0.010***
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.030***
(0.002)
0.430***
(0.005)
0.707***
(0.006)
0.023***
(0.006)
-0.092*
(0.049)
0.190***
(0.042)
-0.059***
(0.017)
-0.027*
(0.015)
0.007
(0.013)
-0.010*
(0.006)
0.028***
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.008***
(0.002)
-0 007***
(0.003)
-0.022***
(0.002)
0.308***
(0.006)
0.414***
(0.009)
-0.135***
(0.048)
0.218***
(0.043)
-0.060***
(0.022)
0. 175***
(0.060)
-0.079
(0.057)
0.034
(0.026)
0.027***
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.007**
(0.003)
-0.022***
(0.002)
0.308***
(0.006)
0.415***
(0.009)
SOURCE: EU Labor Force Survey
NOTE: Dependent variable: for unemployment duration, fraction of unemployed who have been in unemployment for more than one
year; for employment duration, fraction of employed who have been on the current job for more than one year/more than five years.
EPL is measured as deviation from cross country mean. N=4317. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by country*year. Regressions
also control for country and year dummies, country*years residence, year*years residence, female*years residence, age*years
residence and education*years residence. OLS estimates.
Table 5. Labor Market Reforms in Spain after 1997
Dismissal costs under existing Dismissal costs under new Payroll tax reductions for Payroll tax reductions for
permanent contracts permanent contracts newly hired workers under newly hired workers under
permanent contracts in 1997- permanent contracts in 1999
1998
Unemployed aged 30-44 Fair dismissals: 20 day.s' wages Fair dismissals: 20 days' wages None None
years per year of seniority with a per year of semority with a
maximum of 12 months' wages maximum of 12 months' wages
Unfair dismissal: 45 days' Unfair dismissals: 45 days'
wages per year of seniority with wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months' wags a maximum of 42 months' wages
Young unemployed Fair dismissals: 20 days' wages Fair dismissals: 20 days' wages 40% of employer coutnbutious 35% of employer contributions
workers (under 30 per year of seniority with a per year of senirity with a for 24 months for 12 months. 25% for another
year of age) maximnum of 12 months' wages maximmn of 12 mouths' wages 12 months
Unfair dinsmssr h: 45 days' Unfair isminssalt 33 days'
wages per year of senionty with wages per year of seniority with
a maimum of 42 months' wages a maximum of 24 months' wages
Unemployed workers Fair dismiusals: 20 days wages Fair dismissals 20 days' wages 60% of employer contributions 45% of employer contributions
above 45 yea rs of age per year of seniority with a per year of semority with a for 24 months., 50% thereafter for 12 months.. 40% for another
maximum of 12 months' wages iaxim of 12 months' wages 12 months
Unfair disnmissak: 45 days' Unfair dismissals: 33 days'
wages per year of seniority with wages per year of seunity with
a maximum of 42 months' wages a maximum of 24 months' wages
Long-term unemployed Fair dismissals: 20 days' wages Fair dismissals: 20 days' wages 40% of employer contributions 40% of employer contributions
(over 1 year of per year of seniority with a per year of seniority with a for 24 months for 12 months, 30% for another
registered maximum of 12 months' wages maximum of 12 months' wages 12 months
unemployment) Unfair dismissals: 45 days' Unfair dismi••as: 33 dats'
wages per year of seniority with wages per year of semorty with
a maxim omonths aaximun f 42 months' wximum of 24 months' wages
Workers employed Fair dismissals: 20 days' wages 50% employer contributios for None
under temporary per year of seniority with a per year of seniority with a 24 months. 20% for another 12
contracts maximum of 12 months' wages maximum of 12 months' wages months
Unfair dismissals: 45 days' Unfair dismijls: 33 days'
wages per yearof seniority with wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months' wages a maximum of 24 months' wages
Women hired under Fair dismissals:20 days' wages Fair isminals . 20 days' wages 60% employer contributions for 45% employer contributions for
temporary contracts or per year of seniority with a per year of seniority with a 24 months, 20% for another 12 24 months, 40% for another 12
long-term unemployed maxmum of 12 months' wages maximum of 12 months' wages months months
hired in occupa tions Unfair dismissals: 45 days' Unfair dismissals: 33 days'
with low weight of wages per year of seniority with wages per year of semority with
female employment a maximunm of 42 months' wages a maximum of 24 months' wages
Workers hires under Fair disnmissals: 20 days' wages Fair diisssals: 20 days' wages 50% employer contributions for 25% employer contributions for
training contracts per year of seniority with a per year of seniority with a 24 months. 20%. for another 12 24 months
maximum of 12 months' wages maximum of 12 months' wtages months
Unfair dismissals: 45 days' Unfair dismissals: 33 days'
wages per year of seniority with wages per year of senioritny wth
a maximum of 42 months' waxes a maximmn of 24 months' waees
Workers above 45 years Fair dtsmisal: 20 days' wages Fair dismissals: 20 days wages 60% employer contributions for 60% employer cont'ribuions for
of age hired under per year of semority with a per year of seniority with a 24 months. 20% for another 12 24 months. 20% for another 12
temporary contracts maximum of 12 months' wages maxmmum of 12 months wages months months
Unfair dimissals: 45 days Unfair dismissals: 33 days'
wages per year of seniority with wages per year of semority with
a maximnum of 42 months' wages a maximum of 24 months' wages
Disabled workers Fair dismissals: 20 days' wags Fair dismissals: 20 days wages 70%-90% for the whole 70%-90% for the whole
per year of seniority with a per year of semority with a employment spell employment spell
maximun of 12 months' wages maximum of 12 months' wages
Unfair dismisals: 45 days' Unfair dismissals 33 days'
wages per year of seniority with wages per year of seoniority with
a maximum of 42 months' wages a maximum of 24 months' wages
SOURCE: reproduced from Kugler et al (2002)
Table 6. Coverage of Immigrants in the Spanish EPA
Year % Immigrants in Labor Force
Spain LFS OECD (2006)
1995 1.08 0.8
1996 1.11 1.0
1007 1.18 1.1
1008 1.38 1.2
1999 1.58 1.1
2000 1.79 2.5
2001 2.56 3.4
2002 3.52 4.5
2003 4.67 5.2
2004 5.54 6.3
2005 6.62 n.a.
2006 8.34 n.a.
SOURCE: Spanish economically active population survey (EPA) and OECD (2006)
NOTE: OECD (2006) data comes from the number of valid work permits. EU workers are not
included. From 2000 on, data refers to the number of workers who are registered in the Social
Security system. The source of the data is the Ministry of Labor and Social Security.
Figure 7. Origin of Immigrants - Spain
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for the Spanish EPA
Age 16-29 Age 30-44 Age 45-59
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
A. Native Men
Employment probability 39.25 49.58 78.09 84.54 67.1 74.25
Permanent employment probability 36.23 43.06 75.06 74.92 84.62 85.08
Temporary employment probability 63.77 56.94 24.94 25.08 15.38 14.92
B. Native Women
Employment probability 25.97 36.51 36.68 50.83 19.16 32.46
Permanent employment probability 37.33 42.4 73.11 70.9 80.02 82.2
Temporary employment probability 62.67 57.6 26.89 29.1 19.98 17.8
C. Immigrant Men
Employment probability 48.29 68.72 69.08 83.46 52.66 71.46
Permanent employment probability 25.4 26.19 48.63 40.62 71.33 50.8
Temporary employment probability 74.6 73.81 51.37 59.38 28.67 49.2
D. Immigrant Women
Employment probability 24.78 47.1 31.95 56.11 22.27 47.09
Permanent employment probability 35.4 35.7 51.8 47.06 73.25 56.77
Temporary employment probability 64.6 64.3 48.2 52.94 26.75 43.23
SOURCE: Spanish economically active population survey (EPA)
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Table 8. Employment Effects of the 1997 and 2001 Spanish Reforms
(1) (2)
P(employment) Log[P(temporary)/ Log[P(permanent)/ P(employment) Log[P(temporary)/ Log[P(permanent)/
P(non-employment)] P(non-employment)] P(non-employment)] P(non-employment)]
A. Native Men
Age 16-29
Age 45-59
Age 16-29*Post
Age 45-59*Post
Age 16-29*Expansion
Age 45-59*Expansion
\Age 16-29
Age 45-59
Age 16-29*Post
Age 45-59*Post
Age 16-29*Expansion
Age 45-59*Expansion
Age 16-29
Age 45-59
Age 16-29*Post
Age 45-59*Post
Age 16-29*Expansion
Age 45-59*Expansion
Age 16-29
Age 45-59
Age 16-29*Post
Age 45-59*Post
Age 16-29*Expansion
Age 45-59*Expansion
-0.202***
(0.041)
-1,289***
(0.045)
-0.177***
(0.034)
-0.158***
(0.036)
-0.091
(0.075)
-0.985***
(0.048)
-0.128***
(0.038)
-0.084*
(0.048)
-0.171**
(0.081)
-1.227***
(0.114)
-0.239***
(0.079)
0.332***
(0.117)
-0.239***
(0.062)
-1.093***
(0.093)
-0.117*
(0.062)
0.593***
(0.108)
-
-1.527***
(0.055)
-0.488***
(0.046)
0.165***
(0.034)
-0.252***
(0.046)
-1.542***
(0.094)
-0.375***
(0.041)
0.239***
(0.052)
0.129***
(0.039)
-0.915***
(0.118)
-0.833***
(0.118)
0.216*
(0.111)
0.023
(0.124)
-0.907***
(0.200)
-0.291***
(0.100)
0.134
(0.197)
0.046
(0.111)
-0.197***
(0.010)
-0.156***
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.048***
(0.008)
-0.197***
(0.010)
-0.160***
(0.011)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.051***
(0.008)
0.001
(0.005)
0.017**
(0.009)
B. Native Women
-0.183***
(0.016)
-0.115***
(0.009)
0.017**
(0.007)
0.017**(0.008)
-0.018***
(0.006)
-0.0004
(0.005)
C. Immigrant Men
-0.078***
(0.018)
-0.168***
(0.024)
-0.01
(0.016)
0.004
(0.019)
-0.013
(0.018)
-0.039**
(0.019)
D. Immigrant Women
-0.125***
(0.022)
-0.139***
(0.018)
-0.002
(0.022)
0.052**
(0.022)
-0.011
(0.014)
0.005
(0.016)
-0.209***
(0.042)
-1.296***
(0.046)
-0.180***
(0.034)
-0.164***
(0.036)
0.029
(0.023)
0.035
(0.029)
-0.095
(0.076)
-00980***
(0.051)
-0.128***
(0.037)
-0.081
(0.052)
0.021
(0.022)
-0.029
(0.044)
-0.176**
(0.079)
-1.209***
(0.121)
-0.231***
(0.075)
0.333***
(0.119)
0.016
(0.085)
-0.086
(0.119)
-0.244***
(0.062)
-1.107***
(0.094)
-0.115*
(0.061)
0.061***
(0.106)
0.023
(0.052)
0.082
(0.073)
-1.512***
(0.056)
-0.509***
(0.047)
0.180***
(0.029)
-0.268***
(0.043)
-0.094**
(0.038)
0.113**
(0.050)
-1.508***
(0.095)
-0.374***
(0.043)
0.264***
(0.046)
0.130***
(0.036)
-0.180***
(0.050)
-0.002
(0.026)
-0.867***
(0.125)
-0.765***
(0.132)
0.199*
(0.117)
0.008
(0.131)
-0.239**
(0.100)
-0.334***
(0.092)
-0.908***
(0.203)
-0.278***
(0.103)
0.134
(0.198)
0.044
(0.110)
0.005
(0.092)
-0.081
(0.073)
-0.186***
(0.016)
-0.116***
(0.008)
0.014*
(0.008)
0.017**
(0,008)
-0.082***
(0.018)
-0.178***
(0.023)
-0.008
(0.016)
0.006
(0,019)
-0.127***
(0.022)
-0.138***
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.022)
0.052**
(0.022)
SOU()RCE: Spanish economically active population survey (EPA)
NOITE: Logit marginal effects. Regressions include year and quarter dummies, an indicator for head of household, an indicator for being married, number
otf ears of schooling and, for immigrants, years of residence and region of nationality (EU 15, other Europe, Central and South America, North America,
Africa, and Asia and Oceania).
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for the Italian WHIP
Small firms Large firms
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
A. Native Men
Hiring rate 37.86 11.06 27.17 9.50
Firing rate 28.98 28.13 14.59 21.71
B. Native Women
Hiring rate 35.13 9.68 28.44 12.07
Firing rate 26.54 27.00 16.45 23.82
C. Immigrant Men
Hiring rate 49.32 27.11 38.27 23.94
Firing rate 40.18 40.65 24.84 32.62
D. Immigrant Women
Hiring rate 51.59 26.44 41.10 23.83
Firing rate 43.65 40.69 30.47 33.49
SOURCE: Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP)
NOTE: Sample restricted to workers with permanent contracts.
Table 10. Effect of the 1990 Italian Reform on Hiring and Firing Rates
Hiring Rate Firing Rate
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Post
Small firm
Immigrant
Immigrant*Post
Immigrant*Small firm
Small firm*Post
Immigrant*Small firm*Post
Recession
Small firm*Recession
Post
Small firm
Immigrant
Immigrant*Post
Immigrant*Small firm
Small firm*Post
Immigrant*Small firm*Post
Recession
-0.141***
(0.013)
0.0002
(0.010)
0.087
(0.242)
0.060***
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.034***
(0.003)
0.027***
(0.004)
-0.132***
(0.009)
-0.013*
(0.007)
0.156
(0.209)
0.040***
(0.011)
-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.061***
(0.003)
0.030***
(0.006)
Small firm*Recession
SOURCE: Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP)
-0.135***
(0.014)
0.0001
(0.010)
0.091
(0.241)
0.064***
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.034***
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.003)
-0.015***
(0.001)
0.0003
(0.0005)
-0.129***
(0.009)
-0.013*
(0.007)
0.157
(0.212)
0.044***
(0.011)
-0.008***
(0.002)
-0.062***
(0.004)
0.023***
(0.006)
-0.008***
(0.0007)
0.004***
(0.001)
A. Men
0.057***
(0.011)
0.104***
(0.012)
0.528***
(0.194)
-0.011l**
(0.005)
-0.032***
(0.008)
-0.065***
(0.002)
0.037***
(0.003)
B. Women
0.043***
(0.006)
0.080***
(0.008)
0.616***
(0.082)
-0.003
(0.005)
-0.044***
(0.003)
-0.059***
(0.003)
0.023***
(0.007)
0.090***
(0.011)
0.103***
(0.011)
0.537***
(0.185)
-0.016***
(0,005)
-0.032***
(0 008)
-0.073***
(0.002)
0.031 ***
(0.003)
-0.086***
(0.001)
0.043***
(0.0004)
0.075***
(0.006)
0.079***
(0.008)
0.611 ***
(0.084)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.044***
(0.003)
-0.066***
(0.003)
0.028***
(0.006)
-0.085***
(0.0008)
0.036***
(0.0009)
NOTE: logit marginal effects. Regressions also control for log(wage), age, sector of activity, region where firm is located, skill level
and interactions of all the covariates with the immigrant dummy.
Table 11. Summary of results
EU Spain Italy
Experiment: Reduction in EPL for young Increase in EPL for small
Increase in EPL index and old workers firms
Effect on: Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Employment + (a)
rate
Permanent + insignificant
employment
Hiring rate -- insignificant
Firing rate
NOTE: (a) for immigrants with more than 6 years of residence.
Data Appendix
The Eurostat EU Labour Force Survey
The Eurostat EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) covers the 25 EU member states, as well as
Iceland and Norway. The data are collected by national statistical agencies, following a common
procedure developed by Eurostat, ensuring comparability across countries. The data used in
this paper were constructed on request by the German Federal Statistics Office and contain
information on immigration and labor market variables aggregated by the following groups:
* gender: male, female.
* age: 15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 34, 35 to 39, 40 to 44, 45 to 49, 50 to 54, and 55
to 59.
* education: low (lower secondary), medium (upper secondary), and high (third level).
* nativity: native born, foreign born (aggregated by years of residence: 0 to 5, 6 to 10,
more than 10).
Eurostat implements guidelines to ensure that the data are statistically reliable. In par-
ticular, it computes thresholds of population counts below which the data are unreliable. All
unreliable observations were dropped from the dataset used in this paper.
Construction of EPL Time Series
The time series for EPL on permanent and temporary contracts used in this paper cover
the period 1985 to 2005 and were constructed from the OECD indicators on the strictness of
EPL for the late 1980s, the late 1990s, and 2003, using information on the timing of reforms
which introduced breaking points in the series. The indicators and details on how they are
constructed are available in OECD (1999) and OECD (2004). The version of the indicators
used in this paper is version 1, which does not include information on collective dismissals, but
covers a longer period of time.
The OECD indicators aggregate information in a number of dimensions. For permanent
contracts, they contain information on severance payments, notification procedures, the defini-
tion of 'fair' and 'unfair' dismissals, the amount of compensation following 'unfair' dismissals,
among other measures. For temporary contracts, they contain information on the valid cases
for use of this type of contracts, the maximum number of fixed term contracts permitted, their
maximum cumulative duration, as well as information on temporary work agencies.
To transform the EPL indices for the late 1980s, the late 1990s, and 2003 into a time series
from 1985 to 2005, the information on the breaking points of the EPL time series given in table
2.A2.6 in OECD (2004) is used. This table lists a number of reforms for each country which had
an impact on the EPL indices for permanent and temporary contracts. The starting point of
the time series, 1985, takes the values of the OECD indices for the late 1980s. The other trivial
point is 2003, where the series take the same values as the OECD indices for 2003. Between
those dates, the series are constructed using information on the breaking points.
It is useful to give some illustrative examples. For instance, Belgium adopted a reform in
1997 which reduced restrictions on temporary contracts. This was the only reform on regulation
on temporary contracts in Belgium during the period considered. Therefore, the series on EPL
for temporary contracts in Belgium takes the value of the late 1980s from 1985 to 1996. In 1997
it falls to the value in the late 1990s (which equals the value in 2003 as there were no reforms
after 1997).
Sometimes it is necessary to interpolate. For example, Spain had two reforms on regulation
on permanent contracts: one in 1994, which relaxed the procedural requirements for dismissals
for economic reasons, and another in 1997, which introduced a new type of contract, applicable
to certain categories of workers, with reduced compensation for 'unfair' dismissals. Given these
reforms, the series on EPL for permanent contracts in Spain takes the value of the late 1980s
from 1985 to 1993. In 1997 it falls to the value in the late 1990s. Between 1994 and 1996, it is
a linear interpolation of the values in the late 1980s and the late 1990s.
Bibliography
[1] Angrist, J. and A. Kugler (2003), 'Protective or Counter-Productive? Labour Market
Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives.', The Economic Journal, Vol.
113, No. 488 (June).
[2] Bertola, G. (1990), 'Job Security, Employment, and Wages', European Economic Review,
Vol. 34, pp. 851-886.
[3] Blanchard, 0. and P. Portugal (2001), 'What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Com-
paring Portuguese and US Labor Markets', The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No.
1 (March 2001), pp. 187-207.
[4] Blanchard, 0. and J. Wolfers (2000), 'The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of
European Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence', The Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No.
462 (March), Conference Papers.
[5] Borgarello, A., P. Garibaldi, and L. Pacelli (2004), 'Employment Protection Legislation
and the Size of Firms', II Giornale degli Economisti, No. 1.
[6] Cahuc, P. and A. Zylberberg (2004), 'Labour Economics', The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and London, England.
[7] European Commission Report (2006), 'Synthesis Report on Adequate and Sustainable
Pensions. Country Summaries: Spain'.
[8] Kugler, A., J. Jimeno, and V. Hernanz (2002), 'Employment Consequences of Restrictive
Permanent Contracts: Evidence from Spanish Labor Market Reforms', IZA Discussion
Paper, No. 657, November 2002.
[9] Kugler, A. and G. Pica (2005), 'Effects of Employment Protection on Worker and Job
Flows: Evidence from the 1990 Italian Reform', IZA Discussion Paper, No. 1743, Septem-
ber 2005, forthcoming in Labour Economics.
[10] Lazear, E. (1990), 'Job Security Provisions and Employment', The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 105, No. 3, pp. 699-726.
[11] Migration Policy Institute - MPI (2004), 'Fact Sheet #7: Immigrant Union Members -
Numbers and Trends'.
[12] Moulton, B. R. (1990), 'An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate
Variables on Micro Units', Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 334-338.
[13] Nickell, S. (1997), 'Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North
America', Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 55-74.
[14] OECD (1999), Employment Outlook.
[15] OECD (2004), Employment Outlook.
[16] OECD (2006), International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI.
[17] Pissarides, C. (2000), 'Equilibrium Unemployment Theory', second edition, The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England.
[18] Scarpetta, S. (1996), 'Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies and Institutional Set-
tings on Unemployment: a Cross-Country Study', OECD Economic Studies, No. 26.

Chapter 2
The 35-Hour Workweek in France:
Straightjacket or Welfare
Improvement?
2.1 Introduction
France's workweek is one of the shortest in the world. The latest reduction in the 'standard'
workweek (i.e., the number of weekly hours paid at the regular wage rate) was promoted by
Lionel Jospin's socialist government, who reduced it from 39 to 35 hours in the early 2000s.
While the purpose of this policy was to decrease unemployment, seven years later the unem-
ployment rate remains high (above 8%), making the impact of the 35-hour workweek on the
French economy a topic of heated discussion during the 2007 presidential campaign. The so-
cialist candidate, S6golane Royal, criticised the law not because she believes that the French
should work longer hours, but because she thought that employers had too much power and
(This chapter is joint work with Marcello Estevdo (IMF). It has been presented at the 46th Panel Meeting
of Economic Policy in Lisbon. We are grateful to Joshua Angrist, David Autor, Olivier Blanchard, and the
referees for insightful comments. We thank Georgios Panos for help with data. Paul Bedford, Giuseppe Bertola,
Dora Costa, Luc Everaert, Giuseppe Moscarini, Andrei Shleifer and seminar participants at MIT, the IMF, the
Yale School of Management Behavioral Science Conference, the 9th IZA European Summer School in Labor
Economics, the Bank of England, the EALE Conference 2006, and the Paris School of Economics provided
valuable suggestions. Filipa Sd acknowledges financial support from the Portuguese Science and Technology
Foundation through a PhD fellowship.
flexibility in implementing the shorter workweek. On the other hand, the victorious centre-right
candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, sees the 35-hour workweek as 'the worst mistake France has ever
made'. During the campaign, he promised to relax the policy by exempting all overtime from
payroll charges and income tax in order to encourage workers to work longer hours and increase
their income. He believes that the short workweek has hurt France's competitiveness, making
it less attractive to foreign investors.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effect of the 35-hour workweek on employment
and workers' welfare. Our findings shed light on some of the issues raised during the presidential
campaign and also relate to a broader debate on the reasons why Europeans work less than
Americans. While in the 1960s annual hours per person employed were about the same in
Europe and in the United States, today the average American works approximately 400 hours
more per year than the average European. The reasons for this difference in working hours
have been a topic of recent discussion, with some studies attributing it to differences in tax
rates, while others highlight differences in preferences for work and leisure or in labour market
regulations and unionization between the two continents. 1
After discussing the main theories about how reductions in working hours may increase
employment and welfare in section 2.2, we look specifically at the effects of the 35-hour workweek
in France in section 2.3. We start by describing the institutional features of the laws which
implemented the shorter workweek. We then explain the research strategy used and discuss it
in the context of the existing literature on the impact of the shorter workweek in France. We
describe the dataset and present the empirical results. Section 2.4 contains a brief description
of other studies on work-sharing experiments in Germany, Sweden and Canada. Finally, section
2.5 offers brief policy conclusions.
2.2 The Rationale Behind Hours Reductions
There are two arguments commonly used to justify reductions in working hours. First, reducing
working hours may create more jobs through work sharing. Second, it may improve workers'
welfare by increasing their leisure time. This section discusses these arguments. It also provides
'Key references in this debate are Alesina et al. (2005), Blanchard (2004), and Prescott (2004).
predictions for how key economic decisions may be affected by institutionally-driven restrictions
in working hours. These predictions are tested in section 2.3 using the experiment of the 35-hour
workweek in France.
2.2.1 Job Creation Through Work Sharing
The idea of work sharing as an employment creation policy is simple: if the production of goods
and services in an economy is fixed, then a reduction in hours can re-distribute the fixed amount
of work across more people, increasing employment. In spite of its intuitive appeal, economists
and policy makers are sceptical about the success of work sharing as it is rooted in the so-called
"lump-of-labour fallacy": the false premise that the amount of output in the economy is fixed.
The theoretical literature on work sharing suggests that the employment effect of a reduction
in hours is ambiguous and may actually be negative. These basic effects can be shown with the
help of a simple model. Let us assume perfect substitutability between hours (H) and workers
(N) in the production function, given by: Y = F(HN, K) and that, first, individuals do not
work overtime. Employment has a fixed cost, a, which does not vary with hours of work (e.g.
training, day-care provision, and other overhead costs). The hourly wage is w and the cost of
labour is given by: aN + wHN. Let us also assume that output is fixed. Firms are initially
employing No workers, who work the standard number of hours Ho. There is a mandated
reduction in standard hours to H 1 < Ho0 . Because output is fixed, firms reduce hours to H 1
and increase employment to keep output constant. The reduction in hours increases employment
to N1 = (HtoNo)/E 1 > No. Thus, with fixed output and no overtime, this model predicts that
a reduction in hours of work per person unambiguously increases employment. This is the basic
intuition behind the enthusiasm of policymakers with legislated workweek reductions.
However, as pointed out by Calmfors and Hoel (1988) and the subsequent literature following
them, small modifications in this simple setup will make the final employment effect ambiguous.
First, let us expand the cost of labour to include the possibility of overtime: aN + wHoN +
w(1 + o)(H - Ho)N, where o>O stands for the overtime premium. A reduction in the standard
workweek leaves the marginal cost of an extra hour of overtime, w(1 + o)N, unchanged but
raises the marginal cost of hiring an additional worker, a + wHo + w(1 + o)(H - Ho), causing
firms to hire more hours and fewer people. In addition, if firms are allowed to vary output,
there is a negative scale effect: facing a higher cost of production (because the fixed cost of
labour is diluted over a smaller number of hours) firms decide to produce less, decreasing
both employment and hours. The net effect on employment becomes even more ambiguous if
we introduce another production input in the analysis, say "capital", which would raise the
possibility of increased labour costs causing a substitution away from labour toward capital.
Houpis (1993), Kapteyn et al (2000 and 2004), and the references cited by them, show
that the effectiveness of legislated working-time reduction to increase employment also hinges
crucially on the response of wages. At the same hourly wage, a reduction in hours would
decrease monthly income. If workers demand higher hourly wages as compensation for the
reduction in hours, possibly keeping monthly income unchanged, the increase in costs may
offset any potential positive effect of work sharing on employment. Kapteyn et al (2000 and
2004) test this hypothesis using aggregate data for the OECD. They find that a reduction in
working hours has a positive direct effect on employment. However, taking into account the
increase in wages, the long-run effect becomes small and insignificant.
Wage reactions to a legislated reduction in the workweek is indeed a crucial issue in the
French case. The 35-hour workweek law guaranteed the monthly earnings of workers receiving
the minimum wage ("salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance" or SMIC). For this
group of workers, hourly wages increased to compensate them for the reduction in hours and
keep their monthly income unchanged. This may reduce the employment effect of the reduction
in hours.
2.2.2 Cooperation in the Presence of Positive Spillovers in Leisure
The theoretical results discussed so far limit the effects of the legislated reductions in the
workweek to direct employment decisions without taking into account general equilibrium effects
or the existence of market inefficiencies that could be corrected by government policies. Very
few theoretical studies focus on these issues. Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) is one exception.
Using a general equilibrium framework with search-matching frictions, they show that the
conditions for obtaining even small employment effects from legislated workweek reduction are
rather restrictive. In particular, to raise the effectiveness of the policy, productive factors which
complement labor, such as capital, should not be able to adjust to the policy intervention. That
might explain why some proponents of legislated workweek reductions would like these policies
to be implemented at the widest possible scale (e.g., at the European Union level). Moreover,
the authors show that the output losses associated with these policies could be quite large.
However, they do not take into account social coordination problems or the possibility that
workers like restrictions on working time as a means to prevent employers from exploiting some
type of yardstick competition mechanism to induce them to overwork.
We believe that these externalities could, in principle, provide a beneficial role to policy
action. For instance, mandated reductions in the workweek may improve workers' welfare if
there are positive spillovers in leisure, i.e. interdependencies between the choices of hours of
different workers, with each worker being better off when others are working fewer hours. This
may be the case if there is a 'rat race' in the workplace and individuals want to be viewed as hard
working. In this case, workers are better off when their colleagues work fewer hours because
they gain a comparative advantage in the 'rat race' and can improve their career prospects.
The decentralized equilibrium, in which each worker chooses hours taking the other workers'
choices as given, is characterized by inefficiently high hours. If workers could coordinate their
actions and collectively choose lower working hours, they would achieve a better, cooperative,
equilibrium. A law imposing an upper bound on hours may provide this type of coordination.
This idea is discussed in Landers et al (1996), who describe an organizational setting with
positive spillovers in leisure. They consider a situation in which there are two types of workers:
those who prefer to work short hours and those who prefer to work long hours. Workers
participate in the labour market for two periods. They may be promoted or not in the second
period depending on their performance in the first period. Firms cannot observe a worker's
type, but take hours as an indicator and promote in the second period those workers who
have worked long hours in the first period. This generates a 'rat race' in which workers with
a preference for short hours may have an incentive to work long hours in the first period in
order to be perceived as hard-working types. To reduce this adverse selection and ensure that
they promote workers who really prefer long hours, firms may find it optimal to increase hours
of work, raising the cost that workers with a preference for short hours have to bear when
disguising themselves as hard-working types. The authors show that this type of equilibrium is
characterized by inefficiently long hours and find evidence in support of this conclusion using
data from two large law firms. Indeed, law firms use long hours as an indicator when deciding
whether to promote associates to partners. As a result, associates have a tendency to work
long hours to stay ahead of their colleagues. This situation is inefficient and workers could be
better off with a coordinated reduction in hours.
More generally, the argument can be made using a simplified representation of the model
proposed in Cooper and John (1988). First, assume that a representative worker i has an utility
function given by U(wHi) V(1 -Hi, 1-Hf), where Hi is the number of hours worked by worker
i, H is the number of hours worked by all other workers, and w is the hourly wage. Utility is
concave in consumption and leisure, U1 1 < 0, Vi1 < 0. Using this very simple setup, we can
characterize two types of equilibrium:
* In a decentralized equilibrium, each worker maximizes his utility taking other workers'
hours as given. We focus on symmetric equilibria, where everyone is working the same
number of hours ( Hi = H). The first order condition to the utility maximization problem
in a symmetric decentralized equilibrium is wU'(wHi) - V1 (1 - Hi, 1 - Hi) = 0.
* In a cooperative equilibrium, each worker internalizes the effect of his hours on other
workers' utility. The first order condition in the symmetric cooperative equilibrium is
wU'(wHi) - V1 (1 - Hi, 1 - Hi) - V2(1 - Hi, 1 - Hi) = 0. With positive spillovers in leisure
V2(1 - Hi, 1 - Hi) > 0 and the cooperative equilibrium is characterized by a lower level
of hours than the decentralized equilibrium.
By not taking into account the effect of their working hours on other workers' utility, work-
ers choose inefficiently high hours in the decentralized equilibrium. A coordinated reduction
in hours (for example, imposed by law) would be welfare improving and this simple model
illustrates the possible role of public policies in helping society to achieve a welfare-enhancing
equilibrium.. However, in the absence of positive spillovers in leisure a mandated reduction in
hours would be introducing a constraint and could make some workers worse off. For those
workers who would, in the decentralized equilibrium, choose hours below the mandated up-
per bound, there is no welfare effect. But for those who would choose to work more, the law
introduces a distortion and makes them worse off.
The simple notion of an externality produced by the free-market equilibrium workweek pro-
vides an interesting twist on the labor supply side of the economy, adding a welcome complexity
to the labor demand-oriented discussion of the previous subsection. For instance, it is possible
that, in the absence of strong externalities, workers decide to work overtime or look for a second
job to avoid a reduction in income that could be associated with a reduced workweek, an effect
not studied in previous empirical papers. If present in the data, such an effort to circumvent
the intent of the law will certainly limit its effect on employment. In Section 2.3 we control
for individual characteristics that can be associated with a preference for working longer hours.
One of these characteristics is "gender", since it is plausible that the 'rat race' equilibrium
described above may be more relevant for men than for women.
The model with leisure complementarities can be modified to illustrate another labour
supply effect that would undermine the effectiveness of work-sharing policies. There might be
direct complementarities between leisure and income such that the workers might not be able to
enjoy longer leisure hours if they are cash constrained. In that case, leisure and income would
not be separable in the utility function as sketched above and the cross derivative of the utility
function would be positive, at least in the relevant range of incomes. In this modified setup,
even in the absence of leisure externalities, workers that face a reduction in their workweek may
get an additional job to supplement their income or bargain for increased hourly wages, instead
of enjoying the extra leisure.
Finally, and very important for our analysis, the reduction in the workweek may lower the
benefits of being a part-time worker vis-A-vis being a full-time worker. In this case, a legislated
workweek reduction could induce some part time workers to become full time, which would limit
the positive employment effects of the law. This effect could have been particularly important
in France, as authorities ended a social security rebate associated to the hiring of part-time
when the 35-hour workweek law was enacted. The possible changed incentives to work part
time versus full time in France after the reduced standard workweek is discussed in Oliveira and
Ulrich (2002). The authors find that part-time employees working between 20 and 30 hours in
firms that reduced working time, saw their chances of getting a full-time position increase. To
abstract from this type of effect, we limit the sample to full time employees in the empirical
analysis in section 2.3.
2.3 The 35-Hour Workweek in France
2.3.1 Institutional Background
The workweek in France has been shortened by a sequence of laws since the early 1980s. In
1982, Francois Mitterrand's socialist government reduced the length of the workweek from 40
to 39 hours. In 1998, a new socialist government, led by Lionel Jospin, further reduced the
workweek to 35 hours through two laws: Aubry I (June 1998), which set the length of the
workweek at 35 hours beginning in February 2000 for firms employing more than 20 people and
in January 2002 for smaller firms; and Aubry II (January 2000), which introduced more detailed
legal provisions regarding overtime. Aubry I gave small firms more time to reduce the workweek
as it was understood that it would be more difficult for them to put into practice the necessary
changes to implement a shorter workweek. To ease that transition, the law reduced the overtime
premium for small firms and increased their annual limit on overtime work compared with large
firms. This way, small firms could continue operating on a 39-hour basis paying the difference
with a reduced overtime premium.
The purpose of the workweek reduction was to create more jobs during a period of high
unemployment (11.5 percent in 1997). Employees were expected to bear a small part of the cost
of the working time reduction, continuing to earn roughly the same monthly income--in line
with the unions' slogan "35 hours pays 39." To attenuate the negative effects on profitability,
the government offered rebates on firms' social security contributions. The rebates declined
with the employee's monthly income and were largest for workers receiving the minimum wage.
In addition, unions accepted a more flexible accounting of overtime work from a weekly to an
annual basis and the working time reduction was expected to increase productivity. The official
argument was that productivity increases together with cuts in social security contributions
might even lead to a reduction in labour costs, so that firms would not need to cut monthly
wages for the policy to be sustainable. To protect low-wage individuals, the law guaranteed the
monthly earnings of workers receiving the minimum wage.
Another noteworthy feature of these laws is the treatment given to managers. Recognizing
the autonomy of their work, the Aubry laws gave them more flexibility in the negotiation
of hours. Aubry II classified managers in three categories: managers integrated in a team,
autonomous managers (including researchers, engineers, investment bankers, etc), and directors.
The first two categories of managers could sign an agreement with their employers to establish
a regular work length in hours or days on a weekly, monthly or annual basis, with additional
hours or days being paid at an overtime premium. Directors were fully exempt from the 35-hour
workweek.
2.3.2 Research Strategy
We are interested in studying the effect of the 35-hour workweek along several dimensions, moti-
vated by the theoretical discussion in section 2.2. As we have seen, theory does not make clear-
cut predictions about the effects of reductions in hours on employment and welfare. Therefore,
whether the 35-hour workweek succeeded in creating more jobs and in making French workers
happier is ultimately an empirical question.
To measure the effect of the law, we use the fact that it was applied earlier in large firms
to construct a natural experiment. Firms with more than 20 employees had to implement the
35-hours workweek by February 2000, while firms with less than 20 employees had until January
2002 to do so. Therefore, we use workers in large firms (20 to 49 employees) as the treatment
group and workers in small firms (less than 20 employees) as the control group.
The effect of interest is captured by the difference between the outcome of the treatment
group after the law and before the law, and the corresponding difference for the control group
- the difference-in-differences (DD) estimator. Formally, we use the following specification to
estimate the effect of the treatment on outcome variable yi for individual i:2
Yit = a + ydt + 3Xit + 6otreatmenti + J, (treatment x post)it + cit
where yit is the outcome of interest for individual i at year t. Xit is a set of controls
capturing observable differences in the characteristics of the control and treatment groups that
affect the outcome of interest. dtis a vector of year effects controlling for time-specific changes
in yit. treatmenti is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual belongs to the treatment group and
0 if she belongs to the control group. This variable captures time-invariant differences between
2For a more technical and comprehensive discussion of this and other strategies for identifying causal effects,
see Angrist and Krueger (1999).
the two groups.
(treatment x post)it is the interaction of the indicator for treatment with an indicator equal
to 1 after the treatment was implemented. The coefficient 6b is the DD estimator measuring
the causal effect of the law on the outcome variable.
This strategy requires fairly weak identifying assumptions to be valid. The key identifying
assumption is that there are no contemporaneous shocks, other than the treatment, affecting the
outcomes of the control and treatment groups during the period we analyze. If this assumption
holds, the behaviour of individuals in the control group gives information about how individuals
in the treatment group would have behaved if they had not been treated.
There is an element which may bias our results. If the business cycle affects the control and
treatment groups differently, our estimates may be capturing the effect of the business cycle
instead of the effect of the treatment. This is important in the case of the 35-hour workweek
because it was implemented during a period when the French economy was booming. If the
boom affects the control and treatment groups differently, the DD estimator will be a biased
measure of the effect of the law. To control for this possible bias, we follow the strategy in
Kugler and Pica (2005) and estimate the following alternative specification, in which GDPtis the
growth rate of real GDP and the extra interaction term captures group-specific business-cycle
effects:
Yit = + -ydt + p(GDPt x treatmenti) + fXit + 6otreatmenti + 61(treatment x post)it + eit
Throughout, we report least-squares estimates, but probit or logit estimates give similar
results. In all estimations, standard errors are clustered by year x treatment group cells. By
clustering the standard errors we correct for the fact that there may be common errors within
these groups. Failure to take this into account would lead to underestimation of the standard
errors and overestimation of the effect of interest, as shown in Moulton (1990).
2.3.3 Our Approach in the Context of the Literature on Hours Reductions
in France
The approach used in this paper differs from the existing literature on the effects of reductions
in hours in France both in terms of methodology and scope of the analysis.
Several studies in France estimate the effect of the 35-hour workweek on employment. They
can be categorized in two groups: ex-ante simulations, which predict the effect of the 35-hour
workweek before it was implemented; and ex-post evaluations. A survey of some of these studies
can be found in Gubian et al (2005).
Ex-ante simulations are based on either macro or micro models. Macro models make as-
sumptions about the evolution of productivity, hourly wages, and capital usage following the
reduction in hours and predict the evolution of employment under these assumptions. An ex-
ample of this type of studies in Dares-BDF-OFCE (1998), which found that a reduction in the
workweek from 39 to 35 hours could potentially generate 700,000 additional jobs. Micro models
specify a functional form for the production function and endogeneize the evolution of wages
using hedonic models. Hedonic models explain wages by looking at the different characteristics
of jobs, including hours of work. Gaps between the workers' desired and actual hours lead to an
increase in wages to compensate them for not working their desired hours. Micro models tend
to predict more modest effects on employment than macro econometric simulations, because
wages would need to increase to compensate workers for working shorter hours. This increase
in labour costs reduces the positive impact of the reduction in hours on employment.
Ex-post evaluations follow an approach more similar to ours and compare firms that reduced
hours (treatment group) with those that did not (control group). However, some of these eval-
uations have methodological flaws and do not control for differences in characteristics between
the two groups. Others apply econometric techniques to account for those differences, which is
important to ensure that the control group is a good counterfactual for the behaviour of the
treatment group in the absence of the reduction in hours. 3 Most of these studies find a strong
positive effect on employment. A potential problem is that they ignore small firms. They re-
strict the analysis to large firms and compare those that reduced hours earlier with those that
3 An example of this type of ex post evaluations is the study by Crepon et al (2005).
did it later. By leaving out small firms, these studies ignore potentially useful information.
Moreover, by dividing large firms into two groups depending on the timing of implementation
of the shorter workweek, these studies generate a bias: both groups of large firms were affected
by the law and their decision to implement it sooner or later could be related to unobservable
variables (e.g. productivity). The results would be capturing the effect of those unobservable
differences rather than the effect of the shorter workweek.
The study that is closest to ours in terms of methodology is Cr6pon and Kramarz (2002).
It analyses the effect on transitions from employment to unemployment of the earlier law that
reduced the workweek from 40 to 39 hours in 1982. The authors explore the variation in hours
worked to design a 'natural experiment', comparing workers who were already working less
than 40 hours before the law (control group) with those who were working 40 hours or more
(treatment group). They find that the reduction in hours increased the probability of making
a transition from employment to unemployment between 2.3 and 3.9 percentage points. This
is an indication that the reduction in hours may have reduced employment, even though the
authors do not attempt to estimate the effect on the level of employment, i.e., taking into
account also possible transitions from unemployment to employment. 4
The effect of the 35-hour workweek on workers' welfare has received much less attention
than the effect on employment. Most studies are based on surveys asking employees affected
by the law whether they consider that their situation has improved as a result of the reduction
in hours. Typically, the majority of employees say that their situation has improved. However,
because these studies do not compare the outcomes of treated individuals to the outcomes of a
control group, they fail to capture any causal effect. 5
In this paper we take a broad approach and look at the effects of the workweek reduction on
4 The same approach could be applied mechanically in the evaluation of the 35-hour workweek law by defining
the treatment group as individuals working more than 35 hours per week before the law was announced and
the control group as individuals working less than 35 hours before the law was announced. However, while the
difference between having a workweek of 40 hours or more or 39 hours or less could be viewed as marginal in
terms of the type of individual who would choose one schedule over the other, the same cannot be argued about
the two types of individuals separated by the most recent law. Indeed, individuals working less than 35 hours per
week can be significantly different from those working 39 hours or more. In particular, they may have a stronger
desire to work part-time or have a more flexible schedule. The dynamics of part-time choice and the decision to
hold more than one job when the workweek in the main job becomes significantly smaller may generate behavioral
changes that complicate the identification of the effects studied in this paper. We will return to this important
issue later.
5 An example of this type of study is Cette et al (2005).
several margins closely related to workers' welfare. We use information on wages, dual-job
holdings, employment, worker transitions from large to small firms, and workers' satisfaction
with their working hours to have a fuller assessment of the effects of the law.
2.3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To implement our empirical strategy, we need information on labour market outcomes and on
firm size, for a period of time spanning the implementation of the 35-hour workweek in large
and small firms. We use data from the French labour force survey (Enquate Emploi) from 1993
to 2000. This survey is conducted in March of each year, with the exception of 1999 when it was
done in January. It has information on several demographic characteristics, as well as on labour
market status, wages, hours of work, tenure, etc. The sample is renewed by a third every year,
so the same individual can be followed for three consecutive years. This dataset is matched
with firm-level data from the French Registry of Firms (SIRENE), containing information on
firm size.
The classification of workers into the control and treatment groups needs to be done before
the law was enacted. This is because workers may move from large to small firms (or vice-versa)
as a result of the law and firms just above the 20-employees cut-off may reduce size to avoid
having to implement the shorter workweek earlier. These behavioural responses would bias our
results. For this reason, we exploit the fact that the same individual can be followed for three
consecutive years and construct several three year panels: 1993-1995, 1994-1996, 1995-1997,
1996-1998, 1997-1999, and 1998-2000. The period before the law covers the years 1993 to 1998
(since the law was announced in June 1998 and the Enquite Emploi was conducted in March
1998) and the period after covers 1999 and 2000. Individuals are classified in the base year,
which always falls within the period before the law was enacted. It is possible that employees
do not change behaviour in 1999 as they may not have had enough time to adjust. This would
bias our results towards underestimating the effect of the law. We take a conservative approach
and see if we find a significant effect already in 1999.6
"3Notice that data characteristics limit how far in time our analysis can go. All information after June 1998 is
tainted by the possible endogenous response of economic agents to the law and, thus, cannot be used to "control"
the start of the experiment. Because we can only follow people for three years, the experiment proposed here
can only produce a snapshot of the effect of the law in March 1999 and March 2000. Further research needs to
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics by hours worked, firm size and year for key individual
characteristics. The sample is limited to employees age 15 to 64 with positive net monthly
income, and excludes self-employed individuals. Small firms have less than 20 employees. Large
firms have between 20 and 49 employees. We impose a cut-off at 49 to ensure more homogeneity
between the two groups, so we can be more confident that the behaviour of small firms, after
controlling for individuals' observable characteristics, can be taken as the counterfactual for the
behaviour of large firms in the absence of the law. We experimented with different cut-off levels
and the results are not sensitive to the cut-off choice. The table shows some differences between
workers in large and small firms: workers in large firms earn higher wages, have longer tenure,
and work fewer hours in the second job (when they have one) than workers in small firms.
There are also differences between individuals working longer and shorter hours: individuals
working longer hours tend to be male, earn higher wages, have longer tenure, and work fewer
hours in the second job than those working shorter hours. Our estimations control for these
differences in observable characteristics.
2.3.5 Results
Hours Distribution and Wages
The introduction of the 35-hour workweek had a clear impact on weekly hours of work, as
shown in Table 2. In 1999 most employees were still working 39 hours. After that, there was a
big increase in the proportion of employees working 35 hours, led by large firms. In 2002 more
than 45 percent of employees in large firms and almost 35 percent of employees in small firms
worked on a 35-hour basis.
To examine more carefully the effect of the law on hours worked, we use the DD estimator
with employees in small firms as the control group and employees in large firms as the treatment
group. We report the results in table 3 using a sample in which part-time workers are excluded
to facilitate the interpretation of future results. Results including part-time workers have the
same flavour and, actually produce parameter estimates with smaller standard errors. All
estimates control for possible interactive business cycle effects. The DD estimators are negative,
be designed to study the effects of the law beyond that.
suggesting that the law reduced hours, but only significantly for women. However, even for
women the impact of the reduction of the workweek on hours seems surprisingly small (around
25 minutes, compared with the legal reduction of 4 hours). One reason for this is that working
time includes not only regular time but also overtime hours. It may happen that firms reduce
regular hours and increase overtime, reducing the effect on total hours.
Table 4 shows the results of applying the same technique to measure the effect on hourly
wages and monthly incomes in the main job, again studying the separate effects on men and
women. We also present results separately for workers receiving between 10% below and 10%
above the minimum wage and workers receiving between 10% and 80% above the minimum
wage. We are interested in this distinction because the law mandated that the monthly earnings
of workers receiving the minimum wage should stay constant.7 The results suggest that the
law led to an increase in hourly wages for men working at and above the minimum wage. In
contrast, the average hourly wage earned by women remained constant (even declined a bit in
the group of workers earning more than the minimum wage). Monthly income is estimated to
have remained the same after the introduction of the law for all different groups, with some
chance that it actually declined for women earning more than the minimum wage (although,
the parameter estimate has a high standard error).8
The increase in hourly wages for men has implications for the work-sharing hypothesis. We
have seen in the theoretical discussion that an increase in hourly wages makes it less likely that
a reduction in hours increases employment. This is because the increase in labour costs induces
a scale effect, with a negative impact on both hours and jobs. As we shall see, this is indeed
the case: the flow to unemployment of employed men in large firms increased significantly after
the 35-hour workweek was enacted. Women employed in large firms did not face an increase in
their chances of losing a job.
7 We exclude workers with earnings more than 80% above the minimum wage as we want to ensure more
homogeneity within the group. Moreover, as we have discussed, the law gave more flexibility in the negotiation
of hours to workers in managerial positions. These workers are more likely to be at the top of the earnings
distribution.
8The results are insensitive to estimation with individual fixed effects to account for unobservable differences
among individuals.
Dual-Job Holdings
A margin of adjustment which sheds light both on the work-sharing hypothesis and on the
different supply-side hypotheses on workweek choice (externality in leisure or complementarity
between income and leisure) is the proportion of workers with more than one job. If individuals
respond to the reduction in hours by working in a second job, it is less likely that unemployment
will decline, because some jobs will be filled by individuals who are already employed elsewhere.
At the same time, the fact that workers are looking for a second job suggests that they have a
stronger preference for income relative to leisure. In that case the reduction in hours would not
be working, for instance, as a coordination mechanism to encourage workers to increase their
leisure time.
When excluding part-time workers, Table 5 shows that the law increased dual job holdings
by 1.2 percentage points among women but not among men. If part-time workers are included,
the probability of holding an extra job actually seems to decline after the law. This is consistent
with the effect discussed in the theoretical section: once the workweek is reduced, part-timers
find easier to become full-timers and, thus, some abandon their second job.
So far, the results presented tell a consistent story: full-time men in large firms have not
reduced much their workweek right after the law was implemented, have got higher hourly
wages, and about unchanged monthly income, therefore, having no reason to take up a second
job. On the other hand, women have reduced their workweek by more than men and possibly
began earning smaller monthly incomes after the law was enacted. Thus, they had a higher
incentive (and more free time) to accept a second job. If men's hourly wages and women's
dual-job take-up had remained unchanged, arguments for strong preferences for lower hours
(that could not be attained by the market because of the externalities discussed here) or for
the absence of relevant complementarities between leisure and cash would be more persuasive.
Employment
To test the work-sharing hypothesis directly, we are interested in the effect of the 35-hour
workweek on employment. We look both at flows in and out of employment and at the level of
employment.
To measure the effect of the law on transitions from employment to unemployment, we
restrict the sample to employees working more than 35 hours before the law as those were the
ones for whom the law was binding. We compare the probability of becoming unemployed for
workers initially working at large firms (treatment group) relative to workers initially working at
small firms (control group). The results are reported in Table 6. The law increased transitions
from employment to unemployment for men by 2.8 percentage points, while it did not affect
transitions for women. This is consistent with the results found so far: as hourly wages increased
for men, they became more expensive, giving firms an incentive to fire them. Women, on the
other hand, accepted the same (or even a slightly reduced) hourly wage, which did not put
additional cost pressures on firms.
To measure the effect of the law on transitions in the reverse direction, i.e. from unemploy-
ment to employment, we test whether unemployed workers are more likely to find a job in large
firms or in small firms as a result of the reduction in hours. Table 7 reports the results. The
first column reports the log of the probability of working at a large firm at t+2 relative to being
unemployed. The second column reports the equivalent relative probability for small firms. We
are interested in comparing the coefficients on unemployed x post1999 in the two columns. The
comparison of these two coefficients tells us whether unemployed individuals are more likely to
find a job at a large firm or at a small firm after the 35-hour workweek was implemented.
The results suggest that after 1999 there was an increase in the probability of finding a job,
which was larger in large firms than in small firms for women (although, we reject the equality
of the coefficients on unemployed x post1999 only at the 13 percent level of significance) but
not for men. Again, this is consistent with the previous estimation, which showed no increase
in hourly wages for women in firms that reduced the workweek (large firms).
The evidence on transitions in and out of employment suggests that the 35-hours workweek
changed the composition of the labour force, with large firms letting some more expensive
workers (men) go. The group that has not earned increased hourly wages (women) has not
faced higher transitions to unemployment and had a marginal increase in flows into jobs. This
is strong evidence of the importance of wage reactions to determine the final effect of workweek
reduction laws on employment, a result consistent with previous findings in the literature.
However, to measure the impact of the law on employment it is important to look not only
at transitions in and out of employment but also at the level of employment. Unfortunately,
the data do not allow measuring this effect in a clear way. If we were to apply the DD strategy
to study the effect of the law on the level of employment, we would like to have treatment and
control groups which are composed of both employed and unemployed individuals. Then, we
would test whether the fraction of employed individuals increased by more for the treatment
group than for the control group after the law. The problem is that the source of variation
that we can explore to define the treatment and control groups (variation in firm size) implies
that, by definition, all individuals in the two groups are employed. Indeed, employees in large
and small firms are all, by definition, employed. Thus, we do not have suitable treatment and
control groups.
In spite of this technical difficulty, we can still shed light on the effect of the 35-hour
workweek on the level of employment by comparing the evolution of employment in small
and large firms. To do so, we look at how the probability of working in large firms relative
to being unemployed changed after the implementation of the reduction in hours comparing
with the equivalent probability for small firms. Table 7 reports the results. The probability
of being employed relative to being unemployed increased after 1999 in large and small firms
by approximately the same amount, as the two coefficients on post1999 are not statistically
different for neither men nor women (although the difference is a bit larger in the second case).
Thus, even though employment increased after the law, it did not increase more in large firms
relative to small firms. This suggests that the law did not increase employment, at least by
2000. An alternative way of making the same point is to plot the log of the probability of
working in a large or in a small firm divided by the probability of being unemployed. Figure 1
shows that the log odds of employment by firm size are essentially parallel, suggesting that the
35-hour workweek had no effect on the level of employment.
Transitions from Large to Small Firms
Transitions of workers from firms affected by the law in the first instance (large firms) to
firms where the adjustment in hours was delayed (small firms) could provide some evidence on
whether there are positive spillovers in leisure or complementarities between leisure and cash:
in the absence of these effects we should see an increase in these transitions as individuals try
to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the 35-hour workweek. This may not be the case if
workers anticipate that the 35-hour workweek will also be implemented in small firms with a
two-year lag and decide that it is not worthwhile to move. Nevertheless, this is a margin of
adjustment we should explore. To do that, we look at employees working in large firms and
compare the transitions to small firms of those who were working more than 35 hours (treatment
group) relative to those who were working 35 hours or less (control group) before the law. The
results are reported in Table 9. The law had no effect on transitions from large to small firms
for men. For women, there is evidence of a small increase (0.4 percentage points), but the result
is not highly significant (p-value of 13%).
Satisfaction with Hours of Work
Just as we measured the direct effect of the 35-hour workweek on employment, we would like
to have a direct measure of its effect on workers' satisfaction. One way of doing this is to
look at subjective measures of satisfaction with hours of work. Because this is not the type
of information that can be found in labour force surveys, we need to use an alternative data
source.
We use data from the French section of the ECHP, Waves 1 to 8, covering the years 1994
to 2001. This survey has a panel structure, following the same individuals over time. It has
information on satisfaction with hours of work and with the amount of leisure time.9 It also
has information on firm size, which allows us to classify individuals into the treatment group if
they were working in a large firm in the last survey before the law was implemented and 0 if
they were working in a small firm.
The results, reported in table 10, suggest that lower working hours did not make workers
happier with their work and leisure times. The workweek reduction reduced satisfaction with
working hours for both men and women. Men also became less satisfied with their amount of
leisure time.
!ýSatisfaction with hours of work and with the amount of leisure time is measured on a scale from 1 to 6.
There is some skepticism about the quality of subjective measures of happiness and satisfaction. But, in most
cases, friends and colleagues of the individual give ratings which are strongly related to the way people rate
themselves, as reported in Diener and Suh (1999). This is reassuring and suggests that these measures provide
useful information on individuals' welfare.
2.3.6 Summing up
To close this section it is useful to take stock of the empirical evidence. We found that the
35-hours workweek had the following effects:
* hours of work decreased less for men than for women. This may be explained by men
choosing to work more overtime.
* hourly wages increased for men (probably due to an overtime premium). There is no
evidence of an increase in wages for women.
* transitions out of employment increased for men as they became more expensive and did
not change for women.
* the overall level of employment does not seem to have been affected.
* dual-job holdings increased for women, suggesting a desire to work more than the man-
dated number of hours.
* and satisfaction with working hours and the amount of leisure time did not increase
These findings tell a consistent story and provide strong evidence against the work-sharing
hypothesis and some hints that positive spillovers in leisure are not important and that com-
plementarities between income and leisure may exist. The effect on hours of work suggests
that the law was indeed binding, even if the actual reduction in hours was substantially smaller
than the amount legislated (because some workers, specially men, might have chosen to work
overtime). The evidence on hourly wages and on dual job holdings suggests that there are
other margins of adjustment, which reduced any potential positive impact of the reduction in
hours on employment. In particular, the importance of wage reactions to determine the impact
of workweek reduction laws is clear in our results: negative employment effects exist only for
the group that has obtained an increase in hourly wages (men). The group that has not seen
increased hourly wages (women) looked more actively to obtain a second job, an alternative way
to keep total hours worked and monthly income unchanged, instead of enjoying the additional
leisure time.
The evidence on employment and on satisfaction with working hours provides more direct
tests of the work-sharing hypothesis and of the hypothesis of positive spillovers or complemen-
tarities between income and leisure, respectively. The evidence on employment shows that the
law changed the composition of the labour force, with no evident impact on the overall level
of employment. The evidence on satisfaction with working hours suggests that there are no
positive spillovers in leisure and, on average, workers may need more income to enjoy extra
leisure. This is, to some extent, not surprising as we have seen that positive spillovers arise
from a 'rat race' in the workplace. This type of 'rat race' is likely to be more important for
professions with high earnings and high responsibility, such as managerial positions. But, these
professions (e.g. lawyers, investment bankers, engineers, researchers, etc) had a large degree of
flexibility in adjusting their hours, with directors being completely exempt from the 35-hour
workweek. Thus, it is not surprising that the evidence for the existence of positive spillovers is
not strong. The professionals who could have benefited more from a coordinated reduction in
hours were the ones least affected by it.
2.4 Work-Sharing Experiments in Other Countries
The evidence presented in the last section suggests that the 35-hour workweek failed to increase
employment and make workers happier with their hours of work. To what extent can this
negative evaluation be extended to work-sharing policies in other countries?
The literature evaluating the success of work-sharing experiments is not very extensive. In
spite of that, there are studies applying empirical strategies similar to ours to evaluate work-
sharing experiments in Germany, Sweden and Canada.
Germany started reducing standard hours in 1985 on an industry-by-industry basis, with
the purpose of raising employment. Hunt (1998 and 1999) exploits the cross-industry variation
in standard hours' reductions to study their impact on actual hours worked, wages and em-
ployment. She finds that the reductions in hours decreased employment in the period 1984-94.
This may be explained by the large increase in hourly wages, which was enough to offset the
decline in actual hours worked and keep monthly incomes unchanged.
Sweden reduced working time by 5% for a particular class of shift workers. This reduction
happened gradually in the mid-1980s. Skans (2004) evaluates this policy comparing workers
affected by the reduction in hours to workers unaffected by it. He finds that there was little
implementation of the working-time reduction, with actual hours falling by only about 35%
of the reduction in standard hours. Hourly wages increased sharply, almost enough to offset
the loss in earnings due to the decline in actual hours. He does not look at the effects on
employment.
In Canada, there was a mandated reduction of the workweek from 44 to 40 hours in Que-
bec between 1997 and 2000 with the aim of increasing employment. This reduction applied
only to non-unionized hourly paid workers. Skuterud (2007) looks at the effect of this policy
on employment. He uses both DD and DDD estimation. In the DD estimation he compares
non-unionized hourly paid workers in Quebec (treatment group) to non-unionized hourly paid
workers in Ontario, where there was no reduction in the workweek (control group). In the DDD
estimation he exploits another source of variation to control for province-specific factors unre-
lated to the work-sharing policy. He compares non-unionized hourly paid workers (treatment
group) to non-unionized salaried workers (control group) in Quebec (experimental province)
and in Ontario (non-experimental province). In other specifications, he also exploits cross-
industry variation, comparing industries where hours of worked were affected relatively more to
those affected relatively less. His findings suggest that the policy failed to increase employment
either at the provincial level or within industries that were affected relatively more.
The evidence for Canada is particularly striking because its work-sharing experiment has
a set of conditions which are particularly suitable for it to succeed in creating more jobs.
Skuterud lists five conditions. First, Canada has a less regulated labour market than most
European countries. Therefore, it is less likely that unions or the government will impose full
wage compensation for the reduction in hours. Second, the reduction in hours was applied to
non-unionized hourly paid workers, who are disproportionately unskilled and have high rates of
unemployment. They have little bargaining power in wage negotiations and so are unlikely to
be able to obtain wage compensations. Third, fixed costs of unemployment for these workers
(training costs, benefits, etc) are low, reducing the importance of the scale effect of the reduction
in hours. Fourth, the difference in skills between these workers and the unemployed is small,
facilitating the substitution between hours and jobs. Finally, survey evidence suggests that
these workers have a preference for shorter hours. So, they are less likely to look for a second
job. Even with all these suitable characteristics, work sharing failed to create more jobs for
these workers.
The cross-country evidence for Germany, Sweden and Canada is consistent with our findings
for France and confirms that work-sharing policies have little, if any, potential to increase
employment.
2.5 Policy Implications
Our analysis suggests that the 35-hour workweek in France failed to create more jobs and
promoted a series of behavioural changes suggestive that many workers were less happy with
their working hours. Available evidence for other countries, such as Germany, Sweden and
Canada, also shows that reductions in hours failed to increase employment.
The fallacy underlying the intuitive and simple idea of work sharing is that it fails to consider
additional margins of adjustment other than hours and jobs. In particular, it seems too strong
to assume that hourly wages will remain unchanged by the law. Even for groups of workers to
whom this assumption applies, other margins of adjustment, like holding an extra job, could
decrease the potential of legislated workweek reductions to create more jobs. At the same time,
the idea of positive spillovers in leisure, motivated by a 'rat race' equilibrium in the workplace,
seems to be relevant in some professions, in particular the ones where long hours and high
salaries are the rule. But, because the shorter workweek was applied much more flexibly to
workers in managerial positions, with directors being fully exempt, its potential to provide a
mechanism for offsetting the 'rat race' equilibrium was largely diminished.
Our results suggest that the 35-hour workweek should be discontinued and workers and
firms should be free to choose the length of the workweek. This would eliminate the costly side
effects of the law (in terms of individuals' welfare) that we examined in this paper, such as the
increase in movements in and out of employment and in dual job holdings. Relaxing the law
along the lines initially proposed by Nicolas Sarkozy, exempting overtime from payroll charges
and income tax, is unlikely to yield the same results as discontinuing the law altogether, at
least for two reasons. First, overtime hours are paid with a premium. It is not clear whether
the tax savings by firms will be enough to bring the cost of overtime hours in line with the cost
of regular hours. Second, the two policies (discontinuing the law or relaxing it by exempting
overtime from taxes) are clearly not equivalent from the point of view of the government budget.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
35 Hours or Less More than 35 Hours
Large firms Small firms Large firms Small firms
1993-1997 1998-2000 1993-1997 1998-2000 1993-1997 1998-2000 1993-1997 1998-2000
Percentage female 85.460 79.279 85.162 79.447 34.072 32.602 35.999 33.800
(35.257) (40.567) (35.550) (40.420) (47.397) (46.886) (48.000) (47.308)
Average net monthly
income (francs) 5671.961 5036.295 4578.945 4234.521 7922.348 9450.667 8526.168 9094.425
(21667.760) (5036.926) (18968.900) (2621.242) (4645.550) (36615.400) (31722.900) (36429.050)
Percentage with tenure
less than 1 year 18.600 13.694 20.077 20.207 8.378 10.269 14.201 16.567
(38.918) (34.409) (40.060) (40.166) (27.707) (30.362) (34.907) (37.182)
Average hours in primary
job 23.920 23.955 22.703 23.069 40.564 40.541 41.190 40.992
(7.032) (7.561) (7.401) (7.327) (4.436) (4.644) (5.731) (5.270)
Average hours in second
job 0.704 0.845 0.925 1.110 0.125 0.075 0.136 0.108
(3.588) (3.888) (4.066) (4.535) (1.680) (1.277) (1.714) (1.185)
Notes: Table reports group means by hours worked, firm size and time period. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The sample is limited
to employees under age 64 with positive net monthly income and excludes self-employed individuals.
Source: French labour force survey (Enqu&te Emploi), 1993-2000.
Table 2: Distribution of Usual Weekly Hours (%)
Small firms Large firms
35- 35-
Above 39 39 39 35 Below 35 Above 39 39 39 35 Below 35
1999 21.49 49.02 2.25 2.46 24.78 16.44 47.43 8.66 5.48 15.88
2000 21.39 44.64 2.2 7.2 24.57 14.46 30.66 8.64 24.43 15.76
2001 21.7 41.33 3.27 11.86 21.82 13.49 18.9 8.47 35.68 13.53
2002 17.35 21.54 4.75 33.73 22.62 13.38 9.99 9.71 45.42 15.42
Source. Enquite Emploi, 1993-2000
Table 3: Usual Weekly Hours
Men Women
Treatment -0.594*** -0.243*
(0.100) (0.137)
Treatment*Post 1999 -0.170 -0.443 *
(0.104) (0.247)
Married 0.375*** -0.349***
(0.085) (0.087)
Children under 6 0.040 -0.559***
(0.052) (0.115)
Age 0.146*** -0.047*
(0.027) (0.025)
Tenure less than 1 year -0.144 -0.419***
(0.155) (0.139)
N 25642 15292
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by year x treatment. Regressions
include year dummies, region effects, education, age-squared, and GDPx treatment.
Sample excludes part time workers. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at
the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level.
Estimated equations:
y,, = a + ?d, + f/X, + SoTreatmentj + S1(Treatmentx postl999),, +e,,
y,, is usual weekly hours. d, is a set of time dummies. post 1999, is an indicator
equal to I if year t corresponds to 1999 or after and 0 otherwise. X,, is a vector of
control variables. Treatment, is an indicator equal to 1 if the worker works at a large
firm at time t and 0 if he works at a small firm.
Least squares estimates.
Sources: Enquete Emploi, 1993-2000; authors' calculations.
Table 4: Wages and Monthly Income
Log Hourly Wage Log Monthly Income
Men Women Men Women
A. Workers between 10% below and 10% above minimum wage
Treatment 0.010*** 0.014** -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Treatment*Post 1999 0.010*** -0.006 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.009** 0.004 0.008*** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Children under 6 -0.006** 0.003 -0.003** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Age 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Tenure less than 1 year -0.005 -0.002 -0.005** 0.001
(0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004)
N 7640 3794 7641 3794
B. Workers between 10% and 80% above minimum wage
Treatment 0.021*** -0.016*** 0.008** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002)
Treatment*Post 1999 0.014** -0.016* 0.0002 -0.005
(0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)
Married 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Children under 6 -0.003 0.010 -0.004** -0.008**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003)
Age 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.013*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Tenure less than 1 year -0.024*** -0.035** -0.012* -0.027***
(0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008)
N 10602 5319 10603 5320
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by year x treatment. Hourly
wage is monthly wage/(4.33xusual weekly hours). Section A. shows the results for a
sample of employees under age 64 with net monthly income between 10% below and
10% above the minimum wage. Section B. shows the results for a sample of
employees under age 64 with net monthly income between 10% and 80% above the
minimum wage. Regressions include year dummies, region effects, education, age-
squared, and GDPx treatment. Sample excludes part time workers.
Estimated equations:
y,1 = a + yd, + fX,, + 0Treatment, + 8 1(Treatmentx postl999),, + i,
y,, is log hourly wage or log monthly income. d, is a set of time dummies.
post1999, is an indicator equal to 1 if year t corresponds to 1999 or after and 0
otherwise. X,, is a vector of control variables. Treatment, is an indicator equal to I if
the worker works at a large firm at time t and 0 if he works at a small firm.
Least squares estimates.
Sources: Enquete Emploi, 1993-2000; authors' calculations.
Table 5: Dual Job Holdings
Including
Men
Treatment
Treatment*Post 1999
Married
Children under 6
Age
Tenure less than 1 year
N
-0.010**
(0.001)
-0.005 *
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
-0.007**
(0.002)
27263
Part Time
Women
0.002
(0.002)
-0.0003
(0.006)
-0.024***
(0.003)
-0.004**
(0.002)
0.004***
(0.001)
-0.009
(0.007)
24112
Excluding
Men
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.0008
(0.002)
0.004***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.0007)
-0.002
(0.002)
25935
Part Time
Women
0.004
(0.002)
0.012***
(0.003)
-0.008***
(0.002)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.0007)
0.003
(0.003)
14716
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by year x treatment. Regression
includes year dummies, region effects, education, net monthly income, age-squared
and GDPx treatment.
Estimated equation:
Yi, = a + yd, + f/X, + tTreatment, + 62(Treatment x postl999),, + ci,
y,, is an indicator equal to 1 if the worker has a second job and 0 otherwise. d, is a
set of time dummies. post1999, is an indicator equal to 1 if year t corresponds to
1999 or after and 0 otherwise. X,, is a vector of control variables. Treatment, is an
indicator equal to 1 if the worker works at a large firm at time t and 0 if he works at a
small firm.
Least squares estimates.
Sources: Enquete Emploi, 1993-2000; authors' calculations.
Table 6: Transitions from Employment to Unemployment
Men Women
Treatment -0.011** 0.006
(0.004) (0.006)
Treatment*Post 1999 0.028*** -0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Married -0.016** -0.005
(0.007) (0.006)
Children under 6 0.003 -0.007
(0.003) (0.006)
Age 0.0003 0.0004
(0.002) (0.002)
Tenure less than 1 year 0.082*** 0.074***
(0.008) (0.014)
Seasonal contract 0.003 0.174**
(0.047) (0.062)
N 8542 4779
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by year x treatment. Regression
includes year dummies, region effects, education, age-squared, and GDPx treatment.
The sample is limited to employees working more than 35 hours at time t (the first
year in each panel).
Estimated equation:
Yit+2 = + yd,+2 + pX,, + S0 Treatment, + 5 (large firm x postl 999) i1+2 + Eit+2
yi,+2 is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is unemployed at time t+2 (the last
year in each panel). d,+2 is a set of time dummies. post 1999,+2 is an indicator equal
to 1 if year t+2 corresponds to 1999 or after and 0 otherwise. X,, is a vector of control
variables. Treatment, is an indicator equal to 1 if the worker works at a large firm at
time t and 0 if he works at a small firm.
Least squares estimates.
Sources: Enquete Emploi, 1993-2000; authors' calculations.
Table 7: Transitions from Unemployment to Employment
Unemployed
Unemployed* post 1999
Unemployed*unemployed
less than a year
Married
Children under 6
Age
log[P(large)/
P(unemployed)]
-2.875***
(0.176)
1.878***1.891***
(0.186)
0.511"**
(0.097)
0.878***
(0.089)
-0.094
(0.084)
0.106***
(0.033)
%:n
log[P(small)/
P(unemployed)]
-2.576***
(0.218)
(0.187)
0.447***
(0.165)
0.806***
(0.060)
-0.054
(0.091)
0.051**
(0.026)
log[P(large)/
P(unemployed)]
-2.462***
(0.207)
1.602***
(0.289)
0.669***
(0.177)
0.132**
(0.067)
-0.335***
(0.091)
0.059*
(0.036)
omen
log[P(small)/
P(unemployed)]
-2.253***(0.208)
1.449***
(0.228)
0.501***
(0.124)
0.171"**
(0.061)
-0.299***
(0.069)
0.060**
(0.031)
p-value for equality of 0.893 0.126
coefficients on
unemployed*post 1999
N 7016 7110
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by year x unemployed in base year.
Comparison group is the unemployed. Estimates give the change in the log odds ratio for a
one-unit change in the independent variable. Regression includes year dummies, region
effects, education and age-squared.
Estimated equation:
P(statusi+2 = k) = D(aI + d1 + BXil + 0ounemp + 81(unemp, x post1999,t+2)+
62 (unemp, x unempless 1 year, ))
status,,+2 takes three values (k=-, 2, 3): 1 if the individual is unemployed, 2 if he is
employed at a large firm, and 3 if he is employed at a small firm at time t+2 (the last year
in each panel). d,+2 is a set of time dummies. post1999,+2 is an indicator equal to 1 if year
t+2 corresponds to 1999 or after and 0 otherwise. X,, is a vector of control variables.
unemp,, is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is unemployed at time t (the first year in
each panel) and 0 otherwise. unempless 1 year,, is an indicator equal to I if the individual
has been unemployed for less than one year at time t and 0 otherwise.
Multinomial logit estimates.
Sources: Enquete Emploi, 1993-2000; authors' calculations.
Table 8: Employment
Men Women
log[P(large)/ Log[P(small)/ log[P(large)/ log[P(small)/
P(unemployed)] P(unemployed)] P(unemployed)] P(unemployed)]
Postl999 0.143*** 0.153*** 0.038 -0.010
(0.038) (0.033) (0.038) (0.031)
Married 1.162*** 1.074***0.360*** 0.452***
(0.036) (0.031) (0.033) (0.027)
Children under 6 -0.123*** -0.070*** -0.280*** -0.288***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.030) (0.023)
Age 0.165*** 0.106*** 0.095*** 0.076***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
p-value for equality 0.755 0.185
of coefficients on
post1999
N 46719 44425
Notes. The comparison group is the unemployed. Estimates give the change in the log odds
ratio for a one-unit change in the independent variable. Regression includes year dummies,
region effects, education and age-squared.
Estimated equation:
P(status,, = k) = ýD(a + 7post 1999, + 8X,,
status,, takes three values (k=-, 2, 3): 1 if the individual is unemployed, 2 if he is
employed at a large firm, and 3 if he is employed at a small firm at time t. post 1999, is an
indicator equal to 1 if year t corresponds to 1999 or after and 0 otherwise. X,, is a vector of
control variables.
Multinomial logit estimates.
Sources. Enquite Emploi, 1993-2000; authors' calculations.
Table 9: Transitions from Large to Small Firms
Men
Treatment
Treatment*Post 1999
Married
Children under 6
Age
Tenure less than 1 year
N
-0.022***
(0.007)
0.0006
(0.009)
0.008**
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.002)
0.062***
(0.006)
18671
Women
-0.031 ***
(0.004)
0.005
(0.003)
0.007**
(0.003)
-0.007*
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.074***
(0.012)
14563
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by year x treatment. Regression
includes year dummies, region effects, education, net monthly income, age-squared,
and GDPx treatment. The sample is limited to employees working at large firms at
time t (the first year in each panel).
Estimated equation:
Yi,+2 = a + d+ 2 + fl 1 I + 0,treatment, + 5, (treatmentx postl 99 9)it+2 + Et,+2
Y,i+2 is an indicator equal to I if the worker works at a small firm at time t+2 (the last
year in each panel) and 0 if he works at a large firm. d,+2 is a set of time dummies.
post 1999,+2 is an indicator equal to 1 if year t+2 corresponds to 1999 or after and 0
otherwise. X,, is a vector of control variables. treatment, is an indicator equal to 1 if
the worker works more that 35 hours at time t and 0 otherwise.
Least squares estimates.
Sources: Enquete Emploi, 1993-2000; authors' calculations.
Table 10: Satisfaction with Hours of Work and Amount of Leisure Time
Men
Women
Working Amount of Working Amount of
Hours Leisure Hours Leisure
Satisfaction with: Time Time
Treatment -2.375** 0.217*** -3.139*** 0.023
(1.186) (0.058) (0.993) (0.182)
Post 0.908*** 0.098*** 0.648*** 0.088**
(0.055) (0.014) (0.058) (0.042)
Treatment*Post -1.610** -0.114*** -1.773*** 0.006
(0.645) (0.033) (0.559) (0.117)
Health problems 0.027 -0.167*** 0.061 -0.136
(0.167) (0.061) (0.261) (0.253)
Married -0.096 -0.105 -0.161 -0.201 * * *
(0.112) (0.090) (0.185) (0.038)
Age -0.002 -0.003 0.009*** -0.010*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Children under 12 0.017 -0.231** -0.153** -0.659***
(0.045) (0.111) (0.073) (0.074)
N 1016 562
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by treatment x Post. Regressions
include region effects, education, net monthly income, and GDPx treatment. The
sample is limited to full time employees.
Estimated equations:
P(y,, = k) = $D[apost, + Sotreatment, + 6, (treatmentx post),, + X,,]
y,, represents self-reported levels of satisfaction with hours worked and the amount of
leisure time, on a scale from 1 (not satisfied) to 6 (fully satisfied). post , is an
indicator equal to I if year t falls within the period after the law and 0 otherwise. X,,
is a vector of control variables. treatment, is an indicator equal to I if the worker
works in a large firm just before the law was implemented and 0 if he works in a
small firm just before the law was implemented.
Ordered Probit estimates.
Sources: ECHP for France, Waves 1 to 8 (1994-2001); authors' calculations.
Figure 1. Log employment probabilities by firm size
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Chapter 3
International Investors, the U.S.
Current Account, and the Dollar
3.1 Introduction
Two main forces underlie the large U.S. current account deficits of the past decade. The first is
an increase in U.S. demand for foreign goods, partly due to relatively faster U.S. growth, and
partly due to shifts in demand away from U.S. goods toward foreign goods. The second is an
increase in foreign demand for U.S. assets, starting with high foreign private demand for U.S.
equities in the second half of the 1990s, and later shifting to foreign private and then central
bank demand for U.S. bonds in the 2000s. Both forces have contributed to steadily increasing
current account deficits since the mid-1990s, accompanied by a real dollar appreciation until
late 2001 and a real depreciation since. The depreciation accelerated in late 2004, raising the
issues of whether and how much more is to come and, if so, against which currencies: the euro,
the yen, or the Chinese renminbi.
We address these issues by developing a simple model of exchange rate and current account
"This chapter is joint work with Olivier Blanchard (MIT) and Francesco Giavazzi (Universit6 Commerciale
Luigi Bocconi). It has been published in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2005. An earlier version
of this paper with the same title was circulated as MIT working paper WP 05-02, January 2005. We thank
Ben Bernanke, Ricardo Caballero, Menzie Chinn, William Cline, Guy Debelle, Kenneth Froot, Pierre-Olivier
Gourinchas, Soren Harck, Maurice Obstfeld, H616ne Rey, Roberto Rigobon, Kenneth Rogoff, Nouriel Roubini,
and the participants at the Brookings Panel conference for comments. We also thank Suman Basu, Nigel Gault,
Brian Sack, Catherine Mann, Kenneth Matheny, Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, and Philip Lane for help with data.
determination, which we then use to interpret the recent behavior of the U.S current account
and the dollar and explore what might happen in alternative future scenarios. The model's
central assumption is that there is imperfect substitutability not only between U.S. and foreign
goods, but also between U.S. and foreign assets. This allows us to discuss the effects not only of
shifts in the relative demand for goods, but also of shifts in the relative demand for assets. We
show that increases in U.S. demand for foreign goods lead to an initial real dollar depreciation,
followed by further, more gradual depreciation over time. Increases in foreign demand for U.S.
assets lead instead to an initial appreciation, followed by depreciation over time, to a level lower
than before the shift.
The model provides a natural interpretation of the recent behavior of the U.S. current ac-
count and the dollar exchange rate. The initial net effect of the shifts in U.S. demand for foreign
goods and in foreign demand for U.S. assets was a dollar appreciation. Both shifts however
imply an eventual depreciation. The United States appears to have entered this depreciation
phase.
How much depreciation is to come, and at what rate, depends on how far the process has
come and on future shifts in the demand for goods and the demand for assets. This raises two
main issues. First, can one expect the deficit to largely reverse itself without changes in the
exchange rate? If it does, the needed depreciation will obviously be smaller. Second, can one
expect foreign demand for U.S. assets to continue to increase? If it does, the depreciation will
be delayed, although it will still have to come eventually. While there is substantial uncertainty
about the answers, we conclude that neither scenario is likely. This leads us to anticipate, in
the absence of surprises, more dollar depreciation to come at a slow but steady rate.
Surprises will, however, take place; only their sign is unknown. We again use the model as
a guide to discuss a number of alternative scenarios, from the abandonment of the renminbi's
peg against the dollar, to changes in the composition of reserves held by Asian central banks,
to changes in U.S. interest rates.
This leads us to the last part of the paper, where we ask how much of the dollar's future
depreciation is likely to take place against the euro, and how much against Asian currencies.
We extend our model to allow for four "countries": the United States, the euro area, Japan,
and China. We conclude that, again absent surprises, the path of adjustment is likely to
be associated primarily with an appreciation of the Asian currencies, but also with a further
appreciation of the euro against the dollar.
3.2 A Model of the Exchange Rate and the Current Account
Much of economists' intuition about joint movements in the exchange rate and the current
account is based on the assumption of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
assets. As we shall show, introducing imperfect substitutability changes the picture substan-
tially. Obviously, it allows one to think about the dynamic effects of shifts in asset preferences.
But it also modifies the dynamic effects of shifts in preferences with respect to goods.
We are not the first to insist on the potential importance of imperfect substitutability.
Indeed, the model we present builds on an older (largely and unjustly forgotten) set of papers
by Paul Masson, Dale Henderson and Kenneth Rogoff, and, especially, Pentti Kouril. These
papers relax the interest parity condition and instead assume imperfect substitutability of
domestic and foreign assets. Masson and Henderson and Rogoff focus mainly on issues of
stability; Kouri focuses on the effects of changes in portfolio preferences and the implications
of imperfect substitutability between assets for shocks to the current account.
The value added of this paper is in allowing for a richer description of gross asset positions.
By doing this, we are able to incorporate into the analysis the "valuation effects" that have been
at the center of recent empirical research on gross financial flows 2 , and that play an important
role in the context of U.S. current account deficits. Many of the themes we develop, including
the roles of imperfect substitutability and valuation effects, have also been recently emphasized
by Maurice Obstfeld3
'1Masson (1981); Henderson and Rogoff (1982); Kouri (1983). The working paper version of the paper by
Kouri dates from 1976. One could argue that there were two fundamental papers written that year, the first
by Dornbusch (1976), who explored the implications of perfect substitutability, and the other by Kouri explored
the implications of imperfect substitutability. The Dornbusch approach, with its powerful implications, has
dominated research since then. But imperfect substitutability seems central to the issues we face today. Branson
(1985) provides a survey of this early literature.
SSee, in particular, Gourinchas and Rey (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004).
•'Obstfeld (2004). We limit our analysis of valuation effects to those originating from exchange rate movements.
Valuation effects can and do also arise from changes in asset prices, particularly stock prices. The empirical
analysis of a much richer menu of possible valuation effects has recently become possible, thanks to the data on
gross financial flows and gross asset positions assembled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti.
3.2.1 The Case of Perfect Substitutability
To see how imperfect substitutability of assets matters, it is best to start from the well-
understood case of perfect substitutability. Consider a world with two "countries": the United
States and a single foreign country comprising the rest of the world. We can think of the U.S.
current account and the exchange rate as being determined by two relations. The first is the
uncovered interest parity condition:
E
(1 r) =(1 +) E 1
+1
where r and r* are U.S. and foreign real interest rates, respectively (asterisks denote foreign
variables), E is the real exchange rate defined as the price of U.S. goods in terms of foreign
goods (so that an increase in the exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the dollar), and
E' 1 is the expected real exchange rate in the next period. The condition states that expected
returns on U.S. and foreign assets must be equal.
The second relation is the equation giving net debt accumulation:
F+1 = (1 + r)F + D(E+1,z+I)
where D(E, z) is the trade deficit. The trade deficit is an increasing function of the real
exchange rate (so that DE > 0). All other factors-changes in total U.S. or foreign spending,
as well as changes in the composition of U.S. or foreign spending between foreign and domestic
goods at a given exchange rate---are captured by the shift variable z. We define z such that
an increase worsens the trade balance (Dz > 0). F is the net debt of the United States,
denominated in terms of U.S. goods. The condition states that net debt in the next period is
equal to net debt in the current period times 1 plus the interest rate, plus the trade deficit in
the next period.
Assume that the trade deficit is linear in E and z, so that D(E, z) = OE + z. Assume also,
for convenience, that U.S. and foreign interest rates are equal (r* = r) and constant. From the
interest parity condition, it follows that the expected exchange rate is constant and equal to
the current exchange rate. The value of the exchange rate is obtained in turn by solving out
the net debt accumulation forward and imposing the condition that net debt does not grow at
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a rate above the interest rate. Doing this gives
E= [F- + (1 + r) - z
The exchange rate depends negatively on the initial net debt position and on the sequence
of current and expected shifts to the trade balance.
Replacing the exchange rate in the net debt accumulation equation in turn gives
00
Fr1 - F = [z - (1 + r) - i z'i ]
0
That is, the change in the net debt position depends on the difference between the current
shift and the present value of future shifts to the trade balance.
For our purposes these two equations have one main implication. Consider an unexpected,
permanent increase in z at time t - say, an increase in the U.S. demand for Chinese goods (at
a given exchange rate) - by Az. Then, from the two equations above,
Az
E-E 1= ; F+ - F = 00 1
In words: permanent shifts lead to a depreciation large enough to maintain current account
balance. By a similar argument, shifts that are expected to be long lasting lead to a large
depreciation and only a small current account deficit. As we argue later, this is not what has
happened in the United States over the last ten years. The shift in z appears to be, if not
permanent, at least long lasting. Yet it has not been offset by a large depreciation but has
been reflected instead in a large current account deficit. This, we shall argue, is the result of
two factors, both closely linked to imperfect substitutability. The first is that, under imperfect
substitutability, the initial depreciation in response to an increase in z is more limited, and, by
implication, the current account deficit is larger and longer lasting. The second is that, under
imperfect substitutability, asset preferences matter. An increase in foreign demand for U.S.
assets, for example-an event that obviously could not be analyzed in the model with perfect
substitutability we just presented-leads to an initial appreciation and a current account deficit.
And such a shift has indeed played an important role since the mid-1990s.
3.2.2 Imperfect Substitutability and Portfolio Balance
We now introduce imperfect substitutability between assets. Let W denote the wealth of U.S.
investors, measured in units of U.S. goods. W is equal to the stock of U.S. assets, X, minus
the net debt position of the United States, F:
W=X-F
Similarly, let W* denote foreign wealth and X* denote foreign assets, both in terms of
foreign goods. Then the wealth of foreign investors, expressed in terms of U.S. goods, is given
by
W* X*
- +FE E
Let Re be the relative expected gross real rate of return on holding U.S. assets versus foreign
assets:
1+r EeRe -_ (3.1)
1l+r* E
Under perfect substitutability, the case studied above, Re was always equal to 1; this need
not be the case under imperfect substitutability 4
U.S. investors allocate their wealth W between U.S. and foreign assets. They allocate a
share a to U.S. assets and, by implication, a share (1 - a) to foreign assets. Symmetrically,
foreign investors invest a share a* of their wealth W* in foreign assets and a share (1 - a*) in
U.S. assets. Assume that these shares are functions of the relative rate of return, so that
ao = a(Re, s), e > 0, as >0 * = a*(Re, s), co* < 0 a < 0
4One may wonder whether, even if many investors have strong asset preferences, the effects of these preferences
on expected returns are not driven away by arbitrageurs, so that expected returns are equalized. The empirical
work of Gourinchas and Rey (2005), which we discuss later, strongly suggests that this does not happen, and
that financial assets denominated in different currencies are indeed imperfect substitutes.
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A higher relative rate of return on U.S. assets leads U.S. investors to increase the share they
invest in U.S. assets, and leads foreign investors to decrease the share they invest in foreign
assets.
The variable s is a shift factor, standing for all the factors that shift portfolio shares for a
given relative return. By convention, an increase in s leads both U.S. and foreign investors to
increase the share of their portfolio in U.S. assets for a given relative rate of return.
An important parameter in the model is the degree of home bias in U.S. and foreign
portfolios. We assume that there is indeed home bias, and we capture it by assuming that the
sum of portfolio shares falling on own-country assets exceeds 1:
a(Re, s) + a*(Re, s) > 1
Equilibrium in the market for U.S. assets (and, by implication, in the market for foreign
assets) implies
W*X = a(Re, s) W + (1 - a*(Re, ))
E
The supply of U.S. assets must be equal to U.S. demand plus foreign demand for those
assets. Given the definition of F introduced earlier, this condition can be rewritten as
X*
X = a(Re, s)(X - F) + (1 - a*(Re, s)) (- + F) (3.2)
where R e is given in turn by equation (3.1) and depends in particular on E and E_1 . This
gives us the first relation, which we refer to as the portfolio balance relation, between net debt,
F, and the exchange rate, E.
To see its implications most clearly, consider the limiting case where the degree of substi-
tutability is zero, so that the shares a and a* do not depend on the relative rate of return. In
this case
* The portfolio balance condition fully determines the exchange rate as a function of the
world distribution of wealth, (X - F) and [(X*/E) + F)]. In sharp contrast to the case of
perfect substitutability, news about current or future current account balances, such as a
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permanent shift in z, has no effect on the current exchange rate.
* Over time, current account deficits lead to changes in F, and thus to changes in the
exchange rate. The slope of the relation between the exchange rate and net debt is given
by
dE/E a + a* - 1
dF (1 - a*)X*/E
So, in the presence of home bias, an increase in net debt is associated with a lower exchange
rate. The reason is that, as wealth is transferred from the United States to the rest of the
world, home bias leads to a decrease in the demand for U.S. assets, which in turn requires a
decrease in the exchange rate.
Outside this limiting case, the portfolio balance determines a relation between net debt and
the exchange rate for a given expected rate of depreciation. The exchange rate is no longer
determined myopically. But the two insights from the limiting case remain: On the one hand,
the exchange rate will respond less to news about the current account than it does under perfect
substitutability. On the other, it will respond to changes either in the world distribution of
wealth or in portfolio preferences.
3.2.3 Imperfect Substitutability and Current Account Balance
Assume, as before, that U.S. and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes and that the U.S.
trade deficit, in terms of U.S. goods, is given by
D = D(E, z), DE > 0, Dz > 0
Turn now to the equation giving the dynamics of the U.S. net debt position. Given our
assumptions, U.S. net debt is given by
W* E
F+= (1 - *(R, )) -- (1 + r) - (1 - a(Re, s)) W (1 + r * )  + D(E+I, Z+1)
In words: Net debt in the next period is equal to the value of U.S. assets held by foreign
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investors next period, minus the value of foreign assets held by U.S. investors next period, plus
the trade deficit next period:
* The value of U.S. assets held by foreign investors next period is equal to their wealth in
terms of U.S. goods this period times the share they invest in U.S. assets this period times
the gross rate of return on U.S. assets in terms of U.S. goods.
* The value of foreign assets held by U.S. investors next period is equal to U.S. wealth this
period times the share they invest in foreign assets this period times the realized gross
rate of return on foreign assets in terms of U.S. goods.
The previous equation can be rewritten as
1+r* E
F+1 = (1 + r)F + (1 - a(Re, s))(1 + r)(1 - 1 +r* E )(X - F) + D(E+1 , z+1) (3.3)Sl+r E+1
We shall call this the current account balance relation5 .
The first and last terms on the right-hand side are standard: next-period net debt is equal
to this-period net debt times the gross rate of return, plus the trade deficit next period. The
term in the middle reflects valuation effects, recently stressed by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and
H61lne Rey and by Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti 6. Consider, for example, an
unexpected decrease in the price of U.S. goods - an unexpected decrease in E+1 relative to E.
This dollar depreciation increases the dollar value of U.S. holdings of foreign assets, decreasing
the U.S. net debt position.
Putting things together, a depreciation improves the U.S. net debt position in two ways:
5 This appears to give a special role to a rather than a*, but in fact this is not the case. A symmetrical
expression can be derived with a* appearing instead of a. Put another way, F, a and a* are not independent.
F+1 can be expressed in terms of any two of the three.
" Gourinchas and Rey (2005); Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). As a matter of logic, one can have both perfect
substitutability and valuation effects. (Following standard practice, we ignored valuation effects in the perfect
substitutability model presented earlier by implicitly assuming that, if net debt was positive, U.S. investors did
not hold foreign assets and net debt was therefore equal to the foreign holdings of dollar assets.) Under perfect
substitutability, however, there is no guide as to what determines the shares, and therefore what determines the
gross positions of U.S. and foreign investors.
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the first, conventional way through the improvement in the trade balance, and a second way
through asset revaluation. Note that
* The strength of the valuation effects depends on gross rather than net positions and so
on the share of the U.S. portfolio in foreign assets (1 - a) and on U.S. wealth (X - F).
It is present even if F = 0.
* The strength of the valuation effects depends on our assumption that U.S. gross liabilities
are denoted in dollars, so that their value in dollars is unaffected by a dollar depreciation.
Valuation effects would obviously be very different when, as is typically the case for
emerging market economies, gross positions are smaller and liabilities are denominated in
foreign currency.
3.2.4 Steady State and Dynamics
Assume the stocks of assets X and X* and the shift variables z and s to be constant. Assume
also r and r* to be constant and equal to each other. In this case the steady-state values of net
debt F and E are characterized by two relations.
The first is the portfolio balance relation (equation (3.2)). Given the equality of interest
rates and the constant exchange rate, R e = 1, the relation takes the form
X*
X = a(1, s)(X - F) + (1 - a*(1, s)) (- + F)E
This first relation implies a negative relation between net debt and the exchange rate: As
we showed earlier, in the presence of home bias, a larger U.S. net debt, which transfers wealth
to foreign investors, shifts demand away from U.S. assets and thus lowers the exchange rate.
The second relation is the current account balance relation (equation (3.3)). Given the
equality of interest rates, and given the constant exchange rate and net debt, the relation takes
the form
0 = rF + D(E, z)
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This second relation also implies a negative relation between net debt and the exchange
rate. The larger the net debt, the larger the trade surplus required in steady state to finance
interest payments on the debt, and thus the lower the exchange rate7 . This raises the question
of the stability of the system. The system is (locally saddle point) stable if, as drawn in figure
1, the portfolio balance locus is steeper than the current account balance locus. (Appendix A
characterizes the dynamics.) To understand this condition, consider an increase in U.S. net
debt. This increase has two effects on the current account deficit, and thus on the change in net
debt: it increases interest payments, but it also leads, through the portfolio balance relation,
to a lower exchange rate and thus a decrease in the trade deficit. For stability to prevail,
the net effect must be that the increase in net debt reduces the current account deficit. This
condition appears to be satisfied for plausible parameter values (the next section explores this
issue further), and we assume that it is satisfied here. In this case the path of adjustment-the
saddle path-is downward sloping, as drawn in figure 1.
3.2.5 The Effects of a Shift toward Foreign Goods
We can now characterize the effects of shifts in preferences for goods or assets. Figure 2 shows
the effect of an unexpected and permanent increase in z. One can think of this increase as
coming either from an increase in U.S. activity relative to foreign activity, or from a shift in
exports or imports at a given level of activity and a given exchange rate; we defer to later a
discussion of the sources of the actual shift in z over the past decade in the United States.
For any given level of net debt, current account balance requires a lower exchange rate: the
current account balance locus shifts down. The new steady state is at point C, associated with
a lower exchange rate and a larger net debt.
Valuation effects imply that any unexpected depreciation leads to an unexpected decrease
in the net debt position. If we denote by AE the unexpected change in the exchange rate at
the time of the shift, it follows from equation (3.3) that the relation between the two at the
time of the shift is given by
'If we had allowed r and r* to differ, the relation would have an additional term and take the form 0 =
rF + (1 - a)(r - r*)(X - F) + D(E, z). This additional term implies that if, for example, a country pays a lower
rate of return on its liabilities than it receives on its assets, it may be able to combine positive net debt with
positive net income payments from abroad-the situation in which the United States remains today.
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AF = (1 - a)(1 + r*)(X - F) E (3.4)E
The economy jumps initially from point A to point B and then converges over time along
the saddle path, from point B to point C. The shift in the trade deficit leads to an initial,
unexpected depreciation, followed by further depreciation and net debt accumulation over time
until the new steady state is reached.
Note that the degree of substitutability between assets does not affect the steady state;
more formally, the steady state depends on a(1, s) and Q*(1, s), and so changes in aR and c*
that leave a(1, s) and a*(1, s) unchanged do not affect the steady state. In other words, the
eventual depreciation is the same no matter how close substitutes U.S. and foreign assets are.
But the degree of substitutability plays a central role in the dynamics of adjustment and in the
relative roles of the initial unexpected depreciation and the anticipated depreciation thereafter.
This is shown in figure 3, which shows the effects of three different values of aR and a* on the
path of adjustment. (The three simulations are based on values for the parameters introduced
in the next section. The purpose here is simply to show the qualitative properties of the paths.
We return to the quantitative implications later.)
The less substitutable U.S. and foreign assets are-that is, the smaller are aR and a*-the
smaller the initial depreciation and the higher the anticipated rate of depreciation thereafter. To
understand why, consider the extreme case where the shares do not depend on rates of return:
U.S. and foreign investors want to maintain constant shares, no matter what the relative rate
of return is. In this case the portfolio balance relation (equation (3.2)) implies that there will
be no response of the exchange rate to the unexpected change in z at the time it happens: any
movement in the exchange rate would be inconsistent with equilibrium in the market for U.S.
assets. Only over time, as the deficit leads to an increase in net debt, will the exchange rate
decline.
Conversely, the more substitutable U.S. and foreign assets are, the larger will be the initial
depreciation, the lower the anticipated rate of depreciation thereafter, and the longer the time
taken to reach the new steady state. The limit of perfect substitutability-corresponding to
the model discussed at the start-is actually degenerate: the initial depreciation is such as
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to maintain current account balance, and the economy does not move from there on, never
reaching the new steady state (and so the anticipated rate of depreciation is equal to zero).
To summarize: In contrast to the case of perfect substitutability between assets we saw
earlier, an increase in U.S. demand for foreign goods leads to a limited depreciation initially, a
potentially large and long lasting current account deficit, and a steady depreciation over time.
3.2.6 The Effects of a Shift toward U.S. Assets
Figure 4 shows the effect of an unexpected and permanent increase in s, that is, an increase in
the demand for U.S. assets. Again we defer to later a discussion of the potential factors behind
such an increase.
By assumption, the increase in s leads to an increase in a(1, s) and a decrease in a*(1, s).
At a given level of net debt, portfolio balance requires an increase in the exchange rate. The
portfolio balance locus shifts up. The new steady state is at point C, associated with a lower
exchange rate and larger net debt.
The dynamics are given by the path ABC. The initial adjustment of E and F must again
satisfy the condition in equation (3.4). So the economy jumps from point A to point B and
then converges over time from point B to point C. The dollar initially appreciates, triggering an
increase in the trade deficit and a deterioration of the net debt position. Over time, net debt
continues to increase and the dollar depreciates. In the new equilibrium the exchange rate is
necessarily lower than before the shift: this reflects the need for a larger trade surplus to offset
the interest payments on the now-larger U.S. net debt. In the long run the favorable portfolio
shift leads to a depreciation.
Again the degree of substitutability between assets plays an important role in the adjust-
ment. This is shown in figure 5, which plots the path of adjustment for three different values of
aR and a*. The less substitutable are U.S. and foreign assets, the greater the initial apprecia-
tion and the higher the anticipated rate of depreciation thereafter. Although the depreciation
is eventually the same in all cases (the steady state is invariant to the values of cR and * ), the
effect of portfolio shifts is more muted but longer lasting when the degree of substitutability is
high.
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3.2.7 An Interpretation of the Past
Looking at the effects of shifts in preferences for goods and for assets under imperfect asset
substitutability suggests three main conclusions:
* Shifts in preferences toward foreign goods lead to an initial depreciation, followed by
a further anticipated depreciation. Shifts in preferences towards U.S. assets lead to an
initial appreciation, followed by an anticipated depreciation.
* The empirical evidence suggests that both types of shifts have been at work in the United
States in the recent past. The first shift, by itself, would have implied a steady depre-
ciation in line with increased trade deficits, whereas instead an initial appreciation was
observed. The second shift can explain why the initial appreciation has been followed
by a depreciation. But it attributes the increase in the trade deficit fully to the initial
appreciation, whereas the evidence is of a large adverse shift in the trade balance even
after controlling for the effects of the exchange rate. (This does not do justice to an
alternative, and more conventional, monetary policy explanation, in which high U.S. in-
terest rates relative to foreign interest rates at the end of the 1990s led to an appreciation,
followed since by a depreciation. The observed relative interest rate differentials seem too
small, however, to explain the movement in exchange rates.)
* Both shifts lead eventually to a steady depreciation, to a lower exchange rate than before
the shift. This follows from the simple condition that a larger net debt, no matter what
its origin, requires larger interest payments in steady state and thus a larger trade surplus.
The lower the degree of substitutability between U.S. and foreign assets, the higher the
expected rate of depreciation along the path of adjustment. The United States appears
to have indeed entered this depreciation phase.
3.3 How Large a Depreciation? A Look at the Numbers
The model is simple enough that one can insert some values for the parameters and draw the
implications for the future. More generally, the model provides a way of looking at the data,
and this is what we do in this section.
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3.3.1 Parameter Values
Consider first what we know about portfolio shares: In 2003 U.S. financial wealth, W, was
$34.1 trillion, or about three times U.S. GDP of $11 trillion8 . Non-U.S. world financial wealth
is harder to assess. For the euro area financial wealth was about C16 trillion in 2003, compared
with GDP of E7.5 trillion; Japanese financial wealth was about Y900 trillion in 2004, compared
with GDP of Y500 trillion9 . If one extrapolates from a ratio of financial assets to GDP of about
2 for both Japan and Europe, and GDP for the non-U.S. world of approximately $18 trillion
in 2003, a reasonable estimate for W*/E is $36 trillion-roughly the same as for the United
States.
The net U.S. debt position, F, measured at market value, was $2.7 trillion in 2003, up from
approximate balance in the early 1990s10 . By implication, U.S. assets, X, were W + F = $36.8
trillion ($34.1 trillion + $2.7 trillion), and foreign assets, X*/E, were W*/E-F = $33.3 trillion
($36.0 trillion - $2.7 trillion). Put another way, the ratio of U.S. net debt to U.S. assets, FIX,
was 7.3 percent ($2.7 trillion/$36.8 trillion); the ratio of U.S. net debt to U.S. GDP was 24.5
percent ($2.7 trillion/$11.0 trillion).
In 2003 gross U.S. holdings of foreign assets, at market value, were $7.9 trillion. Together
with the value for W, this implies that the share of U.S. wealth in U.S. assets, a, was 1 -
(7.9/34.1), or 0.77. Gross foreign holdings of U.S. assets, at market value, were $10.6 trillion.
Together with the value of W*/E, this implies that the share of foreign wealth in foreign assets,
a*, was equal to 1 - (10.6/36.0), or 0.71.
To get a sense of the implications of these values for a and a*, note from equation (3.2) that
a transfer of one dollar from U.S. wealth to foreign wealth implies a decrease in the demand for
U.S. assets of (a + a* - 1) dollars, or 48 cents11 .
To summarize:
W = $34.1 trillion
8 Financial wealth data are from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 1995-2003, table L100,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 2004.
9 The figure for Europe is from ECB Bulletin, February 2005, table 3.1, and that for Japan from Bank of
Japan, Flow of Funds (www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/sj/sj.html).
"'The source for the numbers in this and the next paragraph is Bureau of Economic Analysis, International
Transactions, Table 2, International Investment Position of the United States at Year End, 1976-2003, June 2004.
1 Note that this conclusion depends on the assumption we make in our model that marginal and average shares
are equal. This may not be the case.
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W*/E = $36.0 trillion
X = $36.8 trillion
X*/E = $33.3 trillion
F = $2.7 trillion
a = 0.77
a* = 0.71.
We would like to know not only the values of the shares, but also their dependence on
the relative rate of return-the values of the derivatives aR and ak. Little is known about
these values. Gourinchas and Rey provide indirect evidence of the relevance of imperfect sub-
stitutability by showing that a combination of the trade deficit and the net debt position helps
predict a depreciation (we return to their results later) 12 ; this would not be the case under
perfect substitutability. However, it is difficult to back out estimates of aR and a* from their
results. Thus, when needed below, we derive results under alternative assumptions about these
derivatives.
The next important parameter in our model is 0, the effect of the exchange rate on the
trade balance. The natural starting point here is the Marshall-Lerner relation:
dD dE
Exports = [7imp - rlexp - 1]E
where q]imp and 7 exp are, respectively, the elasticities of imports and exports with respect
to the real exchange rate.
Estimates of the 7r, based on estimated U.S. import and export equations range quite
widely 13 . In some cases the estimates imply that the Marshall-Lerner condition (the condi-
tion that the term in brackets be positive, so that a depreciation improves the trade balance)
is barely satisfied. Estimates used in macroeconometric models imply a value for the term in
brackets between 0.5 and 0.9. Put another way, together with the assumption that the ratio of
U.S. exports to U.S. GDP is 10 percent, they imply that a reduction of the ratio of the trade
deficit to GDP by 1 percentage point requires a depreciation somewhere between 11 and 20
percent.
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'
2 Gourinchas and Rey (2005).
'
3 See the survey by Chinn (2004)
One may believe, however, that measurement error, complex lag structures, and misspeci-
fication all bias these estimates downward. An alternative approach is to derive the elasticities
from plausible specifications of utility and the pass-through behavior of firms. Using such an
approach in a model with nontradable goods, domestic tradable goods, and foreign tradable
goods, Obstfeld and Rogoff find that a 1-percentage-point decrease in the ratio of the trade
deficit to GDP requires a decrease in the real exchange rate of somewhere between 7 and 10
percent-a smaller depreciation than implied by the macroeconometric models 14
Which value to use is obviously crucial in assessing the scope of the required exchange rate
adjustment. We choose an estimate for the term in brackets in the Marshall-Lerner equation
of 0.7-toward the high range of empirical estimates but lower than the Obstfeld-Rogoff elas-
ticities. This estimate, together with an exports-to-GDP ratio of 10 percent, implies that a
reduction of the ratio of the trade deficit to GDP of 1 percentage point requires a depreciation
of 15 percent.
3.3.2 A Simple Exercise
We have argued that a depreciation of the dollar has two effects: a conventional one through the
trade balance, and another through valuation effects. To get a sense of their relative magnitudes,
consider the effects of an unexpected depreciation in our model. More specifically, consider the
effects of an unexpected 15 percent decrease in E+1 relative to E on net debt, F+1, in equation
(3.3).
The first effect of the depreciation is to improve the trade balance. Given our earlier
discussion and assumptions, such a depreciation reduces the trade deficit by 1 percent of GDP
(which is why we chose to look at a depreciation of 15 percent).
The second effect is to increase the dollar value of U.S. holdings of foreign assets (and to
reduce the foreign currency value of foreign holdings of U.S. assets) and thus reduce the U.S.
net debt position. From equation (3.3) (with both sides divided by U.S. output, Y, to make
the interpretation of the magnitudes easier), this effect is given by
dF+1 X- F dE
Y Y E
''Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004).
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From the earlier discussion, (1 - a) is equal to 0.23, and (X - F)/Y to 3. Assume that
r* is equal to 4 percent. The effect of a 15 percent depreciation is then to reduce the ratio
of net debt to GDP by 10 percentage points (0.23 x 1.04 x 3 x 0.15). This implies that, after
the unexpected depreciation, interest payments are lower by 4 percent times 10 percent, or
0.4 percent of GDPl . Putting things together, a 15 percent depreciation improves the current
account balance by 1.4 percent of GDP, with roughly one-third of the improvement due to
valuation effectsl 6
It is tempting at this point to ask how large an unexpected depreciation would lead to a
sustainable U.S. current account deficit today?17 Take the actual current account deficit of
about 6 percent. What the "sustainable" current account deficit is depends on the ratio of net
debt to GDP that the United States is willing to sustain, and on the growth rate of GDP: if g is
the growth rate of U.S. GDP, the United States can sustain a current account deficit of gF/Y.
Assuming, for example, a GDP growth rate of 3 percent and a ratio of net debt to GDP of 25
percent (the ratio prevailing today, but one that has no particular claim to being the right one
for this computation) implies that the United States can run a current account deficit of 0.75
percent while maintaining a constant ratio of net debt to GDP. In this case the depreciation
required to shift from the actual to the sustainable current account deficit would be roughly 56
percent, or (6 percent - 0.75 percent) x(15 percent/1.4 percent).
This is a large number, and despite the uncertainty attached to the underlying values of
many of the parameters, it is a useful number to keep in mind. But one should be clear about
the limitations of the computation:
* The United States surely does not need to shift to sustainable current account balance
right away. The rest of the world is still willing to lend to it, if perhaps not at the current
rate. The longer the United States waits, however, the higher the ratio of net debt to
GDP becomes, and thus the larger the eventual required depreciation. In this sense our
15This computation assumes that all foreign assets held by U.S. investors are denominated in foreign currency.
In reality, some foreign bonds held by U.S. investors are denominated in dollars. This reduces the valuation
effects.
16Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) give a similar computation for a number of countries, although not for the
United States.
17This is also the question taken up by Obstfeld and Rogoff in this volume. Their focus, relative to ours, is on
the required adjustments in both the terms of trade and the real exchange rate, starting from a micro-founded
model with nontraded goods, exportables, and importables.
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computation gives a lower bound on the eventual depreciation.
* The computation is based on the assumption that, at the current exchange rate, the
trade deficit will remain as large as it is today. If, for example, we believed that part of
the current trade deficit reflects the combined effect of recent depreciations and J-curve
effects, the computation above would clearly overestimate the required depreciation.
The rest of this section deals with these issues. First, by returning to dynamics, we try to
get a sense of the eventual depreciation and of the rate at which it may be achieved. Second,
we look at the evidence on the origins of the shifts in z and s.
3.3.3 Returning to Dynamics
How large is the effect of a given shift in z (or in s) on the accumulation of net debt and on the
eventual exchange rate? And how long does it take to get there? The natural way to answer
these questions is to simulate our model using the values of the parameters we derived earlier.
This is indeed what the simulations presented in figures 3 and 5 did; we look now more closely
at their quantitative implications.
Both sets of simulations are based on the values of the parameters given above. Recognizing
the presence of output growth (which we did not allow for in the model), and rewriting the
equation for net debt as an equation for the ratio of net debt to output, we take the term in
front of F in the current account balance relation (equation (3.3)) to stand for the interest rate
minus the growth rate. We choose an interest rate of 4 percent and a growth rate of 3 percent,
so that their difference is 1 percent. We write the portfolio shares as
a(Re, s) = a + bRe + s, a*(Re, s) = a* - bRe - s
The simulations show the results for three values (10, 1.0, and 0.1) of the parameter b. A
value of 1 implies that an increase in the expected relative return on U.S. assets of 100 basis
points increases the desired share in U.S. assets by 1 percentage point.
Figure 3 showed the effect of an increase in z of 1 percent of U.S. GDP. Figure 5 showed
the effect of an increase in s of 5 percentage points, leading to an increase in a and a decrease
115
in a* of 5 percentage points at a given relative rate of return. Time is measured in years.
Figure 3 leads to two main conclusions. First, the effect of a permanent increase in z by
1 percent is to eventually increase the ratio of net debt to GDP by 17 percent and require
an eventual depreciation of 12.5 percent. (Recall that the long-run effects are independent of
the degree of substitutability between assets-that is, independent of the value of b.) Second,
it takes a long time to get there: the figure is truncated at fifty years, by which time the
adjustment is still not complete.
Figure 5 leads to similar conclusions. The initial effect of the increase in s is an appreciation
of the dollar: by 23 percent if b = 0.1, and by 12 percent if b = 10. The long-run effect of the
increase in s is an increase in the ratio of U.S. net debt to GDP of 35 percent and a depreciation
of 15 percent. But even after fifty years the adjustment is far from complete, and the exchange
rate is still above its initial level.
What should one conclude from these exercises? We conclude that, under the following
assumptions-that there are no anticipated changes in z or in a or a*, that investors have been
and will be rational (the simulations are carried out under rational expectations), and that
there are no surprises-the dollar will depreciate by a large amount, but at a steady and slow
rate. There are good reasons to question each of these assumptions, and this we do next.
3.3.4 A Closer Look at the Trade Deficit
To think about the likely path of z, and thus of the path of the trade deficit at a given exchange
rate, it is useful to write the trade deficit as the difference between the value of imports in terms
of domestic goods and exports:
D(E, z) - E imp(E, Z, i) - exp(E, Z*, V*)
We have decomposed z into two components: total U.S. spending, Z, and z, which represents
shifts in the relative U.S. demand for U.S. versus foreign goods, at a given level of spending
and a given exchange rate. Similarly, z* is decomposed into Z* and z*, the latter measuring
shifts in the relative foreign demand for U.S. versus foreign goods.
Most of the large current account fluctuations in developed countries of the last few decades
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have come from relative fluctuations in activity, that is, in Z relative to Z *18.It has indeed been
argued that the deterioration of the U.S. trade balance has come mostly from faster growth in
the United States than in its trade partners, leading imports by the United States to increase
faster than U.S. exports to the rest of the world. This appears, however, to have played a
limited role. Europe and Japan indeed have had slower growth than the United States (U.S.
output grew a cumulative 45 percent from 1990 to 2004, compared with 29 percent for the euro
area and 25 percent for Japan), but these countries account for only 35 percent of U.S. exports,
and meanwhile other U.S. trade partners have grown as fast as or faster than the United States.
Indeed, a study by the International Monetary Fund finds nearly identical output growth rates
for the United States and its export-weighted partners since the early 1990s1 9
Some have argued that the deterioration in the trade balance reflects instead a combination
of rapid growth both in the United States and abroad and a U.S. import elasticity with respect
to domestic spending that is higher (1.5 or above) than the elasticity of U.S. exports with
respect to foreign spending. In this view rapid U.S. growth has led to a more than proportional
increase in imports and an increasing trade deficit. The debate about the correct value of the
U.S. import elasticity is an old one, dating back to the estimates by Hendrik Houthakker and
Stephen Magee; we tend to side with the recent conclusion by Jaime Marquez that the elasticity
is close to 120. For our purposes, however, this discussion is not relevant. Whether the growth
in the U.S. trade deficit is the result of a high import elasticity or of shifts in the is, there
are no obvious reasons to expect either the shift to reverse or growth in the United States to
drastically decrease in the future.
One way of assessing the relative roles of shifts in spending, the exchange rate, and other
factors is to look at the performance of import and export equations in detailed macroecono-
metric models. The numbers obtained using the macroeconometric model of Global Insight
(formerly the Data Resources, Inc., or DRI, model) are as follows 21: The U.S. trade deficit in
goods increased from $221 billion in the first quarter of 1998 to $674 billion in the third quarter
'"For a review of current account deficits and adjustments for twenty-one countries over the last thirty years,
and references to the literature, see Debelle and Galati (2005).
"'International Monetary Fund, Article IV United States Consultation-Staff Report, 2004. As the case of
the United States indeed reminds us, output is not the same as domestic spending, but the differences in growth
rates between the two over a decade are small.
"90Houthakker and Magee (1969); Marquez (2000).
21 We thank Nigel Gault of Global Insight for communicating these results to us.
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of 2004. Of this $453 billion increase, $126 billion was due to the increase in the value of oil
imports, leaving $327 billion to be explained. When the export and import equations of the
model are used, activity variables and exchange rates explain $202 billion, or about 60 percent
of the increase. Unexplained time trends and residuals account for the remaining 40 percent, a
substantial amount 22 .
Looking to the future, whether growth rate differentials, Houthakker-Magee effects, or un-
explained shifts are behind the increase in the trade deficit is probably not essential. The slower
growth in Europe and Japan reflects in large part structural factors, and neither Europe nor
Japan is likely to make up much of the cumulative growth difference since 1995 over the next
few years. One can still ask how much a given increase in growth in Europe would reduce the
U.S. trade deficit. A simple computation is as follows. Suppose that Europe and Japan made
up the roughly 20-percentage-point growth gap they have accumulated since 1990 vis-A-vis the
United States-an unlikely scenario in the near future-so that U.S. exports to Europe and
Japan increased by 20 percent. Given that U.S. exports to these countries are currently about
$350 billion, the improvement would be 0.7 percent of U.S. GDP-not negligible, but not a
major increase either.
One other factor, however, may hold more hope for a reduction in the trade deficit, namely,
the working out of the J-curve. Nominal depreciations increase import prices, but these decrease
the volume of imports only with a lag. Thus, for a while, a depreciation can increase the value
of imports and worsen the trade balance, before improving it later.
One reason to think this may be important is the "dance of the dollar" and the movements
of the dollar and the current account during the 1980s. From the first quarter of 1979 to the first
quarter of 1985, the real exchange rate of the United States (measured by the trade-weighted
major currencies index constructed by the Federal Reserve Board) increased by 41 percent. This
appreciation was then followed by a sharp depreciation, with the dollar falling by 44 percent
from the first quarter of 1985 to the first quarter of 1988. The appreciation was accompanied
by a steady deterioration in the current account deficit, from rough balance in the early 1980s
22 The model has a set of export and import equations disaggregated by product type. Most of the elasticities of
the different components with respect to domestic or foreign spending are close to 1, indicating that Houthakker-
Magee effects play a limited role (except for imports and exports of consumption goods, where the elasticity of
imports with respect to consumption is 1.5 for the United States, but the elasticity of U.S. exports with respect
to foreign GDP is an even higher 2.0).
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to a deficit of about 2.5 percent of GDP when the dollar reached its peak in early 1985. The
current account continued to worsen, however, for more than two years, reaching a peak of 3.4
percent of GDP in 1987. The divergent paths of the exchange rate and the current account
from 1985 to 1987 led a number of economists to explore the idea of hysteresis in trade23: the
notion that, once appreciation has led to a loss of market share, an equal depreciation may
not be sufficient to reestablish trade balance. Just as the idea was taking hold, however, the
current account position rapidly improved, and trade was roughly in balance by the end of the
decade2 4
The parallels with more recent developments are clear from figure 6, which plots the dollar
exchange rate and the U.S. current account during both episodes, aligned in the figure so that
the dollar peak of 1985:1 coincides with the dollar peak of 2001:2. The figure suggests two
conclusions:
* If the earlier episode is a reliable guide, and the lags today are similar to those that
prevailed in the 1980s, the current account deficit may start to turn around soon. Today's
deficit, however, is much larger than the earlier deficit was at its peak in 1987 (6 percent
of GDP versus 3.5 percent), and the depreciation so far has been more limited (23 percent
from 2001:2 to 2004:4, compared with 33 percent over the equivalent period from 1985:1
to 1988:3)25 .
* Hence one can surely not conclude that the depreciation so far is enough to restore the
current account deficit to sustainable levels. But it may be that, in our computation,
the appropriate place to start is from a J-curve-adjusted ratio of the current account
deficit to GDP of 4 or 5 percent instead of 6 percent26 . If we choose 4 percent-a very
2
:3In particular, Baldwin and Krugman (1987).
'2 These issues were discussed at length in the Brookings Papers at the time. Besides Baldwin and Krugman
(1987), see, for example, Cooper (1986), Dornbusch (1987), and Sachs and Lawrence (1988), with post mortems
by Lawrence (1990) and Krugman (1991). Another much-discussed issue, to which we return later, was the
relative roles of fiscal deficit reduction and exchange rate adjustment in closing the deficit.
2 0On the other hand, the gross positions, and thus the scope for valuation effects from dollar depreciation, are
much larger now than they were then. In 1985 gross U.S. holdings of foreign assets were $1.5 trillion, compared
with $8 trillion today.
2•"Forecasts by "Macroeconomic Advisors" are for an improvement in the trade balance of $75 billion, or less
than 1 percent of GDP, over the next two years. (The forecast is based on a depreciation of the dollar of 4 percent
over that period.) The residuals of the import price equations of the model, however, suggest an unusually low
pass-through of the dollar decline to import prices over the recent past, and the forecast assumes that the low
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optimistic assumption-the remaining required depreciation is 34 percent, or (4 percent
- 0.75 percent) x (15 percent/1.4 percent)27 .
3.3.5 A Closer Look at Portfolio Shares
One striking aspect of the simulations presented above is how slow the depreciation is along the
adjustment path. This is in contrast with some predictions of much more abrupt falls in the
dollar in the near future2 8 . This raises two issues: Can the anticipated depreciation be greater
than in these simulations? And are there possible surprises under which the depreciation might
be much faster (or slower), and, if so, what are they? We take both questions in turn.
To answer the first question, we go back to the model. We noted earlier that the lower
the degree of substitutability between assets , the higher the anticipated rate of depreciation.
So, by assuming zero substitutability-that is, constant asset shares except for changes com-
ing from shifts in s-we can derive an upper bound on the anticipated rate of depreciation.
Differentiating equation 2 gives
dE (a + a* - 1)X F (X - F) da + (X*/E + F) da*
E (1- a*)X*/E X (1 - a*)X*/E
In the absence of anticipated shifts in shares (so that the second term equals zero), the
anticipated rate of depreciation depends on the change in the ratio of U.S. net debt to U.S.
assets: the faster the increase in net debt, the faster the decrease in the relative demand for U.S.
assets, and therefore the higher the rate of depreciation needed to maintain portfolio balance.
Using the parameters we constructed earlier, this equation implies
dE _ F
= -1.8 d ( ) + (3.5da - 3.7da*)E X
Suppose shares remain constant. If we take the annual increase in the ratio of net debt to
U.S. GDP to be 5 percent and the ratio of U.S. GDP to U.S. assets to be one-third, this gives
pass-through continues. If the pass-through were to return to its historical average, the improvement in the trade
balance would be larger.2 7This number is surprisingly close to the 33 percent obtained by Obstfeld and Rogoff in this volume.
2
"For example, by Roubini and Setser (2005).
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an anticipated annual rate of depreciation of 3 percent a year (1.8 x 0.05/3)29.
If, however, shares of U.S. assets in the portfolios of either domestic or foreign investors are
expected to decline, the anticipated depreciation can clearly be much larger. If, for example, we
anticipate that the share of U.S. assets in foreign portfolios will decline by 2 percent over the
coming year, the anticipated depreciation is 8.7 percent (2.7 percent as calculated above, plus
3.0 times 2 percent). This is obviously an upper bound on the size of the depreciation, as it
assumes that the remaining investors-those who do not anticipate selling-are willing to keep
a constant share of their wealth in U.S. assetsbecause of the assumption of zero substitutability)
in the face of high negative expected rates of return over the coming year . Still, it implies that,
under imperfect substitutability, and under the assumption that desired shares in U.S. assets
will decrease, it is logically acceptable to predict a substantial depreciation of the dollar in the
near future.
Are there good reasons to expect these desired shares to decrease in the near future? This is
the subject of a contentious debate. Some argue that the United States can continue to finance
its current account deficits at today's level for a long time to come at the same exchange rate.
They argue that the poor development of financial markets in Asia and elsewhere, together with
the need for Asian countries to accumulate international collateral, implies a steadily increasing
relative demand for U.S. assets. They point to the latent demand for U.S. assets on the part
of Chinese private investors, currently limited by capital controls. In short, they argue that
foreign investors will be willing to further increase their holdings of U.S. assets for many years
to come"3 .
Following this argument, we can ask what increase in shares-say, what increase in (1- a*),
the share of U.S. assets in foreign portfolios-would be needed to absorb the current increase
in net debt at a given exchange rate. From the relation derived above, setting dE/E and da
equal to zero gives
2ý Although comparison is difficult, this rate appears lower than that implied by the estimates of Gourinchas
and Rey (2005). Their results imply that a combination of net debt and trade deficits 2 standard deviations from
the mean-a situation that would appear to characterize well the United States today-implies an anticipated
annual rate of depreciation of about 5 percent over the following two years.
:"'See, for example, Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) and Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2004).
(a* + a- 1)X d F
X*/E + F X
For the parameters we have constructed, a change of five percentage points in F/Y requires
an increase in the share of U.S. assets in foreign portfolios of about 0.8 percentage points a year
(0.47 x 5 percent/3 )31.
We find more plausible the argument that the relative demand for U.S. assets may actually
decrease rather than increase in the future. This argument is based, in particular, on the fact
that much of the recent accumulation of U.S. assets has taken the form of accumulation of
reserves by the Japanese and the Chinese central banks. Many worry that this will not last,
that the pegging of the renminbi will come to an end, or that both central banks will want to
change the composition of their reserves away from U.S. assets, leading to further depreciation
of the dollar. Our model provides a simple way of discussing the issue and thinking about the
numbers.
Consider pegging first: the foreign central bank buys or sells dollar assets so as to keep
E = P 32 . Let B denote the reserves (U.S. assets) held by the foreign central bank, so that
X*
X = B + a(1)(X - F) + (1 - ao*(l))( E + F)
Figure 7 illustrates the resulting dynamics. Suppose that, in the absence of pegging, the
steady state is given by point A and that the foreign central bank pegs the exchange rate at
E. At that level the U.S. current account is in deficit, and so F increases over time. Wealth
gets steadily transferred to the foreign country, and so the private demand for U.S. assets
steadily decreases. To keep E unchanged, B must increase further over time. Pegging by the
3 1A related argument is that, to the extent that the rest of the world is growing faster than the United States,
an increase in the ratio of net debt to GDP in the United States is consistent with a constant share of U.S. assets
in foreign portfolios. This argument falls quantitatively short: although some Asian countries are growing fast,
their weight and their financial wealth are still far too small to absorb the U.S. current account deficit while
maintaining constant shares of U.S. assets in their portfolios.
3 2 Our two-country model has only one foreign central bank, and so we cannot discuss what happens if one
foreign bank pegs its currency and the others do not. The issue is, however, relevant in thinking about the paths
of the dollar-euro and the dollar-yen exchange rates. We discuss this further in the next section.
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foreign central bank is thus equivalent to a continuous outward shift in the portfolio balance
schedule: in effect, the foreign central bank is keeping world demand for U.S. assets unchanged
by offsetting the fall in private demand. Pegging leads to a steady increase in U.S. net debt
and a steady increase in the foreign central bank's reserves, offsetting the steady decrease in
private demand for U.S. assets (represented by the path DC in figure 7). What happens when
the foreign central bank unexpectedly stops pegging? From point C just before the peg is
abandoned, the economy jumps to point G (recall that valuation effects lead to a decrease in
net debt, and therefore a capital loss for the foreign central bank, when there is an unexpected
depreciation) and then adjusts along the saddle-point path GAi. The longer the peg lasts, the
larger the initial and the eventual depreciation.
In other words, an early end to the Chinese peg would obviously lead to a depreciation of the
dollar (an appreciation of the renminbi). But the sooner it takes place, the smaller the required
depreciation, both initially and in the long run. Put another way, the longer the Chinese wait
to abandon the peg, the larger the eventual appreciation of the renminbi.
The conclusions are very similar with respect to changes in the composition of reserves. We
can think of such changes as changes in portfolio preferences, this time not by private investors
but by central banks, and so we can apply our earlier analysis directly. A shift away from U.S.
assets will lead to an initial depreciation, leading in turn to a lower current account deficit, a
smaller increase in net debt, and thus to a smaller depreciation in the long run.
How large might these shifts be? Chinese reserves currently equal $610 billion, and Japanese
reserves are $840 billion. Assuming that these reserves are now held mostly in dollars, if the
People's Bank of China and the Bank of Japan reduced their dollar holdings to half of their
portfolio, this would represent a decrease in the share of U.S. assets in total foreign (private
and central bank) portfolios, (1 - a*), from 30 percent to 28 percent. The computations we
presented earlier suggest that this would be a substantial shift, leading to a decrease in the
dollar exchange rate possibly as large as 8.7 percent.
To summarize: Avoiding a depreciation of the dollar would require a steady and substantial
increase in shares of U.S. assets in U.S. or foreign portfolios at a given exchange rate. This
seems unlikely to hold for very long. A more likely scenario is the opposite, a decrease in shares,
due in particular to diversification of reserves by central banks. If and when this happens, the
dollar will depreciate. Note, however, that the larger the adverse shift, the larger the initial
depreciation but the smaller the accumulation of debt thereafter, and therefore the smaller the
eventual depreciation. "Bad news" on the dollar now may well be good news in the long run
(and vice versa).
3.3.6 The Path of Interest Rates
Our model takes interest rates as given, and the discussion thus far has taken them as constant33 .
Yield curves in the United States, Europe, and Japan indeed indicate little expected change
in interest rates over the near and the medium term. However, it is easy to think of scenarios
where changes in interest rates play an important role, and this leads us to discuss the role of
budget deficit reduction in the adjustment process.
First, however, we briefly show the effects of an increase in the U.S. interest rate in our model.
Figure 8 shows the effects of an unexpected permanent increase in r over r*. (In contrast to the
case of perfect substitutability, it is possible for the two interest rates to differ even in the steady
state.) The portfolio balance locus shifts upward: At a given level of net debt, U.S. assets are
more attractive, and so the exchange rate increases. The current account balance locus shifts
down: the higher interest rate implies larger payments on foreign holdings of U.S. assets and
thus requires a larger trade surplus, and in turn a lower exchange rate. The adjustment path
is given by ABC. In response to the increase in r, the economy jumps from point A to point
B and then moves over time from point B to point C. As drawn, there is an appreciation
initially, but, in general, the initial effect on the exchange rate is ambiguous. If gross liabilities
are large, for example, the effect of higher interest payments on the current account balance
may dominate the more conventional "overshooting" effects of increased attractiveness and lead
to an initial depreciation rather than an appreciation. In either case the steady-state effect is
greater net debt accumulation, and thus a larger depreciation than if r had not increased.
Thus, under the assumption that an increase in interest rates leads initially to an apprecia-
tion, an increase in U.S. interest rates beyond what is already implicit in the yield curve would
3 3Remember that, when financial assets are imperfect substitutes, the interest rate differential no longer directly
reflects expected exchange rate changes. It is thus perfectly rational for the level of long-term interest rates in
the United States and in other countries to be very similar, even as the market anticipates a depreciation of
the dollar. Therefore, if we consider that financial assets denominated in different currencies can be imperfect
substitutes, there is no "interest rate puzzle," contrary to what is sometimes claimed in the financial press.
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delay the depreciation of the dollar, at the cost of greater net debt accumulation and a larger
eventual depreciation.
Interest rate changes however do not take place in a vacuum. It is more interesting to
think about what may happen to interest rates as the dollar depreciates, either slowly along
the saddle path or more sharply, in response, for example, to adverse portfolio shifts. As the
dollar depreciates, relative demand shifts toward U.S. goods, reducing the trade deficit but also
increasing total demand for U.S. goods. Suppose also that output is initially at its natural
level (the level associated with the natural rate of unemployment), which appears to be a good
description of the United States today. Three outcomes are possible:
* Interest rates and fiscal policy remain unchanged. The increase in demand leads to an
increase in output but also an increase in imports, which partly offsets the effect of the
depreciation on the trade balance. (In terms of our model, it leads to an increase in
domestic spending, Z, and thus to a shift in z.)
* Interest rates remain unchanged, but fiscal policy is adjusted to offset the increase in
demand and leave output at its natural level; in other words the budget deficit is reduced
so as to maintain internal balance.
* Fiscal policy remains unchanged, but the Federal Reserve increases interest rates so as
to maintain output at its natural level. In this case, higher U.S. interest rates limit the
extent of the depreciation and mitigate the current account deficit reduction. In doing so,
however, they lead to larger net debt accumulation and to a larger eventual depreciation.
In short, an orderly reduction of the current account deficit-that is, one that occurs while
maintaining internal balance-requires both a decrease in the exchange rate and a reduction in
the budget deficit 34 . The two are not substitutes: the exchange rate depreciation is needed to
"Many of the discussions at Brookings in the late 1980s were about the relative roles of budget deficit reduction
and exchange rate adjustment. For example, Sachs (1988) argued that "the budget deficit is the most important
source of the trade deficit. Reducing the budget deficit would help reduce the trade deficit... [while] an attempt
to reduce the trade deficit by a depreciating exchange rate induced by easier monetary policy would produce
inflation with little benefit on the current account," a view consistent with the third scenario above. Cooper
(1986), in a discussion of the policy package best suited to eliminate the U.S. imbalances, stated, "The drop in
the dollar is an essential part of the policy package. The dollar's decline will help offset the fiscal contraction
through expansion of net exports and help maintain overall U.S. economic activity at a satisfactory level," a view
consistent with the second scenario.
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achieve current account balance, and the budget deficit reduction is needed to maintain internal
balance at the natural level of output 35 . (The frequently heard statement that deficit reduction
would reduce the need for dollar depreciation leaves us puzzled.) If the decrease in the budget
deficit is not accompanied by a depreciation, the result is likely to be lower demand and a
recession. Although the recession would reduce the current account deficit, this is hardly a
desirable outcome. If the depreciation is not accompanied by a reduction in the budget deficit,
one of two things can happen: demand will increase, and with it the risk that the economy will
overheat, or, more likely, interest rates will increase so as to maintain internal balance. This
increase would either limit or delay the depreciation of the dollar, but, as we have made clear,
this would be a mixed blessing. Such a delay implies less depreciation in the short run but more
net debt accumulation and more depreciation in the long run.
3.4 The Euro, the Yen, and the Renminbi
The depreciation of the dollar since the peak of 2002 has been very unevenly distributed: as of
April 2005 the dollar had fallen 45 percent against the euro, 25 percent against the yen, and not
at all against the renminbi. In this section we return to the questions asked in the introduction:
if substantially more depreciation is indeed to come, against which currencies will the dollar
fall? If China abandons its peg, or if Asian central banks diversify their reserves, how will the
euro and the yen be affected?
The basic answer is simple. Along the adjustment path, what matters-because of home
bias in asset preferences-is the reallocation of wealth across countries, and thus the bilateral
current account balances of the United States with its partners. Wealth transfers modify
countries' relative demands for assets, thus requiring corresponding exchange rate movements.
Other things equal, countries with larger trade surpluses with the United States will see a larger
appreciation of their currency.
Other things may not be equal, however. Depending on portfolio preferences, a transfer
of wealth from the United States to Japan, for example, may change the relative demand for
euro assets and thus the euro exchange rate. In that context one can think of central banks as
3 5Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) emphasize a similar point.
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investors with different asset preferences. For example, a central bank that holds most of its
reserves in dollars can be thought of as an investor with strong dollar preferences. Any increase
in its reserves is likely to lead to an increase in the relative demand for dollar assets and thus an
appreciation of the dollar. Any diversification of its reserves is likely to lead to a depreciation
of the dollar.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to construct and simulate a realistic multicountry
portfolio model. But we can make some progress in thinking about mechanisms and magnitudes.
The first step is to extend our model to allow for more countries.
3.4.1 Extending the Portfolio Model to Four Regions
In 2004 the U.S. trade deficit in goods (the only component of the current account for which a
decomposition of the deficit by country is available) was $665 billion. Of this, $162 billion was
with China, $77 billion with Japan, $85 billion with the euro area, and the remainder, $341
billion, with the rest of the world. We ignore the rest of the world here and think of the world as
composed of four countries or regions: the United States, Europe, Japan, and China (indexed
1 through 4, respectively). We shall therefore think of China as accounting for roughly half the
U.S. current account deficit, and Europe and Japan as accounting each for roughly one-fourth.
We extend our portfolio model as follows. We assume that the share of asset j in the
portfolio of country i is given by
aij(.) = ai j + EZ/ijk Rk
k
where R' is the expected gross real rate of return, in dollars, from holding assets of country
k (so that R' denotes a rate of return, not a relative rate of return as in our two-country model).
We assume further that bijk = bjk, so that the effect of the return on asset k on demand
for asset j is the same for all investors, independent of the country of origin. This implies that
differences in portfolio preferences across countries show up only as different constant terms,
and derivatives with respect to rates of return are the same across countries.
The following restrictions apply: From the budget constraint (the condition that the shares
sum to 1, for any set of expected rates of return), it follows that Ej aij = 1 for all i, and
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Ejjk J= 0 for all k. The home bias assumption takes the form: Zi aii > 1. The demand
functions are assumed to be homogenous of degree zero in expected gross rates of return, so
-Ek jk = 0 for all j.
Domestic interest rates, in domestic currency, are assumed to be constant and all equal to r.
Exchange rates, Ek, are defined as the price of U.S. goods in terms of foreign goods (so E1 = 1.
and an increase in E2 for example indicates an appreciation of the dollar vis a vis the euro--
equivalently, a depreciation of the euro vis a vis the dollar.) It follows that the expected gross
real rate of return, in dollars, from holding assets of country k is given by R' = (1+r)Ek/E ,l.
In steady state, R' = (1 +r), so that -Ek jk R' = 0 and we can concentrate on the aij s. The
portfolio balance conditions, absent central bank intervention, are given by:
-j = 1 a i j ( )i
where Fi denotes the net foreign debt position of country i, so Ei Fi = 0.
So far we have treated all four countries symmetrically. China, however, is special in two
respects: it enforces strict capital controls, and it pegs the renminbi to the dollar. We capture
these two features as follows:
* We formalize capital controls as the assumption that a4i = ai4 = 0 for all i =ý 4; that is,
capital controls prevent Chinese residents from investing in foreign assets but also prevent
investors outside China from acquiring Chinese assets3 6
* We assume that, to peg the renminbi-dollar exchange rate (E4 = 1), the People's Bank
of China passively acquires all dollars flowing into China: the wealth transfer from the
United States to the euro area and Japan is thus the U.S. current account minus the
fraction that is financed by the Chinese central bank: dF1 + dF 4 = -dF 2 - dF3 .
36 This ignores inflows of foreign direct investment into China, but since we are considering the financing of
the U.S. current account deficit, this assumption is inconsequential for our analysis.
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3.4.2 Some Simple Computations
Consider now an increase in U.S. net debt equal to dF1. Assume that a share y of the U.S. net
debt is held by China. Assume that a fraction x of the remaining portion is held by the euro
area and a fraction (1 - x) by Japan, so that the changes in net debt are given by
dF 2 = -x(1 - -y)dF1, dF3 = -(1 - x)(1 - y)dFi, dF4 = -ydF 1
Assume further that China imposes capital controls and pegs the renminbi, that the re-
maining three economies are all of the same size, and that the matrix of aij 's is symmetric in
the following way: aii = a and aij = c = (1 - a)/2 < a for i f j37. In other words, investors
want to put more than one-third of their portfolio into domestic assets (the conditions above
imply a > 1/3) and allocate the rest of their portfolio equally among foreign assets.
Under these assumptions, dE 4 = 0 (because of pegging) and dE 2 and dE 3 are given by:
dE 2  (a - c)(1 - y)[x(1 - a) + c(1 - x)] cY
dF1  (1 - a) 2 - C2  1 - a - c
dE 3  (a - c)(1 - 7)[xc + (1 - a)(1 - x)] cy
dF1  (1 - a) 2 - c2  1 -a - c
Consider first the effects of y, the share of U.S. net debt held by China.
* For y = 0, dE2 /dFi and dE 3 /dF1 are both negative. Not surprisingly, an increase in U.S.
net debt leads to a depreciation of the dollar vis a vis both the euro and the yen.
* As y increases, the depreciation of the dollar vis a vis the euro and the yen becomes
smaller. This, too, is not surprising. What may be more surprising however is that for
high values of y, the depreciation turns into an appreciation. For 7 = 1 for example, the
dollar appreciates vis a vis both the euro and the yen. The explanation is straightforward,
:
7 The assumption of countries of equal size allows us to specify the matrix in a simple and transparent way.
Allowing countries to differ in size, as they obviously do, would lead to a more complex, size-adjusted matrix;
but the results would be unaffected.
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and is found in portfolio preferences. The transfer of wealth from the United States to
China is a transfer of wealth from U.S. investors, who are willing to hold dollar, euro and
yen assets, to the PBC, who only holds dollars. This transfer to an investor with extreme
dollar preferences leads to a relative increase in the demand for dollars, an appreciation
of the dollar against both the euro and the yen.
Consider now the effects of x, the share of the U.S. net debt held by Europe, excluding the
net debt held by China (for simplicity, we set 7 equal to zero):
* Consider first the case where x = 0, so that the accumulation of net debt is entirely
vis-A-vis Japan. In this case, it follows that dE 3/dFi = 2 dE 2/dF 1. Both the yen and the
euro appreciate against the dollar, with the yen appreciating twice as much as the euro.
This result might again be surprising: why should a transfer of wealth from the United
States to Japan lead to a change in the relative demand for euros? The answer is that it
does not. The euro appreciates against the dollar, but depreciates against the yen. The
real effective exchange rate of the euro remains unchanged.
* If x = 1/2 (which seems to correspond roughly to the ratio of trade deficits and thus to
the relative accumulation of U.S. net debt today), then obviously the euro and the yen
appreciate in the same proportion against the dollar.
This simple framework also allows us to think about what would happen if China stopped
pegging, or diversified its reserves away from dollars, or relaxed capital controls on Chinese and
foreign investors, or any combination of these. Suppose China stopped pegging but maintained
capital controls. Because the end of the peg, together with the assumption of maintained
capital controls, implies a zero Chinese surplus, the renminbi would have to appreciate against
the dollar. From then on, reserves of the Chinese central bank would remain constant. So, as
the United States continued to accumulate net debt vis-A-vis Japan and Europe, relative net
debt vis-A-vis China would decrease. In terms of our model, 7, the proportion of U.S. net debt
held by China, would decrease38 . Building on our results, this would lead to a decrease in the
3 8 Marginal -y, the proportion of the increase in U.S. net debt absorbed by China, would equal zero.
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role of an investor with extreme dollar preferences, the People's Bank of China, and would lead
to an appreciation of the euro and the yen.
Suppose instead that China diversified its reserves away from dollars. Then, again, the
demand for euros and for yen would increase, leading to an appreciation of both currencies
against the dollar.
To summarize: The trade deficits of the United States with Japan and the euro area imply
an appreciation of both the yen and the euro against the dollar. For the time being, this effect
is partly offset by the Chinese policies of pegging and keeping most of its reserves in dollars. If
China were to give up its peg or to diversify its reserves, the euro and the yen would appreciate
further against the dollar. This last argument is at odds with the often-heard statement that
the Chinese peg has "increased the pressure on the euro," and that therefore the abandonment
of the peg would remove some of the pressure, leading to a depreciation of the euro. We do not
understand the logic behind that statement.
3.4.3 Two Simulations and a Look at Portfolios
We have looked so far at equilibrium for a given distribution of Fs. This distribution is en-
dogenous, however, in our model, determined by trade deficits and portfolio preferences. We
now report the results of two simulations of our extended model.
In the first simulation we keep the symmetric portfolio assumptions introduced above. We
take the three economies to be of the same size, and we use the values for the portfolio parame-
ters introduced above of 0.70 for a and 0.15 for c. We consider a shift in the U.S. trade deficit,
with half of the change in the deficit falling on China, one-fourth on Japan, and one-fourth on
the euro area. We assume that each country trades only with the United States, so that we can
focus on the bilateral balances with the United States.
We perform this simulation under two alternative assumptions about Chinese policy. In both
we assume capital controls, but in the first case we assume that China continues to peg the
renminbi, and in the second we assume that the renminbi floats; together with the assumption
of capital controls, this implies, as indicated above, a zero Chinese trade surplus.
The top panel of figure 9 presents the results. Because of symmetry, the responses of the
euro and the yen are identical and thus represented by the same line. The lower line shows the
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depreciation of the dollar against the euro and the yen when the renminbi floats. The higher
locus shows the more limited depreciation of the dollar (and more limited appreciation of the
euro and the yen) when the renminbi is pegged and the Chinese central bank accumulates
dollars.
One may wonder whether the preferences of private investors are really symmetric however.
Constructing portfolio shares for Japanese, European, and U.S. investors requires rather heroic
assumptions. We have nevertheless given it a try, and the results are reported in table 1.
Appendix B presents details of the construction.
Note in table 1 the much larger share of dollar assets in European than in Japanese portfolios.
Note also the small share of Japanese assets held by euro-area investors relative to the share of
euro-area assets held by Japanese investors (the difference is much larger than the difference in
relative size of the two economies). Portfolio preferences appear indeed to be asymmetric.
To see what difference this asymmetry makes, the bottom panel of figure 9 presents results
of a second simulation. This simulation is identical to that in the top panel but now takes into
account the relative size of the three economies (the Xs) and uses the shares reported in table
1.
The main conclusion we draw from the bottom panel is that it looks very similar to the
top, except that the dollar depreciates initially a bit more against the yen than against the
euro. This difference is due to the larger share of dollar assets in European than in Japanese
portfolios: a dollar transferred from the United States to Europe leads to a smaller decrease in
the demand for U.S. assets than does a dollar transferred from the United States to Japan.
3.5 Summary and Conclusions
We have argued that there have been two main forces behind the large U.S. current account
deficits of the past ten years: an increase in the U.S. demand for foreign goods, and an increase
in the foreign demand for U.S. assets. The path of the dollar since the late 1990s can be
explained as the reaction to these forces.
The shift in portfolio preferences toward U.S. assets manifested itself first, in the late 1990s,
in the form of high private demand for U.S. equities, and more recently in the form of high
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central bank demand for U.S. bonds. The shift in demand away from U.S. goods is often
attributed to more rapid growth in the United States than in its trading partners. This appears,
however, to have played only a limited role: the performance of import and export equations in
macroeconometric models shows that activity variables and exchange rates explain only about
60 percent of the increase in the U.S. trade deficit, with unexplained time trends and residuals
accounting for the rest. We interpret this as evidence of a shift in the U.S. trade balance
relation.
Either shift could have induced the observed paths of the dollar and the U.S. current account
only in a world where financial assets are imperfect substitutes. A shift in asset preferences
could not account for these paths, because it would be meaningless in a world where assets are
perfect substitutes. Nor can the shift in preferences for goods explain these paths, because with
perfect substitutability such a shift-provided it were perceived as long lasting-would have
induced a quicker and sharper depreciation of the exchange rate and a smaller increase in the
current account than we have observed.
As a way of organizing our thoughts about the U.S. current account deficit and the dollar,
we have studied a simple model characterized by imperfect substitutability both among goods
and among assets. The model allows for valuation effects, whose relevance has recently been
emphasized in a number of papers. The explicit integration of valuation effects in a model of
imperfect substitutability is, we believe, novel.
We find that the degree of substitutability between assets does not affect the steady state.
In other words, the eventual dollar depreciation induced by either shift is the same no matter
how closely U.S. and foreign assets substitute for each other. But the degree of substitutability
does play a central role in the dynamics of adjustment.
In contrast to the case of perfect substitutability between assets, an increase in U.S. demand
for foreign goods leads to a limited depreciation initially, a potentially large and long-lasting
current account deficit, and a slow and steady depreciation over time. An increase in foreign
demand for U.S. assets leads to an initial appreciation, followed by a slow and steady depreci-
ation.
The slow rate of dollar depreciation implied by imperfect substitutability contrasts with
predictions by others of much more abrupt falls in the dollar in the near future. We show that,
in the absence of anticipated portfolio shifts, the anticipated rate of depreciation depends on
the change in the ratio of U.S. net debt to U.S. assets: the faster the increase in net debt, the
faster the decrease in the relative demand for U.S. assets, and therefore the higher the rate of
depreciation needed to maintain portfolio balance. If we take the annual increase in the ratio
of net debt to U.S. GDP to be 5 percent, we derive an upper bound on the anticipated annual
rate of depreciation of 2.7 percent a year.
If, however, shares in U.S. assets in the portfolios of either U.S. or foreign investors are
expected to decline, the anticipated depreciation can be much larger. If, for example, we
anticipate that central banks will diversify their reserves away from dollars and, as a result,
that the share of U.S. assets in foreign portfolios declines by 2 percent over the coming year,
then the anticipated depreciation may be as large as 8.7 percent. This is obviously an upper
bound, derived by assuming that private investors are willing to keep a constant share of their
wealth in U.S. assets despite a high expected negative rate of return. Still, it implies that,
under imperfect substitutability, and under the assumption that desired shares in U.S. assets
will decrease, it is logically acceptable to predict a substantial depreciation of the dollar in the
near future.
On the other hand, a further shift in investors' preferences toward dollar assets would slow
down, or even reverse, the path of dollar depreciation. The relief, however, would only be tem-
porary. It would lead to an initial appreciation, but the accompanying loss of competitiveness
would speed up the accumulation of foreign debt. The long-run value of the dollar would be
even lower. The argument that the United States, thanks to the attractiveness of its assets,
can keep running large current account deficits with no effect on the dollar appears to overlook
the long-run consequences of a large accumulation of external liabilities.
For basically the same reason, an increase in interest rates would be self-defeating. It might
temporarily strengthen the dollar, but the depreciation eventually needed to restore equilibrium
in the current account would be even larger-because (as in the case of a shift in portfolio
preferences) the accumulation of foreign liabilities would accelerate, and eventually the United
States would need to finance a larger flow of interest payments abroad. A better mix would be
a decrease in interest rates and a reduction in budget deficits to avoid overheating. (To state
the obvious: tighter fiscal policy is needed to reduce the current account deficit, but it is not a
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substitute for the dollar depreciation. Both are needed.)
The same will happen so long as China keeps pegging the exchange rate. One should think
of the People's Bank of China as a special investor whose presence has the effect of raising
the portfolio share of the world outside the United States invested in dollar assets. The longer
the Chinese central bank intervenes, the larger this share. Sooner or later, however-as in the
case of Korea in the late 1980s-the People's Bank of China will find it increasingly difficult to
sterilize the accumulation of reserves. Eventually, when the peg is abandoned, the depreciation
of the dollar will be larger, the longer the peg will have lasted, because in the process the United
States will have accumulated larger quantities of foreign liabilities. Thus, if China is worried
about a loss of competitiveness, pegging may be a myopic choice.
What would abandonment of the Chinese peg imply for the euro and the yen? Contrary to a
commonly heard argument, if the renminbi were allowed to float, both currencies would be likely
to appreciate further against the dollar. The reason is that, when the People's Bank of China
stops intervening, the market effectively loses an investor with extreme dollar preferences, to
be replaced by private investors with less extreme preferences. A similar argument holds if the
People's Bank of China diversifies its reserves away from dollar assets. For Europe and Japan,
however, what matter are effective exchange rates, and their currencies may well depreciate in
effective terms even if they appreciate relative to the dollar in bilateral terms.
We end with one more general remark. A large fall in the dollar would not by itself be
a catastrophe for the United States. It would lead to higher demand for U.S. goods and
higher output, and it would offer the opportunity to reduce budget deficits without triggering
a recession. The danger is more serious for Japan and Europe, which suffers from low growth
already, and has little room for use of expansionary fiscal or monetary policy at this stage.
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Figure 4. Adjustment of Exchange Rate and Net Debt to an Increase in s
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Appendix A: Dynamics of the Model
The dynamics of the system composed of equations (3.2) and (3.3) are more easily char-
acterized by taking the continuous time limit. In continuous time the portfolio and current
account balance equations become, respectively,
X = a(1 + r - r* + -, s) (X - F) + (1 - a*(1 + r - r* + ), s) (- + F)
E E E
Ee E
F= rF + (1 - a(1 + r + r* + J), s) - (X -F) +D(E,z)
E E
Note the presence of both expected and actual depreciation in the current account balance
equation. Expected appreciation determines the share of the U.S. portfolio invested in foreign
assets; actual appreciation determines the change in the value of that portfolio, and in turn the
change in the U.S. net debt position.
We limit ourselves to a characterization of the equilibrium and local dynamics, using a
phase diagram. (The global dynamics are more complex. The nonlinearities imbedded in
the equations imply that the economy is likely to have two equilibria, only one of which is
potentially saddle-point stable. This is the equilibrium we focus on.) We do so here under the
additional assumption that r = r*. The extension to differences in interest rates, which we used
to construct figure 8, is straightforward.
The locus (k = _e = 0) is obtained from the portfolio balance equation, and is downward
sloping. In the presence of home bias, an increase in net debt shifts wealth abroad, decreasing
the demand for U.S. assets, and requiring a depreciation.
The locus (F = 0) is obtained by assuming (Fe = t) in the current account balance relation
and replacing (Fe) by its implied value from the portfolio balance equation. This locus is also
downward sloping: a depreciation leads to a smaller trade deficit and thus allows for a larger
net debt position consistent with current account balance.
Note that the locus (F = 0) is not the same as the current account balance locus in figure 1;
that locus is derived under the assumption that both F and t are zero. Using that locus makes
for a simple graphical characterization of the equilibrium but is not appropriate for studying
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stability or dynamics.
The derivatives aR and a* do not affect the slope of the locus E = 0 but do affect that of the
locus F = 0. The smaller these derivatives are (that is, the lower the degree of substitutability
between assets), the closer the locus (F = 0) is to the locus (t = 0). In the limit, if the
degree of substitutability between U.S. and foreign assets is zero, the two loci coincide. The
larger these derivatives are (that is, the higher the degree of substitutability between assets),
the closer the (F = 0) locus is to the current account balance locus: 0 = rF + D(E).
The condition for the equilibrium to be saddle-point stable is that the locus (t = 0) be
steeper than the locus (F = 0); this turns out to be the same as the condition given in the text,
that the portfolio balance locus be steeper than the current account balance locus. For this to
hold, the following condition must be satisfied:
r a+a* -
EDE (1 - a*)X*/E
The interpretation of this condition was given in the text. It is more likely to be satisfied,
the lower the interest rate, the larger the home bias, and the larger the response of the trade
balance to the exchange rate. If the condition is satisfied, the dynamics are as shown in figure
A-1. The saddle path is downward sloping, implying that the adjustment to the steady state
from below is associated with an expected depreciation, and the adjustment from above with an
expected appreciation. Valuation effects imply that unexpected shifts in z or s are associated
with initial changes in F, according to
AF = (1 - a)(l + r*)(X - F)
E
The effect of the degree of substitutability on the dynamics is as follows. The smaller are
aR and ca*, the closer the locus (F = 0) is to the locus (E = 0), and so the closer the saddle
point path is to the locus (E = 0). In the limit, if the degree of substitutability between U.S.
and foreign assets is zero, the two loci and the saddle point path coincide, and the economy
remains on and adjusts along the (E = 0) locus, the portfolio balance relation.
The larger aR and ac, the closer the (F = 0) locus is to the locus given by 0 = rF + D(E),
and the closer the saddle point path is to that locus as well. Also, the larger aR and a*, the
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slower the adjustment of F and E over time. The slow adjustment of F comes from the fact
that the current account is close to balance. The slow adjustment of E comes from the fact
that, the larger the elasticities, the smaller is E for a given distance from the E = 0 locus.
The limiting case of perfect substitutability is degenerate. The rate of adjustment to an
unexpected, permanent shifts in z goes to zero. The economy is always on the locus 0 =
rF + D(E). For any level of net debt, the exchange rate adjusts so net debt remains constant,
and, in the absence of shocks, the economy stays at that point. There is no unique steady state,
and where the economy is depends on history.
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Appendix B: Construction of Portfolio Shares
Data on the country allocation of gross portfolio investment are from the International
Monetary Fund's Coordinated Portfolio Survey for 2002. Data for the country allocation of
direct investment are from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and
likewise refer to 2002. Financial wealth for the United States, the euro area, and Japan, which
we need to compute the home bias of portfolios, are from the Flow of Funds data of the Federal
Reserve Board3 9 .
From these data we construct aij in two steps. First, we compute the geographical alloca-
tion of net foreign investment positions by weighting the shares of portfolio assets and foreign
direct investment allocated to country j by the relative importance of portfolio (pf) and direct
investment (fdi) in country i's total investment abroad. We then scale these shares by the
share of total foreign investment (1 - aii), so that
aij = [(pfi/(pfi + fdii)) aij,p + (fdii/(pfi i fdii))aij,fdi] * (1 - aii)
Table B-1 presents the results.
To perform the simulation described in the text, we then allocate the shares invested in the
"rest of the world" to foreign holdings so as to keep the relative shares in the remaining foreign
assets the same. For the United States, for example, we increase the foreign shares in euro and
yen assets to approximately 0.15 and 0.08, respectively. This gives us the numbers reported in
table 1.
The simulation presented in figure 9 uses these values, together with asset levels of $36.8
trillion for the United States, $23.0 trillion for the euro area, and $8.0 trillion for Japan. Trade is
assumed to be bilateral between the United States and each of the other regions, with elasticities
of the trade balance all being equal to the elasticity used in our earlier two-country model.
:;"For the United States, see footnote 8. The source for Japan is the Bank of Japan flow of funds data
(www.boj.or.jp/en/stat/sj/stat_f.htm), and that for the euro area is the ECB Economic Bulletin (released
February, 2005 and available at www.ecb.int/pub/html/index.en.html).
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